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**SECRET**

**UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS  
AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
GREECE AND TURKEY**

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**HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES SECURITY  
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION**

**PART 7**

**JUNE 9 AND 11, 1970**



UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD, Part 7—Greece and Turkey

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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Note.—Sections of this hearing have been deleted at the request of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Deleted material is indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."

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UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND  
COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
GREECE AND TURKEY

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY  
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol building, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Pell, and Javits.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pineus of the committee staff.

Frank Cash, country director for Turkey, Department of State; Alfred G. Vigderman, country director, Greece, Department of State; Robert L. Pugh, Department of State, Turkish desk officer; Stephen M. Boyd, Department of State, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser, Near East and South Asian Affairs; Charles N. Brower, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State; Lt. Col. Melvin G. Goodweather, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; Peter Knaur, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Sophocles H. Hero, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense; H. G. Torbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State; Capt. Edward Krebs (U.S. Navy) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Turkish desk; Charles W. Quinn, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Greek desk; and Joseph J. Wolf, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. The subcommittee will come to order. It is the custom for witnesses who testify before the subcommittee to take the oath.

Will you rise, please. Raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIES. I do.

Mr. PRANGER. I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Will you identify yourself, starting on the left, for the reporter.

Mr. HERO. Sophocles H. Hero, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense.

Colonel GOODWEATHER. Lt. Col. Melvin G. Goodweather, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. BROWER. Charles N. Brower, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. BOYD. Stephen M. Boyd, Department of State, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser, Near East and South Asian Affairs.

Mr. PUGH. Robert L. Pugh, Department of State, Turkish desk officer.

Mr. WOLF. Joseph J. Wolf, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. KNAUR. Peter Knaur, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, there will be two Defense backup witnesses arriving. They will be a little late, if it is all right with you.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Alfred G. Vigderman, Country Director, Greece, Department of State.

Mr. CASH. Frank Cash, Country Director for Turkey, Department of State.

Mr. TORBERT. H. G. Torbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. You have a prepared statement, do you not?

Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Today we will discuss American military forces, facilities, and programs in Greece and Turkey. We will hear the testimony of Mr. Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the same region.

Mr. Davies, will you proceed with your statement?

**TESTIMONY OF HON. RODGER DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J. PRANGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, both Mr. Pranger and I are pleased to be able to appear before this subcommittee to discuss some of the political-military aspects of U.S. interests in Greece and Turkey, including some of the factors which have led to our current NATO relationship with Greece and Turkey which is the basis of our commitment to these NATO partners. Representatives of your subcommittee have had the benefit of briefings on U.S. activities, installations and U.S. forces in both Greece and Turkey. Your subcommittee has also heard Generals Burchinal and Polk. In addition, you will hear from Mr. Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State and General Goodpaster, commander in chief, U.S. European Command.

**STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF GREECE AND TURKEY**

United States commitments to Greece and Turkey are based on the strategic importance of these nations, both to the United States and to the NATO alliance. The geographic position of Greece and Turkey make them important obstacles to Soviet attempts to expand into the

eastern Mediterranean area. Immediately following World War II the Soviets embarked upon a concerted policy of extending their influence and control into this area. Though Soviet techniques have varied since that time, domination of the eastern Mediterranean clearly remains a primary goal of Soviet policy. So long as this is true, the United States and NATO will continue to share strategic interests with Greece and Turkey.

It was in recognition of these interests that the United States first acted, under the Truman Doctrine of 1947, to provide economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey to enable them to resist Soviet expansion. The entry of Turkey and Greece into the NATO alliance in 1952 derived from the basic importance of these two countries to the West as a whole. The participation of Greece and Turkey in NATO contributed substantially to the strength of the alliance and remains of great importance, given the increasingly complicated situation in the eastern Mediterranean area.

NATURE OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO GREECE AND TURKEY

The heart of our commitment to both Greece and Turkey stems from article 5 of the NATO Treaty which provides that an armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. The United States is, therefore, committed to go to the aid of both Greece and Turkey in the event of external attack by taking such action as we deem necessary, and in accordance with our constitutional processes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which one of the two countries would we defend if they started to fight each other?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the NATO alliance is a defensive alliance and an attack within the alliance by one member upon another is not covered by article 5, and I hope would never take place.

Senator SYMINGTON. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs, I discussed this with Mr. Vance and, as you know, at times it got pretty close.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, and the matter affected our relations with the Turkish Government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Under the SEATO Treaty, no country has to act unless at the time of the crunch it is considered in its interest to act, and that has become a practical matter as a result of so few of the SEATO signatories helping us with respect to whatever it is, we are trying to do in the Far East. Does the NATO Treaty require us to come to assistance if a member is attacked, or do we have the right to make the decision at the time?

Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding, sir, that we are obliged to take action, but the nature of the action would be decided in accordance with our constitutional processes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Presumably that would mean coming to the Congress.

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, that any administration would want to have congressional support. However, the President must exercise his constitutional obligations.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. That is not the thrust of my question. The thrust of my question is, is there a similarity in this regard between the NATO Treaty and the SEATO Treaty?

1772

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. May I just check?

Senator SYMINGTON. Why don't you supply it for the record. Never mind, Mr. Holt gives me article 5 of the NATO Treaty:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

I am still not entirely clear as to whether that requires us to respond or whether we have an individual unilateral right not to.

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, the key words are "such action as it deems necessary." Article 11 of the NATO Treaty provides—

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

(The following additional information was later supplied by the Department of State.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, D.C., June 24, 1970.

Hon. STUART SYMINGTON.

Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,  
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: When Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger Davies appeared before your Subcommittee on June 9, the Subcommittee requested that the Department of State provide for the record information with respect to the differences between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, as well as a statement regarding the question of whether the United States is obliged automatically to come to the aid of a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty with military assistance in the event of external attack upon such signatory.

The information you requested is as follows:

Both treaties were submitted to the Senate which gave its advice and consent to their ratification.

None of the commitments contained in those treaties requires an automatic response from the United States. In the event of an armed attack within the scope of the commitments, the United States is obligated to decide upon and take appropriate action to meet the common danger. Such action shall be taken in accordance with U.S. constitutional processes.

Should a situation arise calling into play these commitments, the Executive would seek to assure that the Congress at that time fulfills its proper role under the Constitution in the decision-making process. The Executive would keep the appropriate committees and congressional leadership fully informed and would cooperate to the maximum in Congress' fulfillment of its responsibilities.

*The North Atlantic Treaty*

The North Atlantic Treaty is central to the U.S. collective defense system. Article V of that treaty provides: (1) that an armed attack against one or more of the parties shall be considered an attack against them all; (2) consequently each party will assist the party or parties so attacked; (3) each party will take forthwith individual or collective action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area. Article XI of the treaty further provides that implementation shall be in accordance with the parties' respective constitutional processes.

There is nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty which could require an automatic declaration of war on the part of the United States. In the event of an

armed attack against one of the parties, there is an obligation to assist, but the Treaty does not prescribe in advance the extent, manner, and timing. The obligation has been described by Secretary of State Acheson, testifying at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was before the Senate, as follows:

"\* \* \* [W]hen the attack occurs, which is an attack upon all of them by definition, each party considers what the objective under the treaty is.

"That objective is to restore, if it has been violated, and to maintain after it has been restored, the security of the North Atlantic area, and if it pledges itself to take any sort of action, including armed force, if that is necessary in its judgment—to take whatever action its judgment says is necessary to bring about that result.

"That might be a declaration of war and use of all the resources of the country. It might be something much less, depending on what happens as the result of the attack. If the attack is something which has not been deliberately planned but has flared up in some way, it might be dealt with by means not involving the use of armed force. It might be dealt with by reason, and that sort of thing.

"If, however, it were a deliberate plan, a highly mobilized attack on the whole area then I assume that the only thing that could possibly have any effect in restoring and maintaining the security would be every possible physical effort on the part of the country. So you are not automatically at war. You take whatever action you think is necessary in the circumstances."

*Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty*

The collective defense arrangements in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty incorporate the so-called "Monroe Doctrine Formula". In 1823 President Monroe warned the members of the Holy Alliance that "we should consider any attempt on any portion of the hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." In this treaty, the recitation that an armed attack against one of the parties would be dangerous to the "peace and safety" of the others is followed by a declaration that each party "will act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

With regard to the action required to implement this and similar treaties, Secretary of State Rusk has stated:

"These treaties represent legally binding commitments to take appropriate action at the request of an ally that is the victim of aggression. These commitments do not bind us to any particular course of action. Most of them state that in the event of aggression we would act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. How we act in fulfillment of these obligations will depend upon the facts of the situation. Some situations will require less participation on our part than others. What is fundamental to the fulfillment of our obligations under these agreements is that we act in good faith to fulfill their purpose. Thus, while the agreements permit great flexibility in choosing the means by which we would assist other countries in their defense, we could not expect what we would be regarded as fulfilling our obligation through the provision of minimum assistance when the survival of the country clearly necessitated greater aid."

*Conclusion*

In reality, the distinction between the obligation of the United States under the North Atlantic Treaty and the obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is more a textual than a practical matter. The Department of State has stated on several occasions that the difference is "not appreciable." The response of the United States in a situation of armed attack against any State which is a party to any of its collective defense treaties would in the final analysis depend on the nature of the attack, the defensive capacity of the State or States attacked, and other relevant circumstances. While the language of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the use of armed force is somewhat more specific and direct than that of the other treaties, the response of the United States in every case, regardless of the particular treaty creating the commitment, would depend upon the requirements arising from the situation.

I trust that you will find this submission responsive to the Subcommittee's request.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,  
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

1774

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that commitment of the United States in event of attack by one NATO country on another but the point I want to make is, are we obligated in the opinion of the State Department, to come to the defense of a country [deleted] if it is attacked by the Soviet Union or can we make the decision at the time it becomes imminent. Second, what has been done, if anything, with respect to any plan if Turkey and Greece became exacerbated over any particular problem, as example, the most obvious one is Cyprus, to the point where one attacked the other?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I will provide a detailed statement for the record.  
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Will you proceed?  
(The information referred to follows:)

On the first point, the response is covered by the report of June 6, 1949 of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty which includes the following: "The Committee emphasizes that this clearly does not commit any of the parties to declare war. . . . Action short of the use of armed forces might suffice, or total war with all our resources might be necessary. Obviously, Article 5 carries with it an important and far-reaching commitment for the United States; what we may do to carry out that commitment, however, will depend upon our independent decision in each particular instance reached in accordance with our constitutional process."

On the second point, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty the United States would plan to consult with its NATO Allies.

Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt to ask just one question? You said the possibility of an attack by one NATO member on another was not covered by article 5. I believe Secretary Acheson testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point on April 27, 1949. I am also informed that the Tripartite Declaration of October 3, 1954—section V of the final act of the London Conference—may bear on this point. I wonder if your lawyers could review this matter and give us your position on it?

Mr. DAVIES. We will research, Mr. Paul, and provide it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

The Department of State has reviewed the matter with specific reference to the legislative history referred to by Counsel and is of the opinion that Article 5 of the Treaty does not cover an attack by one NATO member on another.

Mr. PRANGER. There is an exchange of letters between President Johnson and Premier Inonu at the time of the crisis of 1964 which is published in the Middle East Journal where this question is taken up and the President at that time was loath to intervene in the dispute on the ground that this was an unthinkable thing to happen between NATO allies and furthermore, he did indicate that we would have to consult with our allies before any moves against the Soviet Union if they intervened. But this is in the Middle East Journal and maybe we could supply this correspondence for the record, too.

(The information referred to appears on page 1848.)

#### GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS ON CYPRUS

Senator SYMINGTON. What understanding exists governing U.S. supplied MAP equipment used by Greece and Turkey?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, this is supplied in accordance with the commitments of the two powers to NATO. It is equipment provided for the common defense within the Alliance.

1775

Senator SYMINGTON. Have there been any waivers permitting either Greece or Turkey to transfer war equipment to Cyprus?

Mr. DAVIES. Only in connection with the two contingents that are maintained by the two powers on Cyprus under the Zurich Agreement, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What does that mean?

Mr. DAVIES. Each of the guaranteeing powers has a small contingent of forces on the island. There is a Greek force and a Turkish force.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we supply both?

Mr. DAVIES. They are detached from their national armies so, obviously would have the equipment provided their forces under our NATO program.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they part of NATO or are they Greek and Turkish forces?

Mr. DAVIES. They are Greek and Turkish forces in support of NATO, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do they report to a NATO commander?

Mr. DAVIES. No, not on the island. They would report to several governments.

Senator SYMINGTON. How could they be NATO if they are Turkish?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, the NATO forces, sir, as I understand it, are assisted by the United States and other NATO powers as forces in support of NATO, and you cannot distinguish between elements within those forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many people does Turkey have on the island?

Mr. DAVIES. About 650, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And how many have the Greeks?

Mr. DAVIES. The Greeks have about 950, as far as we know, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do we let the Greeks have more than the Turks?

Mr. DAVIES. The London-Zurich Agreement, to which we are not party, established the force strengths of these countries, taking into account the fact that the Greek Cypriot population is about four times that of the Turkish Cypriots.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are the force levels decided on the basis of population on the island?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, when the powers negotiated the Zurich Agreement the population balance was important because each thought that its forces would be elementary security for their particular segment of the population.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do we supply more to Greece because they have about 950 than we do to Turkey because they have about 650? How do we work that out so far as military supplies are concerned?

#### U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON CYPRUS

Mr. PRANGER. The military supplies for the Greek and Turkish forces, I believe, come just through the ordinary supply channels for Greek and Turkish MAP. At that point the distribution is made to these forces, presumably by the Greek and Turkish forces and not by us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, are you saying the decision as to how much we supply Greece in the way of military equipment on Cyprus is decided by the Greeks and what we supply the Turks is decided by the Turks?

Mr. PRANGER. No, the volume of U.S. supplied military equipment which the two countries might take to Cyprus was established by agreement with Greece and Turkey in 1960 and the disposition of MAP furnished equipment given these countries is currently being monitored by means of equipment utilization reports which are filed periodically by the Military Assistance Group.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do we know what equipment they have taken out of Greece to put into Cyprus?

Mr. PRANGER. I do not have a record of it, sir, but I could look into the matter and supply it for the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you find out for both countries?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes sir. We can get a T.O. & E. for you.

(As of the date of publication, the State Department had been unable to gain Greek Government approval for declassification of the document referred to.)

(The information referred to concerning Turkey follows:)

No. 1727.

ANKARA, May 16, 1960.

His Excellency FATIN RUSTU ZORLU,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to draw the attention of the Government of Turkey to the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Aid to Turkey of July 1947, and with regard to the desire of the Turkish Government to use certain Military Assistance Program material for its planned military force in Cyprus to request that Turkey ask formal consent of the United States Government for such use for a purpose other than these for which the material was furnished.

It must be clearly understood that United States consent for the use of this equipment in Cyprus, which will be granted immediately upon receipt of Turkey's request, should not provide a basis for requests for additional Military Assistance Program material. The equipment sent to Cyprus, which was provided by the U.S. as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program cannot be dropped from accountability and will be considered as assets available to requirements for the Military Assistance Program for Turkey. The material to be deployed initially to Cyprus has been agreed upon by the Turkish General Staff and JUSTMAT and is listed in the attached schedule and any Military Assistance Program material Turkey may subsequently wish to deploy to Cyprus will have to be the subject of a separate request.

I have the honor to propose that, if this Note is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, this Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply, asking for formal United States consent and agreeing to the list submitted, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

FLETCHER WARREN.

Attachment.

Nomenclature:	Ordnance equipment	Quantity
Gas Mask		600
Binocular M3		101
Compass M2		101
Machine Gun cal. 30 (7.62 mm) A4		42
Thompson Submachine Gun		188
Rifle, M1 (7.63 mm) U.S.		334
Tripod Mount, Machine Gun		40
Mortar, 60 mm		4

*Ordnance equipment—Continued*

Nomenclature—Continued	Quantity
Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm	2
Recoilless Rifle, 57 mm	4
Tool Set (Armorer's set)	3
Tool Set (General Mechanic's set)	10
Minor Repair Set	1
Repair Set, metal parts	1
Set No 1, Second Echelon	2
Set No 2, Second Echelon	1
Set No 2, Supplement, Second Echelon	1
Set No 7 (hoist), Second Echelon	1
Set No 8, (Fire Removing) Second Echelon	1
Welding Set, portable	1
Cabinet, Spare Parts, type 1 Model 1940	6
Iron Chains, $\frac{3}{8}$ " x 16'	9
Iron Chains, $\frac{7}{16}$ " x 16'	3
Special Set B, Jeep	1
Special Set A, Jeep	2
Special Set B, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck	1
Special Set A, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck	2
Special Set B, Reo truck	1
Special Set A, Reo truck	2
Special Set, Third Echelon, Jeep	1
Special Set, Third Echelon, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck	1
Special Set (Reo), $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	1
Leather-Canvas Repair Set, Third Echelon	1
Basic Set, automatic vehicle, Third Echelon	1
Electric-Fuel System Repair Set, automotive vehicle, Third Echelon	1
Repair Set, Optical Instruments	1
Repair Set, M1 (7.62) Rifle	1
Repair Set, K1 (7.62) Rifle	1
Repair Set, M2 AA Heavy Machine Gun	1
Repair Set, Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm	1
Repair Set, Recoilless Rifle, 57 mm	1
Repair Set, Mortar, 81 mm (60)	1
Trailer $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	23
Trailer, $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton	8
Truck, T-137, 1 ton	7
Truck (Reo), $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9
Wrecker, M62, 5 ton	1
Ambulance, M63, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	2
Trailer, Water tank, 250 gal	2
Hose, spiral	55
Hand pump, fuel	5
Hand pump, oil	5
Jerry Can, fuel, 5 gal	53
Telescope m-65, Battery Commander's	2
Mount, M3	2
Mount, Recoilless Rifle, 75 mm	2
Aiming Circle	1
Plotting Board, M-10	7
Steel Helmet	650
Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	23

*Ammunition*

Nomenclature :	Quantity
Shell, smoke, WP, M302, Mortar, 60 mm	72
Shell, smoke, WP, 57 or 57A1, Mortar, 81 mm	96
Pyrotechnics, AN-M41, red-green, two-star	288
Pyrotechnics, AN-M42A1, yellow-green, two-star	324
Hand grenade, fragment (W/fuse)	680
Cartridge Clip, 8-round, M1 Rifle	2,004
Demolition Block, 1 lb	50

*Ammunition—Continued*

Nomenclature—Continued	<i>Quantity</i>
Demolition Block, M3, (C-3 demolition) 2½ lb.	16
Demolition Block, M1, chain	80
Fuse, electrical, special	100
Fuse, demolition, special	250
Cord, time fuse (foot)	100
Cord, detonating (feet)	500
Mine, light antitank, M7, simulator	20
Mine, anti-personnel, M2, simulator	20
Cartridge, 45 cal Thompson Sub MG	96,000
Cartridge, ball, 7.62 mm	74,816
Cartridge, tracer, 7.62 mm	2,004
Cartridge, AT, 7.62 mm	70,000
Shell, HE, M 306A1, 57 mm, Recoilless Rifle	160
Shell, HE, AT, M 307A1, 57 mm, Recoilless Rifle	20
Shell, WP, smoke, M 308 A1, 57 mm, Recoilless Rifle	20
Shell, HE, M 309A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle	38
Shell, HE, AT, tracer, M 310A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle	16
Shell, WP, Smoke, M 311A1, 75 mm, Recoilless Rifle	16
Shell, NE, M 49A2, 60 mm, Mortar	432
Shell, illuminating, M 33A2, 60 mm, Mortar	7.2

*Engineering equipment*

Nomenclature :	<i>Quantity</i>
Compass	6
Luft (?)	10
Magnifying glass	15
Carpenter Equipment, Set No. 1	1
Engineer, Equipment, Set No. 1	1
Mine Tape (roll)	8
Calipers (set)	1
Reproduction Set	1
Illuminating set No. 3, electrical	2
Water purification Set	1
Water Quality Test Set	1
Telephone 258	52
Radio, SCS-399	1
Radio, AN/WC-9	10
Radio, AN/WC-535	33
Radio, SCR-300	9
Radio, ANC/SRR-5	2
Switchboard, TC-12	1
Switchboard, BD-72	2
Reel, RL-27	2
Test Equipment IE-17	2
Case CS-130	1
Climbers DC-5	3
Mine Detector SCR-625	4
Switchboard, BD-71	2
Flash Light, TL-122	4
Test Set TS-352/C	100
Power Unit, PJ-290/MR	2
Reel Equipment CE-11	2
Reel Unit, PL-31	7
Coil, OR-8	3
Power Unit, PE-75	7
Terminal Strip TM-184	2
Rectifier, RA-91	10
Frequency Motor Set, SCR-211	1
Lamp Meter TF-7/U	1
Tool Equipment, TE-33	1
Hydrometer, RY-2	18
Tool Equipment, TE-41	2
Tool Equipment, TE-113	1

*Engineer equipment—Continued*

<i>Nomenclature—Continued</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Wire, WD-1/TT-----	100
Wire, WD-1/TT-----	15
Wire, WD-1/TT-----	7
Wire, WD-1/TT-----	4

*Signal equipment*

<i>Nomenclature:</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Vibrator pack, PP-68/0-----	1
Projector, PH-131-----	1
Sereen, PH-358-----	1
Code training set, AN/GSC-T1-----	1
Public address system, AN/TIQ-2-----	1
Antenna, AB-155/0-----	72
Crystal -----	36
Antenna reel, RF-----	36
Tank reel, RF-----	36

*Quartermaster equipment*

<i>Nomenclature:</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Stove, tent-----	15
Burner, stover, tent-----	15
Lamp, kerosene-----	50
Field range, package A-----	7
Field range, package B-----	16
Cooking set, small detachment-----	2
Burner -----	8
Tripod -----	8
Container, galvanized, without cover-----	16
Container, galvanized, with cover-----	8
Heater, water-----	16
Box, refrigerating-----	1
Stove, diesel fuel-----	24
Typewriter -----	6
Typewriter, portable-----	14
Reproduction equipment-----	1
Calculating machine, with handle-----	2
Tent, individual soldier, U.S. type-----	608
Polo, tent-----	1,714
Stake, tent-----	1,714
Canteen, U.S. type-----	660
Cup, Canteen, U.S. type-----	660
Belt, U.S. type-----	660
Belt holding straps, U.S. type-----	660
Ammo pockets, U.S. type-----	3,300
Boot, U.S. type-----	1,436
Underwear, wool, U.S. type-----	1,386
Socks, Khaki, U.S. type-----	12,474
Fork, U.S. type-----	1,340
Spoon, U.S. type-----	1,340
Lantern, U.S. type-----	60
Carpenter Set-----	2
Raincoat -----	600
Hook, canteen-----	600
Cover, canteen-----	600
Scale -----	2
Sling, rifle-----	600
Scale -----	2

*Medical equipment*

<i>Nomenclature:</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Blanket, cot, small-----	1
Evacuation bag-----	1
Stretcher, solid aluminum poles-----	4

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Nomenclature--Continued	Medical equipment--Continued	Quantity
Medical chest, No. 1-----		1
Medical chest, No. 2-----		1
Medical chest, No. 4-----		1
Medical kit for medical personnel-----		5
Tool set-----		1
Dentist set A-----		1
Dentist set B-----		1

ANKARA, June 16, 1960.

His Excellency FLETCHER WARREN,  
Ambassador of the United States of America, Ankara.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Note of May 16, 1960 which reads as follows:

"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to draw the attention of the Government of Turkey to the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Aid to Turkey of July 1947, and with regard to the desire of the Turkish Government to use certain Military Assistance Program materiel for its planned military force in Cyprus to request that Turkey ask formal consent of the United States Government for such use for a purpose other than those for which the materiel was furnished.

It must be clearly understood that United States consent for the use of this equipment in Cyprus, which will be granted immediately upon receipt of Turkey's request, should not provide a basis for requests for additional Military Assistance Program materiel. The equipment sent to Cyprus, which was provided by the U.S. as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program cannot be dropped from accountability and will be considered as assets available to requirements for the Military Assistance Program for Turkey. The materiel to be deployed initially to Cyprus has been agreed upon by the Turkish General Staff and JUSMAT and is listed in the attached schedule and any Military Assistance Program materiel Turkey may subsequently wish to deploy to Cyprus will have to be the subject of a separate request.

I have the honor to propose that, if this Note is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, this Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply, asking for formal United States consent and agreeing to the list submitted, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

In reply, I have the honor to inform you that my Government is in agreement with the foregoing.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

SEЛИM SARPER.

Senator SYMINGTON. These countries have been almost at each other's throats two or three times in the last few years; and Turkey came close to invading Cyprus and is apparently considerably stronger. This is just another case where the United States has a heavy military involvement, as well as political obligations, that are sort of misty. In any case, will you give us the opinion of the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. We will give you all the data we have, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Will you proceed?

MAINTENANCE OF GREEK AND TURKISH NATO COMMITMENTS  
BY UNITED STATES

Mr. DAVIES. Member states have agreed to provide military contributions for the common defense as called for in Article III of the NATO Treaty. Both Greece and Turkey, considering the state of their economies, require outside assistance. As the most powerful member of the alliance, the United States has and continues to shoulder the pri-

mary burden for providing Greece and Turkey with the military assistance necessary to maintain their commitments to NATO.

With specific reference to Greece, the United States undertook in 1947 to provide assistance to Greece which was then faced with a widespread and growing Communist insurrection. At that time the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group, JUSMAAG, was established to oversee U.S. military assistance to the Greek Government. By 1949 Greece, with our assistance, had successfully put down the Communist insurrection. Following the entry of Greece into NATO in 1952, JUSMAAG has played an important role in our military assistance programs to Greece which are designed to facilitate Greece's participation in NATO and improve her NATO defense posture.

#### CLOSE MILITARY ASSOCIATION OF UNITED STATES AND GREECE

The close collaboration between the Greek and American Military Establishments which originated at the time of the civil war has been of primary importance in Greece's active role in the NATO Alliance. At the same time, our reciprocal commitment in support of European defense has been instrumental in Greece's making available installations and facilities vital to U.S. and NATO forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In addition to the JUSMAAG personnel, U.S. military forces in Greece currently occupy a naval communications station north of Athens, installations and port sites in Crete, military airlift command facilities at the Athens Airport and POL and storage facilities at Piraeus. Under agreements with the Greek Government, the United States and NATO may use various air and naval facilities in the event of hostilities between NATO and Soviet bloc nations. U.S. military communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the operations of the U.S. 6th Fleet in that area depend very heavily upon use of these facilities. U.S. military presence in Greece has generally been welcomed by the Greek people and has caused no serious public relations problems to date.

#### EFFECT OF CYPRUS AND COUP ON GREEK-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Greece's close association with the United States, both through NATO and bilaterally, has been troubled by two issues in recent years: Cyprus and the Greek military coup of April 1967. In the case of Cyprus, U.S. efforts to prevent an outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities and to foster a peaceful settlement of the dispute have at times irritated militant elements on both sides. Many Greeks have seen U.S. attempts to defuse the Cyprus question as evidence of pro-Turkish bias.

More importantly, the establishment of an authoritarian government in Greece in April 1967, following a period of instability, has posed a dilemma for U.S. policy. We disagree with the political system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to parliamentary rule essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask a question there, Mr. Chairman?  
Senator SYMINGTON. Sure.

WAS UNITED STATES INVOLVED IN OVERTHROW OF PREVIOUS GREEK ADMINISTRATION?

{ Senator FULBRIGHT. You say you disagree with the political system prevailing in Greece. Can you say categorically whether or not we had anything to do with the overthrow of the previous administration or not?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, in full honesty, I can say that as far as I am aware, we had nothing to do with the change in government and, as far as I am aware, we were caught by surprise by the developments.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you be aware of it in your position as Deputy Assistant Secretary if the military or the CIA had a hand in it? You would not necessarily be aware of it. Anyway, you did not know anything about it if we did.

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I was responsible for Near Eastern affairs primarily at the time.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. In the Department of State.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did you know anything about it? What is your position in the Defense Department?

Mr. PRANGER. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were you there at the time?

Mr. PRANGER. No, I was not. I was in university life, but I can also state categorically from my reading of the records available to me that there was no U.S. connivance in the coup.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, but you really do not know. You were not there, you would not know if it took place.

Mr. PRANGER. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is there anybody present who was in the Department who was in a position to know at that time?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is very interesting.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, the way things are organized within our Government, and from my knowledge of our actions in adjacent areas, I would think it highly unlikely that there was any connivance whatsoever. In fact, I would say categorically I am certain there was not. I believe that I can relay your question back to my superiors and provide confirmation of that assurance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Under oath?

Mr. DAVIES. I am under oath.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know, but they will not be. The point I would like to make is that we have been deceived so often by official statements that we are very skeptical about it. The actions of the Department, for example, only recently, we discovered that in spite of the declared embargo on shipments you surreptitiously and secretly broke the embargo and we are just now finding out about it. Your actions are so sympathetic to the Greek colonels that it lends very little credence to your declaration that you are opposed to them because you have done everything really that they needed to do to keep them in power and to give the impression that we approve of them. The

} pressure was very great, to be sure to send a sympathetic Ambassador there, and you did send a sympathetic Ambassador there.

I recently got a letter from him about the arrest of the secretary of the Fulbright Commission in Greece. Did that come to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, it did, Miss Pipinopoulou.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is rather disgraceful, it is a small matter. She is a small person but our attitude is certainly critical. But go ahead. I do not want to —

IDENTIFICATION OF NEWLY ARRIVED WITNESSES

Senator SYMINGTON. Two new people have come in. Will you identify yourselves, please?

Mr. QUINN. I am Mr. Charles Quinn, and I work for Mr. Pranger at the Pentagon.

Senator SYMINGTON. Work for whom?

Mr. QUINN. International Security Affairs.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long have you been in the Department?

Mr. QUINN. I have been in the Pentagon roughly 23 years, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. The chairman was asking whether or not we had anything to do with a change in the Greek Government that resulted in the Papadopoulos setup? Do you know anything about that?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long have you been in the ISA part of the Pentagon?

Mr. QUINN. How long have I been in ISA? Since June of 1954, sir. I have only been involved in Greek problems since August of 1968. Previous to that time I was engaged in Arab-Israel affairs.

Senator SYMINGTON. You just came in, sir.

Captain KREBS. I am Captain Krebs, Turkish Desk, ISA, Defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are pretty well fortified with staff.

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, those are my two additions.

Senator SYMINGTON. I hope it has nothing to do with physical security. What is the point of having so many different people from your Department? I was just wondering.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir, I came with no one and then I find my colleagues from State brought an entourage.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are used to seeing Mr. Knauer and Mr. Wolf and are glad to see all of these other gentlemen.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They had an entourage and so you thought that it was beneath the dignity of the Defense Department not to have one.

[Laughter.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I think the more people who know what is going on the better.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to be certain you had the best possible information that we could give. I am newly arrived in my responsibilities.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is thoughtful of you, and I appreciate it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you mean newly arrived?

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Mr. DAVIES. I have been handling Arab-Israel affairs for the past 8 years in the Bureau and it is only since Ambassador Rockwell departed that I added Greece, Turkey and Iran to my duties.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you finished, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES IN GREECE

Mr. DAVIES. We disagree with the political system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to parliamentary rule essential to the long-term stability and prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region. Balancing these often conflicting interests has been the major concern of U.S. policy toward Greece since the coup. Our strategic interests in the area and our commitment to Greece as a member of NATO dictate our maintaining a working relationship with the Greek regime, but we do not endorse the internal policy of the regime.

RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM BY MEANS OTHER THAN MILITARY

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not want to belabor this, Mr. Chairman, but it raises again the question. Is there anyone in the Department, does the Policy Planning Staff or anyone review this assumption which has prevailed in the Department forever that the only way to prevent Communist expansion is militarily, and I am reminded of Libya, for example? The Russians do not only expand their influence through invasion and occupation. They do it through political means and the assumption seems to be all through here in this connection that our purposes are served by supporting this authoritarian, really disgraceful regime; it is one of the worst ones. The stories about their torture of artists, and so on, are as bad as or worse than anything that ever came out of Russia in Stalin's time and I just wondered if the State Department has made this judgment, apparently years ago, that the only way to resist communism is militarily. It completely ignores the other aspects of this matter, which I think are probably more important. I am reminded of it in both the United Arab Republic and in Libya, the Russians did not move there with armies and navies, they just gained influence by the internal political means. And now in Greece you are aligned with a very weak, I think long-term weak, regime because these people have no roots in the populace, and one of these days they will be thrown out and you will be thrown out with them. I think you are very shortsighted in this policy of thinking that it is in our interest to go to bed with the Papadopoulos.

Mr. DAVIES. You have raised several very serious, very complex issues.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The first issue is, is there anybody in the State Department who proceeds to the theory that militarism is not the only answer and is trying to find other solutions?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, there is the Policy Planning Staff.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not hear about them any more. I do not even know who is head of it any more.

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Mr. DAVIES. In many ways we all serve in that category. We accept discipline but the policies of the U.S. Government are constantly under review and I would like to think under review as consistently at the working level as at the policy planning level.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, your statement does not reveal that at all to me. It is just a reiteration of the same thing we have heard year after year. Here we are faced with some nasty boys but we have got to support them because our policy is so dependent on them, which seems to me the same thing we talked about Mr. Thieu, I guess.

Mr. DAVIES. I would put to you, Mr. Chairman, that there has been historically a threat, both to Greece and Turkey, that only the tactics of the Soviet Union have changed, we have, I hope, entered a period of detente, but Soviet intentions are not clear.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not say that.

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly, this administration—

Senator FULBRIGHT. The tactics have changed but not detente. I will go along with you on tactics. They are not about to invade these countries but they are about to subvert them in a way that, if that is a proper word. Libya, for example, they deal with these people more sympathetically and I think with much greater foresight than we do, which is the way it goes.

Mr. DAVIES. If I may put on my other hat, sir, my Arab hat. I do not think the Soviets have had too much success in penetrating Libya. The Revolutionary Command Council has been very careful to rely upon primarily its Arab neighbors, primarily the United Arab Republic.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I will accept that. I just oversimplified that. I will accept that amendment. I think you are correct, but they have also thrown us out of Wheelus.

Mr. DAVIES. We were, in any event, scheduled to get out in 1971.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I favor it. I am not complaining.

Mr. DAVIES. As far—I am learning my way in Greek affairs, sir, and I am aware of a very painful dilemma that faces us and I would like to think that policy recommendations start down at our level. Our objective is to support the return of Greece to a parliamentary democratic regime.

#### EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY UNITED STATES TO GREECE IN 1968

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why did you break the embargo and give them the arms when you did not have to?

Mr. DAVIES. The decision in 1968 was made by the previous administration in the light of the—I think I can say honestly, although it is outside of my bailiwick—in light of the unexpected Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which, I might say, Mr. Chairman, has had as fine a record of democracy down through the years as had Greece [deleted].

The brutal invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a reassessment of the situation of our suspension program and had stopped delivery of certain items which were essential to Greece's carrying out its role in defense of the alliance. We provided equipment which was clearly related to that NATO commitment. It was—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why was it kept secret then?

Mr. DAVIES. As far as I am aware, sir, we went through our con-

sultations with the Congress, and in October of 1968 we publicly announced that this exception to deliveries had been made.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was under the impression you had suspended them. These were tanks, were they not? We were told little things like rifles and popguns and things of this sort but just recently have I been aware that you went right ahead with the heavy equipment; it was in the paper just recently.

Mr. DAVIES. We have released no tanks.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What was the story, have you got it? It came out about 2 weeks ago. What was it?

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, June 3, 1970]

#### ATHENS GIVEN U.S. ARMS DESPITE BAN

(By Bernard D. Nossiter)

Despite the embargo on heavy arms to Greece, the United States has quietly given jet fighter-interceptors, medium tanks and 155-millimeter howitzers to the colonels' regime in Athens.

The deliveries were described yesterday by officials as a "one time only" breach of the prohibition, a breach inspired by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

At the same time, it was learned, the Nixon administration has decided in principle to scrap the embargo entirely. Knowledgeable sources disclosed that the ban has been reviewed by the National Security Council and that body has determined that the embargo has outlived its usefulness. A public announcement to this effect, however, is being delayed until a more receptive climate at home and abroad is ensured.

The ban on heavy-arms shipments was imposed after the colonels overthrew Greece's constitutional government in April 1967. Sales and gifts of small arms like automatic weapons, rifles and mortars have continued, however.

From time to time, officials have hinted that the embargo has been relaxed but details have not been available until now. Last summer, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, in a little-noticed statement, said that "delivery of a portion of the suspended items" was approved by President Johnson, Oct. 18, 1968.

The shipment apparently began late in that year and continued through 1969. Mr. Johnson approved the delivery of 22 F-102s, 92 medium tanks and an undisclosed number of howitzers.

Officials have now revealed that all 22 planes were given to Greece. But how many tanks and howitzers were shipped could not be determined.

These deliveries explain what up until now has been a puzzling jump in arms shipments to Athens. For the budget year ending June 30, 1968, Greece received arms estimated at \$51 million in value. The next year's total jumped to \$93.2 million.

However, this understates the amount of the increase. The Pentagon values items it considers surplus at about one-fourth of their cost. Thus, if these totals are adjusted to reflect the original cost of the arms shipped, Greece received \$58.5 million in fiscal 1968 and a whopping \$170.0 million the next year. All but a small portion of both figures were gifts rather than sales.

Officials said the embargo was breached because the Czechoslovakian invasion heightened the importance of maintaining belief in NATO's ability to deter an aggressor.

Officials also said that leaders from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee were consulted about the relaxation of the ban.

However, Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said yesterday he had not been consulted and did not know the embargo had been broken.

Staff members at the House Foreign Affairs Committee said they knew of no consultation either. Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) was unavailable for comment.

The disclosure is likely to touch off a fresh Senate outcry against any arms for Greece. Last year, an amendment to cut off these shipments was narrowly

beaten, 45 to 38. This year, Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) is sponsoring a similar ban.

The Nixon Administration decision to junk the embargo entirely rests on a belief that the ban will not influence the colonels. The argument runs that they are firmly in the saddle, can turn to the French and other sources for major weapons and any continued prohibition only weakens American influence in Athens.

However, the unimpeded resumption of heavy-arms shipments will probably be delayed until the congressional temper, inflamed by Cambodia, is cooler. In addition, Washington is being held back by the opposition of Denmark, Norway and Italy, where criticism of the junta is exceptionally strong.

Mr. DAVIES. The story was to some extent misleading and the tank items were simply programmed for MAP pipelines, but have not been released.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is June 3. Department of State issued a statement denying the story.

Mr. DAVIES. The Department of State issued a statement that it was misleading.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was it wrong? I mean, did you not give them any weapons?

Mr. DAVIES. We did, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What were the weapons?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir, part of the story is correct, [deleted] F-102 aircraft, were released for Greece in its NATO role.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Ninety-two medium tanks.

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir, that is not correct.

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir, that is not correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And an undisclosed number of howitzers.

Mr. PRANGER. We have released [deleted] 175 self-propelled artillery pieces.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Those are awfully big guns.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The biggest we have.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are they capable of nuclear disposition, nuclear weapons?

Mr. PRANGER. I am not qualified on that, sir. I do not believe there are—

Senator FULBRIGHT. You mean, you have been instructed not to answer questions on nuclear weapons.

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir, I am just not competent to answer that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have any of you been instructed not to answer questions in certain areas before this committee?

Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding, sir, that on this subject that Mr. Spiers was made available, he is our man, the Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understand that. Were you instructed not to answer questions in this area?

Mr. DAVIES. I would have to consult, sir, with—

Senator FULBRIGHT. You know whether or not you were instructed.

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, as far as I know, the 175's have no nuclear capability but I can correct this record, if I am wrong.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thought they were the biggest howitzers we have that are mobile. Anyway, you say there were no tanks but [deleted] F-102's.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you not consider this a very serious breach of the understanding of an embargo on heavy weapons?

Mr. PRANGER. Again, sir, as Mr. Davies pointed out, these were released to enhance Greece's contribution to NATO.

ADVISABILITY OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY REGIME IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Finally, in this connection, and I mean in this particular, last year you know this committee attempted to share the responsibility with the Defense Department by putting in an amendment prohibiting further aid, military aid, until they resumed democratic government. Then the administration backed the movement which took it out in the House. Thus you see all of this contributes to make your statement sound rather hollow about how you disapprove of that regime, because the political effect of giving them this aid, aside from the military effect—your concept of the military relationship, I think, is quite obsolete but that is always true, it is nothing new—but politically, you give the appearance that we support the colonels. They play upon it. It is quite obvious they say we do support them, we give them money, and we give them arms and this tends to keep them in and to defeat what you say is our purpose, which is to return to parliamentary government; this is what bothers me.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, if I may return to my previous statement, I think this is a very painful dilemma. We do have a policy of supporting the military capability of our NATO allies in the military field, the Greek regime has been very faithful to its responsibilities as an ally. When their decision was made—

Senator FULBRIGHT. By what, you mean by receiving our weapons? They have had nothing else to do.

Mr. DAVIES. They are also applying 26 percent of their budget to their armed forces.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, they have to, because in order to keep them in power. I mean, it is a military regime, that is perfectly obvious.

Mr. DAVIES. Which we hope, sir, is moving, is trending toward—

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is not a thing to indicate they are. I just think it is a disastrous policy. I do not see what you mean bringing up the Czechs. What relationship does this have to do with the Czechs except you feel that since the Russians do it you feel we have got to do it, and we have got to support a similar regime?

Mr. DAVIES. This was a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It was a Russian invasion.

Mr. DAVIES. The decision reflected the following considerations: We believed that it was necessary to add credibility of the NATO deterrent in terms of the alliance, the alliance solidarity in the face of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why did you believe so? What was the reasoning that justified it? It seems to me a complete non sequitur; I do not know how you can reason that Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia justifies you in breaking an embargo and giving heavy weapons to Greece. What is the connection?

Mr. DAVIES. The changed military situation, sir, of heightened tensions were deemed to warrant making this exception. This was a matter which was thoroughly explored within the administration.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was it a NATO decision; did NATO say that we should break this embargo?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It was solely a U.S. decision, was it not?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think your reasoning is absolutely irrelevant. The truth of the matter is that if it revealed anything the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a nervousness and weakness on the part of Russia, she was afraid Czechoslovakia was becoming too independent, was she not?

Mr. DAVIES. As of last month, sir, with the signing of the Brezhnev-Czech agreement Czechoslovakia has been reduced to the status of a complete puppet.

#### U.S. SUPPORT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, kind of like the Dominican Republic.

Mr. DAVIES. I would think more so, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. More so. How come more so?

Mr. DAVIES. In that the Soviets have veto power, who assumes power, who takes office.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You do not think we have in South Vietnam or the Dominican Republic?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware that we do, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are not?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is amazing how you can become so insulated to the developments of events. You are not aware that we support Mr. Thieu and Mr. Ky? Do you think they could exist without our active support?

Mr. DAVIES. There was an election, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Really?

Mr. DAVIES. In South Vietnam, as there recently has been in the Dominican Republic.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who supervised the election? We did.

Mr. DAVIES. I am afraid, sir, I am outside the field of my competence.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You should not play games with us. You know very well that is what it is. Nobody outside of the State Department believes that Thieu and Ky could exist without us. I do not know why we bring it up, it is so obvious, but I do not see what that has to do with giving arms to Greece. If you are interested in Greece and the preservation of Greece as a longtime ally, you are now being identified with what I would believe to be a temporary regime which is the Greek colonels.

#### ADVISABILITY OF SUSPENDING MILITARY AID TO GREECE

Mr. DAVIES. Again, sir, I think this is a question of how we go about attaining an objective. Whether to stay in working relationship with a government, extra constitutional though it may be, and use whatever influence we have to accelerate the trend toward return to parliamentary democracy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is exactly the point I am making as a politician. It seemed to me you should have accepted, for example, the restriction that this Congress, that this committee tried to put on aid, that this would put pressure upon the Greek colonels to return to a parliamentary system. What would be their alternative, go running off to Moscow? Do you think they would if we did not give them those F-102's?

Mr. DAVIES. The suspension of the delivery of major items, sir, does not in what I have seen of the record, seem to have been instrumental in moving the regime toward implementation of their—

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is not responsive to my question. You still have the effect of our approving of them, of strengthening them, that is what your policy actually does.

Mr. DAVIES. Again, sir, you are quite right at the dilemma of how you achieve this best. Whether you follow the tactics of staying in relationship with them—

Senator FULBRIGHT. What I am asking is sometime we ought to at least experiment with a policy of not supporting the military dictatorship. I can think of hardly any exception in which we do not find ourselves lined up. So far as I know our relations with General Onganía of Argentina were very good; I suppose it will be good with Lanusse of Argentina or it is very good with the Government of Brazil. I am not saying we ought to intervene or throw them out or anything of this sort. I think there is a big difference between choosing up and becoming identified with them in every case and simply being indifferent to them and let them drift on their own and see what they can do on their own. I hate to see this country lined up and be faced with this dilemma which we are faced with time after time, faced with military decisions of military support in this case in the reaction against Czechoslovakia. In every case did we strengthen the arms deliveries to Turkey and Italy and Portugal and everybody? Did we respond all around the periphery there, unilaterally the United States taking the decision to strengthen them with arms? Did we?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not believe so, sir; because we were, those countries where we had programs, we were current in our deliveries.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But you did not increase them, did not step up aid to Turkey or anyone because of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. DAVIES. As I recall, sir, the Alliance was seriously concerned and there were meetings in Brussels on how best to cope with what looked like a burgeoning of Soviet Warsaw Pact threat.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seems to me if it was logical to do so in Greece you should have increased aid all around. I do not know why you did not take it up with NATO what they thought about it. NATO is supposed to be interested as we are, in the security of Western Europe. Was it ever submitted to the NATO ministers?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware that it was, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know whether it was or not?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir: I do not think it was.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You do not think it was. We took it unilaterally. Was that because you were sure that the Council of Europe would not agree with us because they have been very critical of the Greek regime, have they not?

Mr. DAVIES. They have, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So, I suppose the reason we did not take it up with them was because we knew they would not agree with us.

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of the answer, sir.

ATTITUDE OF NATO ALLIES TO INCREASED U.S. AID TO GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do any of the countries, do any of the NATO allies, do they approve of our giving this increased aid, I mean, these heavy weapons, F-102's, to Greece or not? Have they expressed themselves?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, there is concern throughout the Alliance on the extra constitutional nature of the Greek regime. Most of the Western states see the same dilemma that we do. Greece is an important element in the Alliance. Geographically it is in a key area. We are concerned at the general situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the rising Soviet presence in Egypt, the explosive potential of the Arab-Israel conflict. We desire to see Greece retain its military strength, at the same time, we desire that the Greek Government accelerate its move back to constitutional order. There is a trend. They have a timetable which they have begun to implement.

IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTION IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. What evidence do you have that they have begun to implement?

Mr. DAVIES. On April 10, sir, that part of the Constitution, which requires warrants for arrest, and provides certain safeguards against arbitrary judicial processes was implemented. Most recently, last week, procedures were set up for appeals to sentences administered by the courts martial. We do not know quite how meaningful this is going to be, but it would seem to be one route by which people who have been dealt with harshly under the courts martial can appeal through the Greek civil judicial system for justice. We are informed that the entire Constitution will be implemented by the end of the year.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you believe it?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe it, sir—

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are repeating what they tell you. Can you express what your own belief is? Do you honestly believe they are moving toward a democracy?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe it is possible that they may.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you have not answered the question. You are here under oath representing the State Department with respect to what our policy is towards Greece.

Chairman Fulbright asked you what do you think. First, he asked, do you think they are going to implement the Constitution, yes or no?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, that the Constitution will be implemented by the end of this calendar year.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Please answer the questions, you are under oath, and are completely protected.

Mr. DAVIES. It is my belief that the assurance we have received from Athens, that the Constitution will be implemented in full by the end of the calendar year, will be carried out.

My problem, sir, is that I think the important thing is for the setting of a date for parliamentary elections, and I believe that implementation of the Constitution really will not mean much until the elections are scheduled and held, and that is my official and personal view, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then, you think, your first statement that the Constitution will be implemented by the end of the year, you did not include in that concept elections of a parliament.

Mr. DAVIES. The procedures for parliamentary elections are covered by the Constitution. But it will still be necessary for a date to be set and so far the regime has not set that date.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If that is not done within the year how can you believe it is going to be implemented?

Mr. DAVIES. The Constitution legally will be promulgated in full. Senator FULBRIGHT. But not practically.

Mr. DAVIES. It will not fully be implemented until they hold their elections, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Which may or may not be this year, you are not committed on that.

Mr. DAVIES. We have no commitment on date.

INCIDENTS WITHIN GREECE WHICH ILLUSTRATE CONTEMPT FOR DEMOCRACY

Senator FULBRIGHT. You told me you were familiar with the arrest of the secretary of the cultural exchange program which obviously was dictated by the idea, there was no idea there was an element of danger with her. They have exiled her to an island, is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that is correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And you still can say with a straight face they are making progress toward a democratic regime?

Mr. DAVIES. We abhor the arbitrary actions like this.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This illustrates what creates what I call skepticism; that is, that your statements that you believe this are so utterly contrary to the facts as they exist and the happenings, the actual actions. This cannot help but raise a question in our minds as to whether you are playing with us or whether you are using words in the diplomatic sense.

Mr. DAVIES. I would not hope so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Without having any real substance at all because I just cannot believe if you are familiar with that case and others, maybe the State Department closes its eyes to the reports of treatment of civilians in Greece, and you do not know about it, but you do know that case as one of the most extraordinary cases of just going out of their way to show their contempt for this country and its exchange and for democratic procedures.

Mr. DAVIES. I know this case, sir, and I know of others.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes. Of course, the reply of our Ambassador did not suit me at all. He writes this letter and then he says: "But we believe this can be handled better if it is kept secret and no publicity given to it," although he admits there is not a thing he can do about it and she has been sent to exile for over a year having done nothing whatever.

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Mr. DAVIES. Ambassador Tasca has been extremely vigorous in his contacts with those running the regime and also those who are critical of the regime.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When you say vigorous, you do not mean to imply that he has been successful in any way of getting them to ameliorate it?

Mr. DAVIES. It is our belief, sir, that what amelioration has taken place, and there has been some, in part can be ascribed to the strong position taken by Ambassador Tasca in his conversations with government leaders.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He said he did everything he could in behalf of this woman, and he could not do anything. Of course, she had not done anything. There was not the slightest evidence she had done anything.

Mr. DAVIES. We would like to think, sir, the most recent regulation which affects these arbitrary sentences resulted from Ambassador Tasca taking the whole subject up with the leaders of the government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be well for the record to have these excerpts from the Council of Europe's report on treatment of prisoners in Greece so that we will have some idea of what we are talking about. It is a good statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection, we will put it in the record.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 16, 1970]

EXCERPTS FROM COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S REPORT ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN GREECE

STRASBOURG, FRANCE, Apr. 15.—Following, as made public today by the Council of Europe, are excerpts from a report by the European Commission on Human Rights on the situation under the military Government in Greece. The first section is testimony by Mrs. Anastasia Tsirka, who was arrested in connection with pamphlets deemed suspicious. The second section consists of comment by the commission.

WITNESS' TESTIMONY

"I say to them (the police), I am going to have a baby." They answer: "Who cares about that? It will be another person like you, it is better not to have it." So I told to them again when I was laid down, "I am going to have a baby, be careful please!" But they do not care at all about my stomach, they do not care at all!

Mallios (an official) ordered to Spanos to give me 15 "Falanga" (blows on the soles of the feet) and he give me 20. I counted, maybe it was not, 18 maybe 21, but it was more than 15, it is silly.

I started to scream very loudly and they put a very dirty rag in my mouth to keep my mouth shut. So I started to shake, they have me, they started to shake me, and I scream and scream, and I say "oh no, you cannot do that to me!" Oh, I hate the people!

"VERY DARK AND DIRTY"

I was there in [cell] No. 3. It was very, very dark, dirty and they have so many many bedbugs. Have you ever heard about them? They just come up all over. And you hurt and move like that, always, and no one can hear you. And you scream and there are people outside, they hear you but they cannot give you any help and the guard come in my little window and: "Will you shut up, please. Someone sleep."

"What can I do? and I start to get tired, tired, tired and fall down, where I never thought I am going to sleep. I just tried not to get dirty like that, then after, after, after I leave that cell I come down and sleep so normal, and I have nothing, nothing.

It was about 5 o'clock in the morning, something like that. I already sleep maybe, I have sleep, I was dizzy and groggy and all that and; hurting all over. But I would like to sleep, so I did sleep.

At 5 o'clock it started to come blood, you know, all over my feet, and I feel it, I never saw it, because there is no light. But I feel that I have blood somewhere, so I start to scream. I say, "I lost my baby!" So then the guard comes and says, "What is the matter with you?" Then I show people.

#### COMMISSION'S COMMENT

The commission finds two features common to many of the accounts of ill-treatment: the use of falanga, and, in particular, its use in the washroom and the Terrazza. [Athens]. Not all accounts of the washroom and the Terrazza mention the same features, and there are sometimes errors. Thus some describe the small wall outside the washroom; the boiler, the sink with the metal lid and the back door in the washroom, and the notice on the stairs leading to the Terrazza.

The use of falanga has been described in a variety of situations: on a bench or chair or on a car seat; with or without shoes on. Sometimes water has been thrown over the seat and sometimes the victim has been made to run around between heatings. Victims have also been gagged.

The commission considers that the variety of the situations in which falanga is described as being used, and the differences and errors of description of the washroom and terrazza, instead of putting in question the veracity and reality of the accounts, tend to confirm them. For it is natural that, where several witnesses describe the same place or incident, there will be variations and errors of detail: indeed it is the precise repetition of the same features that would be suspect and would point to fabrication.

While falanga and severe beatings of all parts of the body are the commonest forms of torture or ill treatment that appear in the evidence, other forms have been described: For example, the application of electric shocks, squeezing of the head in the vise, pulling out of hair from the head or pubic region, or kicking of the male genital organs, dripping water on the head and intense noises to prevent sleep.

The commission has found it established beyond doubt that torture or ill treatment has been inflicted in a number of cases. It will now apply to these cases, in the light of all the other evidence at its disposal, the criteria it has chosen for determining whether they are part of a practice of torture or ill treatment of political detainees in Greece since the 21st of April 1967: namely the repetition of acts and official tolerance of them.

#### SOME ROUGHNESS

It appears from the testimony of a number of witnesses that a certain roughness of treatment of detainees by both police and military authorities is tolerated by most detainees and even taken for granted. Such roughness may take the form of slaps or blows of the hand on the head or face.

This underlines the fact that the point up to which prisoners and the public may accept physical violence as being neither cruel nor excessive varies between different societies and even between different sections of them. However, the allegations raised in the proceedings generally concerned much more serious forms of treatment which, if established, clearly constitute torture or ill treatment.

The factor of repetition of torture or ill treatment appears in the concentration of incidents around the security police. It is to be noted that in complaints of torture or ill treatment by the security police, some witnesses have made a distinction between the uniformed guards and more senior officers, usually in plain clothes, and have spoken of help and kindness from the former.

Further, the commission cannot ignore the sheer number of complaints. The International Red Cross reported that at one stage, out of 131 prisoners, 46 complained of torture or ill treatment, and it apparently later investigated further torture allegations, but the respondent Government has failed to submit the report on those investigations.

In the present proceedings, thirty cases had been examined to some substantial degree before the proceedings were terminated following the respondent Government's refusal to make possible the hearing of a number of further witnesses detained in Greece.

OTHER NATO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED MILITARY AID TO GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Has any other NATO country given military aid to Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who?

Mr. PRANGER. In 1964 Canada, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom pledged amounts of aid for the military budget.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was that before the coup?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have they given any aid since the coup?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir; they have not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is what I meant to bring out.

Mr. PRANGER. They have, however, sold equipment since the coup as contrasted to giving aid.

Senator FULBRIGHT. To Greece?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. For which we could pay indirectly, of course. How much money have we been giving them, about \$60 million a year?

Mr. PRANGER. It has been programmed at that, sir, but it turns out to be much less.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, these people who were giving the predecessor government aid, are now selling it to colonels and we are paying for it?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir; credit for this year is pegged at fiscal year 1971 is pegged at [deleted] million, I believe, is it not, and that is the amount for credit this year. They could buy some U.S. material with our credit, yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is what I mean, if we give them aid, money is still fungible if you still give it to them, they can use it to pay for it. It comes out that same way.

#### PRINCIPAL THREAT TO GREECE

Last, what about the threat, I mean, you give these F-102's, what do you consider the threat to Greece other than internal?

Mr. PRANGER. The primary threat to Greece, sir, is considered to be from the Warsaw Pact Powers and particularly from Bulgaria, which is the closest of those powers. Bulgaria has undergone an updating of its army and air force, and it now has in its air force at any rate frontline Soviet MIG 21's, and, therefore, this is one aspect. The second aspect concerns Greece's contribution to NATO, its contribution to the NATO command at Naples, and for this purpose aircraft have been programmed for Greece and are available for updating its air force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So, it is a threat from, the principal reason for military aid is the threat from Bulgaria in a physical invasion of Greece.

Mr. PRANGER. The primary, the first nation which would be involved, we feel, in a Warsaw invasion against Greece, would be Bulgaria, yes, sir.

WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would ask again and you can say whatever you would like, do we have nuclear weapons in Greece?

Mr. PRANGER. I believe, sir, that Mr. Spiers covered that question in his testimony before this committee.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is not what I asked you. What is your answer? I want it on the record whatever your answer is.

Mr. PRANGER. I have been instructed, sir, by the Secretary of Defense not to answer questions relating to nuclear matters.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I just wanted to know what it is. Have you been instructed the same by the Secretary?

Mr. DAVIES. I have been instructed by my Department not to deal with this matter, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. With nuclear weapons, disposition of nuclear weapons?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, Mr. Spiers was made available to the committee——

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know all about that. I just want you to put on the record what I asked you. I wanted to make it clear what the attitude of both Departments are toward the committee and I do not know why you are putting it up, just say you have been told. I am not complaining. I know you have been instructed. If you have been instructed you have been instructed is all I want to know. Have you been instructed not to answer similar questions before the Armed Services Committee?

Mr. PRANGER. I have not appeared before the Armed Services Committee in this regard.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are your instructions so broad not to answer them at all or only before this committee?

Mr. PRANGER. In relation to this testimony I have been so instructed, but I have not appeared before the Armed Services Committee.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So, you do not know?

Mr. PRANGER. No, I do not know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who instructed you in the Department of Defense, you say the Secretary of Defense, did he do it himself?

Mr. PRANGER. Mr. Stuart French, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Who instructed you in the Department of State?

Mr. DAVIES. The instructions were issued in the name of the Secretary, sir. I do not know. Do you know how they came down?

Mr. WOLF. They came down from the Secretary through Mr. John Stevenson, the legal adviser through me to Mr. Davies.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you receive it in writing?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the form of a memorandum?

Mr. PRANGER. In the form of a memorandum.

SELECTIVE SUSPENSION POLICY

Mr. PAUL. Could I ask a question with respect to tanks? The 1969 military assistance presentation book indicates there was delivery of

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[deleted] medium tanks to Greece in fiscal year 1968. Was there delivery of [deleted] medium tanks to Greece in that year?

Mr. PRANGER. Those tanks were delivered prior to the coup.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Therefore, shortly after the April 1967 coup, we instituted a selective suspension policy on the shipment of major military items programmed under MAP for Greece. Other equipment, supplies and services have continued. The items suspended include ships, aircraft, military helicopters, tanks, APC's, artillery, missiles and tank ammunition. Apart from some exceptions following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets, the selective suspension policy remains in effect.

The administration is actively reviewing our military supply policy for Greece in cooperation with the Country Team and Ambassador Tasca. No decision has as yet been made on the question of lifting the suspension policy toward Greece. The future course of our military aid policy will take into account Greece's position in NATO as well as the other factors which I have mentioned relevant to U.S. interests in Greece.

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you turn to Turkey, I want to be clear on one point about Greece.

You say no decision as yet has been made on the question of lifting the suspension policy toward Greece. But you have lifted it, have you not?

Mr. DAVIES. You mean the October 1968 exception, sir?

Senator SYMINGTON. You just said the items suspended, including aircraft and howitzers have been shipped. Therefore, you have lifted the suspension, have you not?

Mr. DAVIES. There was a one-time exception, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Your statement says no decision has as yet been made on the question of lifting the suspension policy toward Greece; but I thought your oral testimony a few minutes ago was that some of it had been lifted.

Mr. DAVIES. This was a one-time exception. The selective suspension remains in effect. We have approximately [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you make exceptions to your policy?

Mr. DAVIES. Apart from that one exception in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the suspension remains in effect. There was a one-time exception for the reasons I discussed with Chairman Fulbright.

Senator SYMINGTON. In order to get from Czechoslovakia to Greece, you would have to either go through Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria or through Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Therefore, I do not understand the military implications of the Czech invasion with respect to making this exception.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, the fear was, as I recall, that the Soviets would move militarily to stamp out the expansion of nationalism which was glowing not only in Czechoslovakia but also brightly in Rumania, and the thought was that the demonstration of NATO solidarity might be a factor in influencing Soviet tactics within the Soviet bloc.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR 1968 EXCEPTION TO EMBARGO

Senator SYMINGTON. I know. But even if it did affect Rumania, that country is still not on the borders of Greece and you have the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, which is supposed to be very strong indeed.

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the planners at that time had no firm idea of what the Soviets were going to do.

Senator SYMINGTON. So, your testimony under oath before this committee is that these shipments were made not because of a request from the Greek Government, which was having its problems, but because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, by Soviet troops; is that right?

Mr. DAVIES. To the best of my knowledge, this was the basis of the decision, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. You say: The future course of our military aid policy will take into account Greece's position in NATO as well as the other factors which I have mentioned relevant to U.S. interests in Greece.

Are you telling us there was no fear on our part that the Papadopoulos government would not be able to continue unless we gave him the arms?

Mr. DAVIES. The primary consideration, sir, was the strength of the NATO alliance. I do not believe that the supply of arms to the regime will be a major factor in its staying in power. Did I understand you, sir, to be drawing a parallel between—

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did this government decide to lift the suspension which I think it did surreptitiously? Did you tell us about it when you did it?

Mr. DAVIES. When we made the exception?

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Were we notified of that before the act?

Mr. DAVIES. The congressional consultations were undertaken, and the fact of the exception was made public in October of 1968, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Whom did they consult with in the Congress?

Senator SYMINGTON (continuing). Before you did it.

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware, sir. I assume Ambassador Rockwell was the

Mr. TORRETT. I can tell you that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whom did they consult in the Congress?

Mr. TORRETT. We have not wanted to state this publicly, sir, but Mr. Rockwell, Ambassador Rockwell, and I participated in that. As you recall, Congress had recessed at that particular time in October 1968, there were very few people in Washington but our records indicate that we called the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Symington, and Senator Hickenlooper, who was the ranking Republican.

Senator SYMINGTON. As chairman of the subcommittee I don't recall being consulted.

Mr. TORRETT. We also visited the staff here in Washington at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you give us the details of what you planned to do at that time?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is there a telephone conversation?

Mr. TORBERT. There was a long-distance telephone conversation; yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Oh.

Mr. TORBERT. I do not know in what great detail but we certainly gave the approximate detail.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you call me or did Mr. Rockwell call me?

Mr. TORBERT. Mr. Rockwell called you, sir. He called Senator Pell also.

Senator SYMINGTON. What reasons did he give for this action?

Mr. TORBERT. My assumption is that he gave you the same reason that Ambassador Davies did.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean Czechoslovakia?

Mr. TORBERT. I think that certainly was the major factor in the discussion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you have a memo of the conversation you keep in your files?

Mr. TORBERT. I have a very brief one, sir, not going into all the details.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you furnish that for the record?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, all of them that you called, this committee, with the memorandum you made at the time as to what you said.

Mr. TORBERT. I will certainly look into that, sir.

(The information is classified and in the Committee files.)

Senator SYMINGTON. If it was a long-distance telephone call during an election year; as I remember, my son was running for the first time for the House—was there any confirmation of that in writing to the subcommittee or the full committee?

Mr. TORBERT. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why not?

Mr. TORBERT. Senator, we were taking an action for which we had authority in the executive branch to take. In that case consultation normally consists of advising the committee and reporting any views that you have.

U.S. EQUIPMENT RELEASED TO GREECE FOLLOWING CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't consider a phone call as "consultation with the Congress." Was the receipt of these arms given any publicity in Greece?

Mr. TORBERT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. It was not.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was not. Why not?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware, sir, of the reason.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When were they received, delivered?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the pipeline, as you know, runs anywhere up to 24 months. So, I would assume, unless Mr. Pranger has some delivery dates, that the pipeline ran through to the beginning of this year. Are we all finished with that?

Mr. PRANGER. The last of the [deleted] have arrived.

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Senator SYMINGTON. Will you supply for the record, exactly what we are talking about, what was done?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

(The information referred to follows:)

EQUIPMENT RELEASED FOLLOWING CZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS

[Deleted] Coastal Minesweepers.  
[Deleted] F-5 Aircraft.  
[Deleted] F-104 Aircraft.  
[Deleted] HU-16 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (excess).  
[Deleted] F-102 Aircraft (excess).  
[Deleted] T-41 Trainer Aircraft.  
[Deleted] T-33 Trainer Aircraft.  
[Deleted] of 90 mm. Cartridges.  
[Deleted] Self-propelled 175 mm. Artillery Pieces.  
Value: Approximately \$28 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave for a minute and if you do not have to go, I will be back.

AGREEMENT BY WHICH UNITED STATES SUPPLIED AIRCRAFT TO GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have a few questions. With regard to the planes, in accordance with the memorandum from Maj. Gen. S. K. Eaton and given to the staff in April of 1969 the following agreement was made back on November 1, 1966; we offered one squadron of F/TF-102A aircraft and associated equipment to deputy chief, Hellenic National Defense general staff. Chief, JUSMAAG stressed the need for an all-weather interceptor capability, the extremely low-cost and early availability of F-102's, and cited Secretary McNamara's offer to Minister of Defense Costopoulos to find good equipment at lower costs. Formal acceptance of one squadron of F-102's for RHAf was received from the Greek Ministry of National Defense on November 7, 1966. The first aircraft is scheduled to be delivered in June 1969 and the last aircraft in October 1969, relating to these same aircraft. It did not occur to the general at that time to state that this is all because of Czechoslovakia that we were going to deliver them. It was not in his thinking at all.

Mr. DAVIES. What was the time sequence, sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. This was in April 1969. He was simply relating the agreement that had been made in 1966 for these planes. He does not mention either the embargo or the breaking of the embargo. I do not know how significant it is. It seems a little odd that it is more like an afterthought rather than a justification. You sought the justification for it after they decided to give it to them.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I, as I said, was preoccupied with the other crisis area but it is my recollection that there were some very anxious people in the Department of State in April of 1969, with respect to Soviet intentions.

MISSION OF PERSONNEL IN MAAG OFFICE IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. As of March 1969 we had 73 military and 16 civilians in our MAAG office in Greece. Could you tell us what they were doing primarily?

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Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir. Their primary missions would be related to the Greek Armed Forces. With the ground force that they will program to update the equipment. With the air force that they will attempt to develop a limited air defense capability, and in the navy that they will attempt to update the naval craft.

In addition, our MAP policy provides for a combination of grant and sales credits to enhance Greece's defensive contribution to NATO.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are they training the Greek forces; are they engaged in training them?

Mr. PRANGER. They do some fieldwork with the Greek forces; yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Training. How much would you say, how many of these people are devoted to training, 10 percent or 20 percent?

Mr. PRANGER. On the basis of the current joint table of distribution (JTD) about 70 percent of the U.S. strength in JUSMAG devotes their efforts to training and advisory matters.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are they training them for what kind of activity?

Mr. PRANGER. Their activities at present are primarily oriented toward external defense.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But not exclusively?

Mr. PRANGER. In any direct sense we give no support to anything but the external defense factor.

#### AMMUNITION SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES TO GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do we supply the Greeks with ammunition?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do we control its use?

Mr. PRANGER. We control its use, sir, only to the extent that we are at all involved with their training or to the extent that we are at all involved with their force planning with NATO, but we do not in fact, control the actual dispensation of ammunition.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have no practical way to prevent the Greek forces from using your ammunition for internal security purposes, have you?

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, as far as the ammunition which we are supplying today, no.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, we can supply the bullets which they use to kill their own citizens then, can they not? I mean, we do.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir, that is not the intention.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know.

Mr. PRANGER. But obviously, that can happen.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That can happen.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So, when the firing squads dispose of their enemies it probably is with American ammunition.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir, we have certain—they have other relationships on ammunition, too, and also I do not know if any people have been killed by firing squads, sir. Mr. Davies can answer that question.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No, I think they usually garrot them. I only ask that as a symbolic question.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But if they had, did have firing squads, it probably would be our ammunition. Where do they get ammunition aside from yourself?

Mr. PRANGER. Some of their own.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Some of their own. How much, what percentage?

Mr. PRANGER. We just do not know, sir. This is information available that MAAG might have.

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many military personnel overall do you have in Greece?

Mr. PRANGER. We have military personnel and dependents of about 8,000 at last count.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What date was that?

Mr. PRANGER. I believe that was the date of September of 1969.

Senator FULBRIGHT. About 8,000.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then, it is going up in Greece.

Mr. PRANGER. I do not quite know what up means, sir. Maybe you can explain it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. On the 31st of March 1969 according to a briefing chart that was given the staff you had 3,091 military personnel, you had, there were 189 civilians, and, in connection with the military, and 3,975 dependents making 7,255 total. So, I assumed the figure you gave me of about 8,000 is the total comparable to the 7,255 of March 1969.

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, let me be more specific. Our military as of September 30, 1969, we had a total of 3,237. That was military personnel, and we had a total of 3,901 military dependents. In addition to that, we had certain civilians working for the Department of Defense which would then be worked into the figures.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. PRANGER. 630 civilians working for DOD, plus 177 dependents. So, that would add up to another 807.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is a substantial increase over the civilians of 189 in March of 1969. What are they doing, what are those civilians doing?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, sir; it is 105 U.S. citizens, civilians in September 1969.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said 630.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, that includes foreign nationals, I am sorry sir. It is 105 U.S. citizens plus foreign nationals.

Senator FULBRIGHT. 105, well, that is comparable to 103 then that were on this briefing.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And the 525 is the dependents of the—

Mr. PRANGER. The 525, sir, is the foreign nationals working for the Department of Defense.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I see. Are they all Greeks?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, I think most of them are Greeks in this case.

MILITARY FACILITIES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, now, in the military facilities on the USAF Crete, 6931st Section, U.S. Air Force Crete, you have [deleted] people on Crete. What are they doing?

Mr. PRANGER. Let me just check that, sir. This is on Greece, this is the NATO missile firing station.

Senator FULBRIGHT. On Crete this is.

Mr. PRANGER. Crete, yes. There is an air station at Iraklion which is present [deleted].

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then there are—

Mr. PRANGER. There is a naval facility there that is part of NATO Souda Bay facility. Then, there is a NATO missile firing station on Crete, NAMFI, which the United States also uses, so there are two facilities, two NATO facilities and our own facilities on Crete.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have, I believe, separate listing here of Navy communications station [deleted] people. Is that separate from the USAF on Crete or is it also on Crete?

Mr. PRANGER. Navy personnel at Souda Bay, yes, sir. It is separate from Iraklion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is in addition to the [deleted].

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir. I think it is part of the number.

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is at Nea Makri, which is near Athens. I am told [deleted]. That is a Navy installation.

Mr. PRANGER. At Marathon Bay, yes, sir, it is naval communications.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then, you have [deleted] communications squadron [deleted] personnel. Where are they? [Deleted] communications [deleted] personnel.

Mr. PRANGER. I am not aware of where that is, sir; we will check that out.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Where are they?

Mr. PRANGER. Excuse me, sir; they are at various sites, [deleted].

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many different sites have you got in Greece?

Mr. PRANGER. You mean of—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Where we have American personnel.

Mr. PRANGER. Facilities.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Facilities, I guess.

Mr. PRANGER. We have seven major facilities [deleted].

Senator FULBRIGHT. Seven major and how many minor, I mean; altogether?

Mr. PRANGER. Actually, we group them as follows, sir. Athens Air Base at Athens, which supports our Air Force facilities and MAC aircraft is the first. We then have—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is that the one that has over 2,000 people?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do they do just service the air base, our use of the air base?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, they supply maintenance and they also support other facilities, U.S. Air Force facilities in Greece. It is in the nature of a headquarters and support. We then have five communications [deleted] stations [deleted], that is our second category, I suppose when you add these up there will be more than seven.

We have the Nea Makri communications station at Marathon Bay. [Deleted.]

We have the Iraklion Air Station at Crete.

We share a NATO naval facility at Souda Bay.

We share a NATO missile firing installation NAMFI on Crete. Sir, it breaks down to more than seven facilities. I do not want to leave that impression. There are five communications centers [deleted].

WITHHELDING OF INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS

Senator FULBRIGHT. How could there be much question that the committee ought not to know? This is the strangest attitude; this is what I had reference to a while ago. We run into this attitude time after time; it is perfectly all right to tell the host government or any other government but you cannot tell the Foreign Relations Committee, even you, you hesitated, you were not sure whether you could tell us or not. Does this not strike you, as an American, leaving out the fact you are in the Pentagon, as a rather unusual development that your own Congress is not entitled to know, although you do not hesitate to tell the host government? Does this not ever strike you as a little unusual, just as an American and not as an employee of the Pentagon?

Mr. PRANGER. On this particular question, sir, I would prefer not to express my personal opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You do not. Well, as an American, I mean, being a Member of the Congress, it does seem that the executive branch from one end to the other has come to regard the Congress as its enemy and does everything possible to prevent the Congress from knowing what it is doing.

This is a recent development. It did not used to be that way. In fact, I am quite sure it grows out of the Vietnam war and the criticism which has developed.

This seems to be that the executive branch has completely lost any confidence in the constitutional system. That is that the Congress participates in these matters and this is an illustration of it. It is not the first time, I must say, and probably not the last time. We have been going into this time and time again. Thailand, we make these contingency plans with the Thai Government. They know all about it but they could not tell this committee. You are familiar, I expect, you have heard rumors about this. And this is really what disturbs so many people who still believe in the constitutional system which we inherited, and are trying to make it work, and this is why we are not really being contentious about you and I know you are under instructions but I would think, as simply a citizen of the country here we are giving up the constitutional system and going to the executive system such as the Greeks have, and which obviously the State Department does not regard with any horror. They cooperate with the colonels with the greatest of ease, but it is a rather startling thing in the course of these hearings to come to the conclusion that the executive branch has no longer any role in fully informing the legislative about what is going on.

I do not know, take this matter [deleted]. But here you come unwilling to testify about it. We already know it. [Deleted] you are instructed not to discuss this with us. This is what has seemed so odd, you see, and this is the real point. We do not ask you these questions

to try to find out from you what it is. We are trying to make a record that is useful to the Government and to the Congress, because ultimately the decision is whether or not this policy which has been followed so long has been in the interest of this country. Are we going to continue to maintain these innumerable bases all around the world which are breaking the country, this is what is at issue. I was not just trying to pick your brains about [deleted]. We know all about that, and I do not understand it, why you are given instructions not to discuss it. You are not keeping from us any information. You are just showing the contempt of your Department for this committee and the Senate. That is all you are doing. I think it is a very sad development, frankly. Because the country is reflecting in many areas a deterioration of confidence and faith in our constitutional system. And I think it is too bad that this has arisen.

It is really difficult to say why the Greek Government, being the kind of government it is [deleted].

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A COUNTRY

You will have to admit, do you not think, Mr. Davies, that there would be grave political implications from having nuclear weapons in [deleted] any [deleted] country?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, the NATO alliance rests on a strategy of flexible response. The whole question is one which is addressed by our NATO allies, and I would not presume to answer for our partners in NATO as to their attitude toward the common defense strategy.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I did not ask you what their attitude was. I said do you not think having nuclear weapons in a country has grave political implications?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, my answer is, I think it is basically a strategic concept which is agreed upon by sovereign and equal nations within an alliance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think you should either say you refuse to answer or answer something that is relevant. I mean, this gibberish which has no relation to my question does not make much of a record. Say if you do not wish to answer you are at perfect liberty to say so.

Mr. DAVIES. I would prefer not to answer.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Just say so. Do not make a funny record when you say a lot of words that have no relation to the question. I can understand your reluctance being under instructions. I am not falling out with you about this. I am only making a point that the question I asked you is what would be the political implications or are there not grave political implications of having nuclear weapons in a country. You say you do not wish to answer it. I am not going to—

Mr. DAVIES. I believe this is basically a strategic basic defense question in the alliance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I asked you more specifically in Greece and you just said you did not wish to answer it. I did not ask you about strategic implications. I asked you if you do not think it would have any political or you wish not to say that.

Would you go so far as to say you do not believe that the presence of American nuclear weapons in a country has no political implications, would you do that for me or do you wish not to answer?

Mr. DAVIES. [Deleted.]

Senator FULBRIGHT. What about any country, [deleted]? Do you think if we had them in country X, would you still say you do not know whether there are any political implications?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that there could be political implications, sir, relative to the concept of the threat. I believe if a nation believes its future is threatened, its way of life is threatened, that the NATO strategy would be a factor of reassurance.

These doctrines, sir, are hammered out in committees within NATO. And as far as I am aware, have the general support of [deleted] the other Western governments.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you believe that the presence of nuclear weapons in a country on the border of Russia would have any influence at all on the attitude of Russia toward that country?

Mr. DAVIES. The alliance, sir, is purely defensive—

Senator FULBRIGHT. I did not ask you about the alliance. If you do not want to answer you are at perfect liberty to say, no, but do not go off on irrelevance.

Mr. DAVIES. Senator, this is not too relevant.

Senator FULBRIGHT. [Deleted] I asked you about the existence in a country on the border of Russia.

Mr. DAVIES. It is certainly a factor in the Soviet Union and it is certainly a factor in the military balance.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all I was seeking to inquire. Why do you find that so difficult to answer? It is not all that painful, is it?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have been coached to be careful about what you say to this committee, and it is hard to get it out.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I have not been coached. I was told by our Secretary or we have all been told to be as cooperative as possible within the regulations of our Department, and I hope that you, sir, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, are in a position to know that we have been as forthcoming in the past on a variety of delicate matters on some of which I have participated in drafting responses to your queries.

Senator FULBRIGHT. With regard to this question, you know we have already had testimony that [deleted].

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of any, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are not aware of them. We already have had testimony to the effect, which raises very serious questions, in dealing with a government like this raises the question, which of course, we find it extremely difficult to discuss and explore because of the attitude of the Department, in effect [deleted] and it is very difficult to resist the conclusion that one of the reasons why as you said it is a dilemma, you could not have it as a dilemma unless underneath you had a certain reluctance to be associated with an extremely cruel and barbarous regime. [deleted] but, you see, the political implications of this are very grave and I just wonder whether or not our Government has any longer the capacity to make an independent judgment about the regime, if we are not a prisoner of this arrangement, just as I think we are a prisoner of Thieu and Ky. We no longer have any independence to make a judgment on our own behalf unless the Congress can do it. You see, these are grave implications if there is anything to that.

MEANS BY WHICH UNITED STATES SHOULD PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ON GREECE

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I can assure you that within the administration, within the Department of State, we consider the problem of Greece to be very serious. I think all Americans of my generation have a philosophic attachment to what Greece has meant down through the years. We have close, we have had very close ties with the Greek people down since, particularly since 1948. We have over 2 million Greek-Americans in this country. The question is whether we try to use what influence we have to move this situation toward greater participation with the Greek people and their Government, restoration of civil liberties, or whether we turn our back and try to isolate the regime. And as I said earlier, sir, I think this is a very painful dilemma and it is one of those things being examined minutely within the National Security Council.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of course, the way you put it is the way you put the very thing in Vietnam. You assume the very matter at issue. The matter at issue then, as we put it, is not the objective of return to parliamentary government; we all agree on it. What we are arguing about is the means. You are saying, in effect, that the way to promote a return to free government is to support the colonels. What some of us are saying is the way to return to free government is not to support the colonels, and not to let the Greek people know we are behind them, that we give them arms, ammunition, money if they need it. We are really arguing about the means.

The President says he wants to get out of Vietnam; we all applaud it. We all want to get out. Then, when he says the way to get out is to invade Cambodia we all leave him. We are all arguing about the question. You just assume supporting the colonels is the way to move toward a democratic system. But this is the very question at issue. Some of us, including me, do not believe that by supporting the colonels and giving every evidence that we are behind them is a way to move. We think it only solidifies them in power.

Mr. DAVIES. This is indeed, sir, a question that has been looked at today. The administration's selective suspension of MAP deliveries is still in effect and this is part and parcel of the consideration of how best we can achieve our objective.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is still in effect with exceptions on the things they really want and also the papers give clear indications you are on the verge of making a decision to assume full aid, that is what we have read; I have read several times lately just as I read yours, they anticipate you are going to give arms to others in the Middle East. But it is very difficult for us to develop any exchange of views or to play any part at all where these questions are just assumed, and we cannot develop a real exercise with regard to it in the way of a discussion of what is the best way to return Greece to a free country.

I think it is rather notable that in this case, as in Vietnam and others, that most of our friends, traditional friends in NATO, for example, do not approve of our policy. They are not supporting the colonels on the theory that this will return them to free government, are they? Are any of them taking the same position we do?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware that they are.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You are not aware. So, again, as in the case of Vietnam and other ones we stand alone against the judgment of all of our best friends. I do not necessarily believe you ought to always follow your friends, but after a while I think when it is almost universally that way time after time, there ought to have at least sufficient humility to reexamine your premises, and maybe it is possible that supporting the colonels is not the best way to promote Greek democracy.

Mr. DAVIES. May I interject one element, sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Certainly.

DISAPPROVAL BY UNITED STATES OF PRESENT GREEK REGIME

Mr. DAVIES. The policy of suspension of MAP deliveries, selective suspension, is an indication of our disapproval of the extra constitutional nature of this regime. It remains in effect, has remained in effect. We believe—

Senator FULBRIGHT. With exceptions, I mean, you have already gone over the exceptions.

Mr. DAVIES. There is—there are about 56 million dollars worth of undelivered equipment in storage or undelivered.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, but you have already discussed the breaking of the embargo which we—you do not have to repeat it, I say with exceptions of that you have just finished delivery of the F-102's. I just want the record to be clear, I do not want to say it here and at another place to make it equivocal any more than it is.

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I wish I had the answer as to how to bring about the restoration of parliamentary government in Greece. I can assure you that Ambassador Tasca is fully aware of the desire of his government to move the junta in that direction and in my view, has done an outstanding job and in vigorously making our points in Athens.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I think you may have in a way but as I said earlier [deleted] as we have in the commitments, the colonels, just as General Thien, feel that we are hostage, and that he can do as he pleases and tell us where to go and we cannot do anything about it. Otherwise, how can you explain the lack of influence? If you say we have exerted every argument we have and yet you look at the results and they are nil, there is some reason why a great country giving them I do not know how many billion dollars, has so little influence on their policy.

TREND TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GREECE

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, there is a trend toward constitutional government. There have been these decrees previously mentioned. I believe that it is the quiet but persistent influence applied by the U.S. Government and Ambassador Tasca which have brought about this trend, and we would like to see it accelerated. Ambassador Tasca is doing everything possible to accelerate it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, you have offered no very convincing proof of any trend other than just the words you use. I mean, I know of no actions that I can think of they have taken which would support their statement. Have you any evidence to offer?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, that the April 10 decrees set up certain judicial guarantees which are being observed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In the face of that, we have just gone over it, they continue to imprison people without any cause, send them off to islands. There is very little evidence of change. This comes from the press which, unfortunately, many of us feel it is a little more unbiased than the Government's report.

Mr. DAVIES. May I, sir, for the record, in your interest, supply some recent information that has come through on releases that have occurred?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, I would like something other than just a release. I mean, these words that, "We are going to be good boys," what have they actually done? Have they actually quit imprisoning people? This matter, I am frank to say, about a young woman who happens to be secretary of the cultural exchange program is an absurd case, I mean, absurd from the point of view of there being any justification for it to put her in prison for a year. That is very recent. But if you have any evidence, concrete evidence, aside from a statement, a pious statement, that they love liberty, I wish you would put it in. I really do not think we ought to burden the record with these pious statements.

Mr. DAVIES. I will provide a list of recent releases, sir, I wish it were longer, but there have been some—

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not want releases, I want some evidence about it.

Mr. DAVIES. The names.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The musician, I forget the name.

Mr. DAVIES. Theodorakis.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you consider that significant?

Mr. DAVIES. No, there are other cases that I can cite.

#### ESCAPE OF ELENI VLACHOU

Senator FULBRIGHT. As a matter of fact, the woman, Vlachou—

Mr. DAVIES. Eleni Vlachou. She is in Washington this week.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But she escaped by subterfuge, that shows no relinquishment of their totalitarian attitude, does it?

Mr. DAVIES. She escaped, sir, I believe, in 1967.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean, she escaped. She is here, as a matter of fact, I think I am scheduled to meet her somewhere in the next day or two. I never have met her. I was invited to.

Mr. DAVIES. She is a great woman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know her?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does she support your theme they are moving toward democracy?

Mr. DAVIES. I have not seen her since 1968 in London. I met her at a mutual friend's at that time. She was highly critical of the regime and hoped the United States would use whatever influence it could to move it toward more liberal policies.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will you see her when she is here?

Mr. DAVIES. I will see her when she is here; I will see her tomorrow night socially.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the Department, will the President, the Secretary see her?

Mr. DAVIES. I am quite prepared, I am delighted to see her, certainly.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean officially.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, she is being received officially.

Senator FULBRIGHT. By the Secretary or whom?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. By the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Sisco.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Publicly or is this secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Not secretly. She is a distinguished lady.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. There is nothing secret about a reception.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean is it published, is all. I do not know whether the colonels approved of your receiving her. Have they given their approval?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. We have not consulted the colonels about that, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have not consulted?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Certainly not.

REFUSAL OF PRESIDENT TO SEE PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN

Senator FULBRIGHT. I notice you refused to, the President refused to, see the Prime Minister of Sweden last week, which is a very broad-minded approach. So why should you receive Madam Vlachou.

We cannot receive the Prime Minister of one of the oldest friends this country has had simply because he disagrees with our current policy. It is a rather immature attitude frankly it strikes me. The only similar example I can remember is when the President refused to see a Prime Minister or a President, although the Secretary of State did see him, and that was when Castro visited here in 1959-60. Do you remember this, were any of you here at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir. I was in Baghdad.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were you here at that time?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that may be the precedent for not receiving Mr. Palme. They asked the Vice President. Who was the Vice President?

Mr. HOLT. Vice President Nixon.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Saw Castro?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The reason this committee saw him, the Department asked us to, the Department asked this committee to receive Castro. They were not quite sure what his role was. They did not want to completely rebuff him, but they did not want to receive him either, so they asked this committee to receive him, and he came in here. It is the only time I have ever seen the bearded one. But I was quite ashamed of our attitude toward the Prime Minister of Sweden.

I think it would have been very useful if we really do have a justification for our policy to give him a little instruction about it and see if we could not persuade him rather than ignore him.

This is, I think, a very insulting attitude toward an extremely civilized country, far more civilized than most countries.

GREEK OPPOSITION TO PRESENT REGIME AND PERSONALITIES

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, with respect to Greek opposition and personalities, there is no reason why we should not see them. Ambassador Tasca, in his sampling of Greek opinion, is talking to those who oppose the regime at home.

I was to have seen Andreas Papandreou when he was here, but something occurred.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did you see him?

Mr. DAVIES. I was waiting; something came up that he did not come in.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you sure? I was under the impression the Department refused to see him.

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir; that is not correct. It was very short notice. I canceled a meeting I had and said I was ready to receive him—Mr. Sisco was not available but I was ready, willing, and able to receive him.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If I should see Madam Vlachou would I be at liberty to tell her that the Department would be glad to receive her, and at what level? Sisco is the highest level? The Secretary would not see her, would he?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. The arrangements with Mr. Sisco have already been made. The appointment is fixed.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Already made. I just wanted to know where we stood. The matter might come up.

Mr. DAVIES. She is a charming woman and her paper was the New York Times of Greece.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am reminded that—what was that you said, the New York Times of Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. Let me say it was an eminent paper, sir. May I recall that remark, sir. It was one of the best papers in Athens.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And one of the first to be closed up. That may happen here.

Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, she closed it voluntarily as an action of protest against the extraconstitutional nature of the regime. It was a voluntary action on her part.

The regime sought to get her to reopen it in order to reestablish normalcy, and I suppose to indicate their tolerance of opposition elements.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But it is a fact she escaped; they did not allow her to leave, is that not so?

Mr. DAVIES. It is my understanding.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I just read a story a few days ago in which she described the subterfuge.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes. She has just written a book called "House Arrest," in which she describes it.

POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF PLAN FOR GREEK COUP

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have just been handed a note that Mr. C. L. Sulzberger, in Foreign Affairs, said that the plan the colonels followed in Greece was originally drawn up as a part of the NATO contingency plan to protect the Greek Government under the code name, I believe, of Prometheus.

1812

Do you know anything about that?

Mr. DAVIES. I have read that article, sir. I am not aware of the facts. Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it accurate or inaccurate?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does anybody in the Department? Do you know?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. I do not; no, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know?

Mr. PRANGER. No, sir. I believe Mr. Richardson and General Goodpaster are coming before the committee. It may be at that level there is better information on the subject. We do not have it.

Senator JAVITS. What is that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sulzberger, he wrote an article that said that the plan the coup followed was the plan originated by NATO called Promethens for the protection of the Greek Government. They just took it over and tried to dispose of the Government.

Do you have any questions?

#### SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Senator JAVITS. If the chairman is willing, I would like to ask a question, and please correct me if this has been asked before.

I must apologize to the chairman, Senator Symington, but I am the author of the administration's bill, and the sponsor of \$1.5 billion to desegregate the schools, and I had to be there for the first hearing.

If you have not testified on the present crisis respecting the Eastern Mediterranean, which is wrapped up in the Israeli-Arab confrontation, and the Russian, the new Russian, participation in the Nile River Valley, I would like to have your comment because I note you say in your statement on page 2:

Though Soviet techniques have varied since that time, domination of the Eastern Mediterranean clearly remains a primary goal of Soviet policy.

How does that relate to the existing crisis?

Mr. DAVIES. Senator Javits, I believe it is directly related. The Soviet objectives have not changed. Some of their tactics have.

The strength of Greece and Turkey and the alliance, in my judgment, is a very important factor in our Arab-Israeli situation.

The Soviets have parlayed the impasse between the United Arab Republic and Israel into gaining more and more military concessions from President Nasser.

The establishment of SAM-III sites serviced by Soviet technicians, the flying by Soviet pilots in Egypt give the Soviets not only greater and greater influence in the country, but also integrate them more and more into the Egyptian forces.

[Deleted] the Soviets are conducting surveillance of the 6th Fleet. In my judgment, the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean is basically a political-military force, and Soviet political influence has increased by the factor by which our military-political influence is decreased, and I believe that any weakness in the NATO Alliance ipso facto gives the Soviet greater influence in this situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Senator JAVITS. Now, we must accept, tragic as it may sound and be, the fact that if the Soviet Union wished to throw its might against

Israel it could eliminate Israel; isn't that true? Isn't that an enemy capability?

Mr. DAVIES. It is an enemy capability. I doubt very much, sir, that it is the enemy intention.

Senator JAVITS. I know, but your own experience and mine indicate that when you are assessing the situation you do not give the benefit of good intentions to the enemy. You assess their capability.

Now, suppose they did eliminate Israel, what would be the effect upon the NATO alliance in terms of that in the way you state it, domination of the Eastern Mediterranean clearly remains a primary goal of Soviet policy?

Mr. DAVIES. I would assume, sir, and this is a hypothetical situation which I cannot imagine coming about, but that this would mean that the Soviet Union in supporting the Arab cause would have established it so firmly not only in the United Arab Republic but still have some way to go before they have seriously compromised Egyptian independence, as well as other Arab countries where Soviet influence is, at best, slight or nonexistent.

I think the Near East, and the North African littoral of the Mediterranean would increasingly be hostile to the Western free world, Western free world position.

Senator JAVITS. What would it mean to Greece and Turkey in terms of the strategic situation?

Mr. DAVIES. It would be serious, sir, because the Soviet military power would have leapfrogged the alliance. [Deleted.]

Senator JAVITS. Would it have any effect, in your opinion, on Italy or Spain or both?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe in the long run, sir, it would enhance the Soviet military-political situation in the Mediterranean. I believe, [deleted].

Senator JAVITS. To the Soviet Union?

Mr. DAVIES. To the Soviet Union.

IMPORTANCE OF SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT TO  
EUROPEAN SECURITY

Senator JAVITS. Have you gentlemen assessed at all the effect upon Europe of the domination of the Middle East which contributes 50 percent of Europe's energy resources to Europe's ability, outside of the Mediterranean littoral countries, to function as an industrial machine? Would they have to make concessions to the Soviet Union for economic reasons?

Mr. DAVIES. If the terms of delivery from the Near East became so as to put a Soviet hand on the tap, the economies of Western Europe would be hostage to the Soviet Union or their supported governments in the Near East.

Senator JAVITS. Is this wishful hoping that this could not happen or what is the State Department's thinking on the subject?

Mr. DAVIES. We believe that NATO is a very important element in this, sir, and the strength of our NATO Allies.

We believe also that the best way to prevent this from happening is to work strongly toward a settlement between the Arab States and Israel and, as you know, sir, we are energetically involved in pursuit of this objective at this very moment.

Senator JAVITS. Is our only hope a political settlement at any price or are we prepared to help Israel to maintain its national integrity through the use of arms, if need be?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, Israel's defensive capability is important as Greece's in stabilizing the situation in the Near East, and it is a factor which is very much weighed in current planning.

Senator JAVITS. Is it fair, you are testifying about Greece and Turkey, is it fair to say that Israel's survival and effectiveness is an important factor in respect of the security of Greece and Turkey?

Mr. DAVIES. In my judgment, it is, sir. The strength and stability of Greece and Turkey are also major factors in the Near Eastern situation.

If the alliance should come asunder I think that our position in the Near East and the position of our friends there would be substantially weakened.

Senator JAVITS. Well now, you speak of the Near Eastern situation, but this is the European situation.

What I am trying to get at is whether or not it is a fact that what we are doing or what we should do about Israel is equally important to Europe as it is to the Near East.

Mr. DAVIES. A settlement of the Arab-Israel problem and the continued independence, security of Israel, are, in my judgment, essential to the strength and security of Europe.

Senator JAVITS. Now, we gather, at least I gather—I will be very personal about this—that the Europeans, some of them, at least and, perhaps many of them, are not as impressed with that, and they think they can do just as well if Israel is expendable.

Could you comment on that. Is that or is it not a fact?

Mr. DAVIES. I know of no Western European state, sir, which is not as seriously concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Near East as we are, and this goes for France as well as our other allies.

Senator JAVITS. Well now, what are they prepared to do about it or are they just going to hold our coat?

Mr. DAVIES. I think all, sir, are willing to involve themselves politically, and we are in close consultation with the British and French in our negotiations with the Soviets, and we are, as you know, getting support from our allies in the four-power talks in New York.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, would you repeat that.

Mr. DAVIES. We are getting support from our Western allies in the four-power talks in New York. [Deleted.]

#### ATTITUDE OF FRANCE TOWARD ISRAEL

Senator FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will yield again, do you think after Israel paid for the planes and France not only refused to deliver them but gave them to Arab countries, that is evidence of supporting our position?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that the planes that were purchased, sir, are still in Israeli custody in France.

As far as I know, they physically have been turned over to Israel but their export has not been permitted.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator will yield just once more, this is the first time I have ever heard that. Will you check that out and let me know what the facts are?

1815

Mr. DAVIES. I will send you the facts, sir, but it is, I believe, true still.

(The information referred to follows:)

FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT SOLD TO ISRAEL

Export of the [deleted] Mirage aircraft sold to Israel was not permitted [deleted].

Senator JAVITS. However, they are not yet prepared, the European powers, including France are not yet prepared, to do anything by way of military supply.

Mr. DAVIES. To Israel?

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. Senator, may I provide for you and for the committee the latest estimate of what is going to Israel from France?

Senator JAVITS. All right.

(The information referred to follows:)

MILITARY SUPPLY FROM FRANCE TO ISRAEL

France has maintained its policy of embargo on all armaments shipments to Middle East nations directly involved in the conflict. [Deleted.]

ARAB-ISRAEL ARMS BALANCE

Could we also know from you or, perhaps, we ought to call Secretary Laird, what is the assessment of Israel's capability to hold off this formidable armada, including the Russians, and what supply is required to enable them to do it, and what casualties are likely to be imposed, and can Israel absorb such casualties. Could we get any light on that? I assume the Defense Department has made those estimates.

Mr. DAVIES. Senator, in response to the President's request, the entire question of the Arab-Israel arms balance was gone into in intensive detail.

Senator JAVITS. Well, has there been in the Defense Department an assessment of the Soviet capability beyond their intentions?

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, speaking from the Department of Defense standpoint, I think maybe it is wise to put in the record that on June 1, 1970, there were 43 Soviet ships connected with a squadron in the Mediterranean. This is a rather low number compared with some other past figures in recent months.

Among these are certain guided missile frigates and cruisers with surface-to-surface potential.

In response to your question as to whether the Department of Defense has looked into this matter, I can say that we watch the Soviet fleet very closely with our 6th Fleet, and this is a constant source of concern to us, both from the standpoint of the Middle East and from the standpoint of the coastal protection of Greece and Turkey.

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. PRANGER. So we do follow the movement of these ships very closely, including the submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the Soviets are putting their fleet underwater, while we maintain ours on top, isn't it just as fair to say that the Soviet Navy is following our fleet as it is to say that the U.S. Navy is following their fleet?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Especially as they consistently have their planes over our carriers, as is well known through pictures in the press?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir. I think that the composition of the Soviet fleet includes some other interesting elements, including helicopter carriers and guided missile frigates and cruisers with surface-to-surface missiles which [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Senator?

Senator JAVITS. There is a direct relationship and, if so, what is it with relation to the size and composition of the Soviet fleet and the capability of the Soviet Union to carry on air or other operations against Israel should it choose to do so by way of enemy capability?

Mr. PRANGER. [Deleted.] There have been some maneuvers by the Soviet fleet, but these maneuvers have been primarily oriented against or in relation to our 6th Fleet [deleted].

It is difficult to see from maneuvers of the fleet, with the exception of some landing exercise, I believe, which was held in Syria recently or sometime, just what exactly the fleet will do, and the Soviet squadron—it is not a fleet, it is a squadron, made up of North Sea and Black Sea elements, but this was due—one could use one's imagination, but I would not care to speculate on this point.

MEANS BY WHICH SOVIET CAPABILITY IS MEASURED

Senator JAVITS. Now, I was thinking of it more in aid of aircraft. Is there any other answer than that that you could give us? In other words, is the Soviet capability to be measured solely or almost solely by ability to fly planes from the Soviet Union to Egypt which, of course, is very simple, or must it also be measured by the degree of servicing, POL, and so forth, which would come by way of the squadron?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir; I see what you mean.

The Soviets, of course, are running a very active freighter traffic between their ports and the UAR, and so this element of the naval squadron does not include the freighter traffic into Alexandria.

Senator JAVITS. Has that traffic materially increased?

Mr. PRANGER. I will have to scratch the reports—

Mr. DAVIES. If I may, at the time of the decision to put in the SAM-III, we detected a sizable increase in shipping and air flights. I have not checked it recently, Senator Javits, but I believe it is now back to normal.

Senator JAVITS. Could you check it and let us know?

Mr. DAVIES. I will, sir.

(The information follows:)

SOVIET SHIPMENT TO THE UAR

Confirming my earlier remarks, we detected a substantial increase in surface and air shipment during the spring months. During late May and early June the flow of shipments appeared to slack off in the direction of more normal levels although they did not fall back to the approximate situation which prevailed before the marked increases began in February.

ENFORCEMENT OF PROVISIONS OF MONTREUX CONVENTION

Senator JAVITS. My last question along this line, aside from the Soviet Union's capability, and the Israeli ability to contain the situation, is the question of whether any estimate has been made of the elements of attrition which would occur in respect to Israel's airpower if the Soviet Union should adopt a more active role as, for example, to give air cover to the building of the SAM-III sites in the Suez Canal Zone, which it is not doing now?

Mr. DAVIES. This has been a part of the assessment.

Senator JAVITS. Assessment.

Mr. DAVIES. Which is, as you know, continually examined.

Senator JAVITS. Does Turkey enforce the provisions of the convention which require Russian naval craft to proceed in daylight and identified?

Mr. DAVIES. Generally, the Montreux Convention provisions are strictly observed.

Senator JAVITS. Is that an important element of U.S. policy in relation to Turkey? Would that be enforced?

Mr. DAVIES. It is, sir.

RELATIONSHIP OF UNITED STATES AND GREEK MILITARY

Senator JAVITS. Finally, about Greece itself, and I listened with the greatest interest to our chairman's questions, does the State Department have a projection as to what it expects and what it is pressing for with the colonels in terms of opening up the situation in Greece, and to what extent does it have the cooperation of the Defense Department?

We are advised, at least I am advised, that very friendly relations continue with our military people, and that this is a source of great comfort to the colonels.

I noticed what you say about the limitations on the nature of the military supply. But this obviously is a very delicate, and also a very worrisome situation; that is, my information is, that we won't take too much more time to have the colonels so deeply entrenched that it will be a long time before you will get them out on whatever terms they want to face.

Mr. DAVIES. Senator Javits, our military relations with Greece have been very close since 1948.

The personnel of the Greek Military Establishment have not changed, and to that extent it has continued. At the same time, I would like you to know we have one of our strongest ambassadors in Athens who is running the show for the U.S. Government. There is no change that I am aware of either in the field or here to our approach to the Greek Government.

As far as assessment of what we can expect subsequent to Mr. Abshire's conversation with the chairman, we have asked Ambassador Tasca to prepare a report which will be made available to the committee.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

USE OF VOICE OF AMERICA INSTALLATIONS BY GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask one or two questions? I was asking you about the radio. I understand we built for our

own use and the Greeks use it also as a very extensive radio broadcasting facility beginning in 1962?

Mr. DAVIES. We have some Voice of America installations in Greece, sir, if this is what you are referring to.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. We have a medium wave, shortwave transmitter in Rhodes from which we broadcast to the Near East primarily in Arabic. There is an installation at Kavalla, and one at Salonika.

Senator FULBRIGHT. At the time of the coup, of course, which brought to power the Greek colonels, we recognized their right to use this, these facilities, the Greek Government, did we not?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We did not? Put it this way, then the counter-coup, when the King of Greece attempted a coup, and he at one point tried to send a message to be broadcast to Greece over the Voice of America outlet, that it never was done; is that not correct? They refused to do it; is that not right?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of that, sir. The King was at Larissa, where there was a very low powered Greek transmitter which he used.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But under the arrangement with Greece [deleted.]

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I will provide the answer for the record.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We have the answer, but I thought you would be willing to confirm it. I want this in the record. This is what the agreement says.

But do you know whether the Greeks are still using these facilities for their purposes?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not, sir. I will find out for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

Under an arrangement with Greece there is to be a loan of a 250 KW short-wave transmitter and of the use of a 150 KW medium-wave transmitter primarily during daylight hours, when these facilities now under construction are completed, in addition to the use at present during daylight hours of a medium-wave facility at Thessaloniki.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Does your aide--I did not get your name, sir--

Mr. VIGDERMAN. My name is Vigderman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you on the Greek Desk?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you know about this?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. My recollection is a little shaky, but what it comes to is that part of the deal in connection with all of the Voice of America facilities was that a station we had built would be turned over to them and for their use, going back to 1962.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, that is a loan, that is under one, loan of a 50 kilowatt medium wave transmitter. In addition to loans of similar transmitters at Corfu under the 1955 agreement, and Athens under the 1955 agreement, and the Government of Greece agrees to allot some time on this on a nonpriority basis. That is one.

I am talking about full priority use at U.S. Government expense of the 250 kilowatt shortwave transmitter. Is that still in effect?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. I am not sure, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I will find out from the Information Agency.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you find out whether or not the Greek King sought to broadcast over this facility and it was denied to him the use of it at the instance of his attempted counter-coup?

Mr. DAVIES. I will look into the files, sir.

(The information follows:)

**REPORTS ABOUT ATTEMPTS BY KING CONSTANTINE TO BROADCAST OVER VOICE OF AMERICA FACILITIES DURING HIS UNSUCCESSFUL COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT**

Immediately following the failure of King Constantine's effort to oust the military regime in December 1967, rumors that the King had tried to use Voice of America facilities during his attempted counter coup circulated both within and outside Greece. Specifically, the King was alleged to have prepared a tape, calling for support from the Greek people, which he tried to have broadcast over the VOA station in Rhodes.

Whether or not the King prepared such a tape, there is no record that the King or any representative of the King contacted U.S. officials in an attempt to broadcast over VOA facilities.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They can use this 250-kilowatt shortwave transmitter to broadcast to Greeks all over Europe, can they not, in the Greek language?

Mr. DAVIES. I assume so, sir. A 250-kilowatt—

Senator FULBRIGHT. When you assume so, can you find out and say yes or no?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir; I will.

(See above.)

Senator FULBRIGHT. The significance of this is here. I wish to show by these agreements, the continuation of them, there is this close association with the Greek Government under these continuing agreements. This agreement was for 15 years, although it is cancelable, it may be terminated with 1 year's notice. If it is not terminated it will run for 15 years, and the continued support of the Greek colonels and the continued use, we believe, of the transmitter's facilities, which again confirms in the eyes of the Greeks and nearly everyone else, our close support of the Greek Government.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, the facility is of great use to us in our information program. I am familiar with our Arabic programming which does have some impact in the area.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Apparently adverse, is it not? Most of these are adverse, apparently. You do not pretend that they are favorable, do you?

Mr. DAVIES. Whenever I have been in a crisis situation in the area I think invariably the Foreign Office officials, the Government turns to the "Voice of America" for accurate information.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Accurate information?

Mr. DAVIES. Accurate news on developments. In my opinion, sir, it does have impact.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, it is sort of hard to take that, you know, when the Secretary of State comes before this committee 2 days before the invasion of Cambodia and testifies without mentioning it, and for you to say that you regard this as a source of accurate information by everybody else, it is a little difficult for me to take without protesting.

Mr. DAVIES. I am quoting, sir, my Arab colleagues. I do not think they listen to it for entertainment, but in my view they do consider news broadcasts over the "Voice of America" as free from distortion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I do not think I have any more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps this might be a time to stop because we have a Policy Committee lunch. If it is all right with you we will resume at 2:30. Fine, thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., a recess was taken until 2:30 o'clock p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SYMINGTON. The meeting will come to order.

Mr. PAUL. I believe Mr. Davies was reading his statement on page 6, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF RODGER DAVIES, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J.  
PRANGER—(Resumed)

Mr. DAVIES. Turning to Turkey, in the post-World War II years the Soviet Union demanded that Turkey cede two of its provinces bordering the Soviet Union and that it be allowed to establish military bases in the Turkish Straits. Turkey rejected these demands, but it felt a grave and continuing threat from the Soviet Union. The position of Turkey appeared even riskier early in 1947, when an economic crisis forced Great Britain to withdraw precipitately from the supporting role it had played for both Greece and Turkey, leading to the American assumption of this role, as enunciated in the Truman Doctrine. From mid-1947, then, the United States has been Turkey's principal source of military assistance and, until recent years, the primary provider of economic assistance.

From the first discussions among Western nations of a defense pact to protect Europe from the Soviet threat, Turkey actively sought to be included in any such arrangement. Recognition of the depth of Turkey's and Greece's commitment to participate in the common defense against the expansionary efforts of Communist nations followed their contribution of effective contingents to the United Nations

forces in the Korean conflict. Membership in NATO became a reality early in 1952, and a new phase developed in America's relationship with Turkey.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me interrupt there for a minute. Would you furnish for the record what equipment and/or personnel each country furnished to the Korean conflict?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Also how long they stayed there and whether or not we put up the money involved.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows.)

GREEK AND TURKISH CONTRIBUTION—KOREAN CONFLICT

Greece furnished one (1) augmented infantry battalion plus a squadron of seven (7) C-47 aircraft. Turkey provided one (1) brigade consisting of three (3) infantry battalions. The Greek battalion strength was mostly in the 850-1100 range. Whereas the Turkish unit strength peaked at about 5455. Greece and Turkey provided pay and allowances with the U.S. furnishing weapons, equipment and logistical support. Turkey is still represented in Korea by an eleven-man Honor Guard attached to the United Nations Command.

IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY IN AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

Mr. DAVIES. A vital airbase was constructed [deleted] near Adana, in south central Turkey, and another air base several years later near Izmir. Turkey has become a vital link in our air transport operations from Europe and the Mediterranean to the east and south. A number of facilities also were established to make use of Turkey's natural geographical advantages in support of the common defense.

CAPACITY OF TURKEY TO DEFEND HERSELF

Turkey's own defense efforts have been greatly facilitated by American military assistance; its unwieldy and too-large army, which in 1947 was perhaps a quarter of a century behind the Soviet and Western forces, was scaled down in size, and its capability considerably enhanced through the provision of modern equipment and technical training. Turkey's capacity to defend itself, especially as part of NATO has been immensely improved. A large volume of American economic assistance has also been instrumental in assisting Turkey to score impressive gains in its economic, social, and political development. Our continued substantial assistance in both these areas is essential to the attainment by Turkey of self-sustaining economic growth, which should begin in the mid-1970's.

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record the amount of economic and military aid the United States has given Turkey to date?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows.)

TOTAL OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TURKEY

Economic aid from the United States to Turkey during the period July 1946 through June 1969 totalled \$2,555.3 million. Of this total, loans accounted for \$1,370.6 million and grants amounted to \$1,184.7 million. Military assistance during the same period totalled \$3,045.1 million, of which \$154.9 million represents grants from excess stocks and the remainder Military Assistance Program and other grant aid.

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO GREECE

Senator SYMINGTON. And also the same information for Greece.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The information referred to follows:)

TOTAL UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

In the period 1946 to 1969 United States economic aid to Greece in all forms totaled \$1,883 million.

United States economic assistance to Greece through AID and its predecessor agencies totaled \$1,061 million. The last AID grant assistance was made in 1962, the last aid program loan in 1964.

Other programs, Food for Peace (PL 480 titles I and II), long-term EX-IM Bank loans, Greek-Turkish aid and surplus property credits came to \$821 million. The last of the expenditures, in the amount of \$700 thousand, was made under the Food for Peace program in 1968.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Beginning in 1947 (during the Greek-Turkish aid period) through 1969, United States military assistance to Greece totaled \$2 billion. Under the Military Assistance Program beginning in 1950, and through 1969, the total is \$1,456 million. During the same period excess equipment with a utility value of \$101 million was delivered to Greece.

During FY 1970 actual deliveries of U.S. military assistance to Greece will come to about \$46.5 million; \$33.6 million in grant assistance, \$12.9 million in excess equipment.

DETERIORATION OF UNITED STATES-TURKEY RELATIONS OVER CYPRUS PROBLEM

Mr. DAVIES. The American presence in Turkey grew steadily during the first decade of Turkey's membership in NATO (1952-63), and, although minor difficulties cropped up, the United States-Turkish relationship was mutually satisfactory. The eruption of the Cyprus problem, and America's role in attempting to dissuade Turkey from exercising its treaty right to intervene on the island, resulted in widespread disillusionment in Turkey. The national frustration the Cyprus problem produced, and sustains, brought about a climate in which minor grievances with the United States grew larger, and a certain level of disenchantment with the United States lingers on in tandem with the persistence of the Cyprus situation. The United States and its presence became convenient targets for a hostile and increasingly violent element of extremists, chiefly far-left students. [Deleted.] The Government of Turkey seems today to have the public and institutional support needed to maintain order when it is threatened, and it is moving to strengthen its hand through a range of legislative measures recently introduced in the parliament.

1823

IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY TO NATO

Turkey is an effective and dedicated member of NATO whose geographical situation has been—and continues to be—of considerable importance to the defense of the NATO area. Equally important for Turkey is the coincidence of its alliance membership with its desire to participate fully in the Western family of nations. That is the end of the statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF WITNESS' STATEMENT

This document is classified "Secret." What is secret about it?

Mr. DAVIES. Primarily, sir; the reference to military installations and certain comments about the political difficulties that both governments have. If you desire, I am certain that we could go over it and lower the classification.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us have a declassified copy.

Mr. DAVIES. All right, sir; I will have it done.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is no secret that we have military installations in Greece, is it?

Mr. DAVIES. Nor in Turkey.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nor in Turkey. What else should be secret?

Mr. DAVIES. We will go over it, sir; as part of the declassification process.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fine. But it is your statement and you originated the classification. What is there in it that should not be declassified?

Mr. DAVIES. Primarily, sir; the description of our various military establishments in both States.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is secret about our military installations?

Mr. DAVIS. On page 4, sir; the last paragraph on the page touches upon our military—

Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't all that known?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, we will go over it and, in particular, I would like to take a look at some of the comments we have made about our Greek-Turkish relations.

Senator SYMINGTON. You bring up this paragraph:

In addition to the JUSMAAG personnel, U.S. military forces in Greece currently occupy a Naval communications station north of Athens.

Everybody knows that, don't they?

Mr. DAVIES. I would assume so, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Certainly the people of Greece do—" \* \* \* installations and port sites in Crete." That is known. The people circulate freely among the Americans, do they not, in the community?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. "Military Airlift Command facilities at the Athens airport," I have been there previously, everybody knows about that, "and POL and storage facilities at Piraeus." They must know that.

"Under agreements with the Greek Government, the United States and NATO may use various air and naval facilities in the event of hostilities between NATO and Soviet-bloc nations."

Well, that is perfectly clear to everybody, is it not, under the NATO agreement?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. I think this is a case of overclassification and it will be remedied.

Senator SYMINGTON. "U.S. military communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the operations of the U.S. 6th Fleet in that area depend very heavily upon use of these facilities." Everybody knows that, do they not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Finally, "U.S. military presence in Greece has generally been welcomed by the Greek people and has caused no serious public relations problems to date." I should think you would want that known. Is there anything classified about that?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who classified this for you, because this is the paragraph that you brought up as the reason for classification.

Mr. DAVIES. This was put together on the basis of several drafts, sir, that were submitted.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Wolf, do you know anything about it?

Mr. WOLF. Well, Senator, this statement, as all of the statements of the key witnesses who have appeared before this committee, have been written with a view to getting the maximum part of it released.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is it declassified?

Mr. WOLF. We will declassify it, sir. We have not been over that yet, but I would say in this statement probably 85 to 90 percent could be released.

Senator SYMINGTON. What could not?

Mr. WOLF. I am not prepared to say, sir. I have not studied it.

Senator SYMINGTON. As far as I can see there is nothing in the statement which is not known. If it is generally known by the Greeks and the Turks and all the other people, why shouldn't the American people know about it?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, there are a few allusions here I would like to see eliminated if we are going to publish it. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Pell, we welcome you this afternoon. Do you have any questions you would like to ask the witnesses?

PREVIOUS ACCESS OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO GREEK KING

Senator PELL. I am just particularly interested in Greece, and I wanted to take advantage of your hospitality to sit in. I look forward to reading the record of this morning's session.

There is one particular question I would like to ask you about.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fine.

Senator PELL. Concerning communications. When the Greek King was over here the one thing he was interested in more than anything else, at least in his talks with me, was if he organized a coup whether he would have access to communications, and he was much more interested in that than military factors.

At the time of the coup, I understand this morning this question was discussed, but I am not sure it was fully answered, I believe he made an effort in that direction. I believe part of the rights that the USIA, part of the arrangements are, that the USIA has with its facilities is that the local government has access to it.

I believe this was one of the questions that the King raised with President Johnson. You probably have a memo of this conversation, of that, in the State Department, and I am curious, did the King ask for access to communications facilities?

Mr. DAVIES. Senator Pell, I am personally unaware of this situation. I undertook to examine the record we have and to supply the answer to the committee.

Senator PELL. I thought you were, what you were unfamiliar with, was the arrangement, the treaty arrangement.

Mr. DAVIES. No; I also am unaware that he actually did ask.

Senator PELL. I am asking, did he ask.

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know. Do you know?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. No; I do not know.

Mr. DAVIES. I will look into it.

BRUTALIZATION PERPETRATED BY GREEK GOVERNMENT

Senator PELL. Two more questions of a general nature concerning Greece. Is it accepted as a matter of course that if one is interrogated for political activity, and one is not famous, well-known, that one is pretty brutalized?

Mr. DAVIES. I think there were some excesses.

We are somewhat reassured by the fact that the International Red Cross was permitted to send a team there in November, and it is still there, and I believe it has access to all places of detention in Athens. I have not seen their reports, but the fact that the group is still there I find somewhat reassuring.

Senator PELL. Is it not correct that the reports are submitted to the Greek Government and that is one reason why we have not had access to them.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. That is correct.

Senator PELL. Unfortunately.

So there is no reason why you should. In other words, this is a report to the Greeks.

The other point is do they have access, and do they take access to the police stations? Nobody has said there were any cruelties perpetrated when people have been sentenced. The problem arises in the presentencing stage.

Do they have access and do they take advantage of that access?

Mr. DAVIES. This I cannot answer.

My impression, Senator, from talking to people on our staff who have recently come back, is that there were some excesses, that the regime has not been conscious of its public relations responsibilities, and its responsibilities as a government to publicly disassociate itself from these excesses.

It is our impression that things are slowly getting better, although there are still cases of isolation of detainees [deleted].

It is our hope that with the presence of the ICRC, a very strong position on the need for the government to make certain none of its officials trespass on the right of the individual, this will bring an end to practices which, as you know, are fairly general in this part of the world, have been even before the revolution.

Senator PELL. Not to this degree.

Mr. DAVIES. No, I quite agree.

BELIEF OF GREEK PEOPLE THAT JUNTA IS SUPPORTED BY  
UNITED STATES

Senator PELL. With regard to the opinions of the Greek people, I am sure you will agree with me that the majority of Greeks, not the intellectuals maybe, but the majority of Greeks believe that the junta enjoys the support of the United States. Would you disagree with that statement?

Mr. DAVIES. I have not been to Greece since the revolution, sir. I would prefer not to answer until I have been there. I hope to get there next month and spend some time.

Senator PELL. I wonder if there is anybody in the phalanx behind you who has been in Greece more recently who has an opinion in this regard.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. I was there on the order of 2 weeks in January, and the question you are asking is a very hard one to answer because, in effect, it is a current Gallup Poll question, what do the Greek people believe.

I am convinced that a respectable portion of them do believe, in fact, that the Government is supported by the United States.

Senator PELL. Certainly every bit of intelligence—I will not use the word "intelligence"—but the impression from the conversations I have had is to that effect.

Do you have any thoughts as to what can be done as a matter of policy—presumably this view of mine is correct—what can be done to disillusion the Greek people of the fact that they enjoy the support of the American Government or does it enjoy the support of the American Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Senator, I believe that—

Senator PELL. This is a policy question, and I am interested in your reaction as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. DAVIES. I think we have made clear through the selective suspension of shipments of military equipment which the administration, that is, the Executive, undertook after April of 1967 is one effort to open some light between us and this extraconstitutional regime.

U.S. POLICY OF MAINTAINING WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE

Our policy is one of maintaining working relations with this Government in order to keep up our ties with the Greek people while, at the same time, urging the regime to move toward the restoration of a parliamentary government.

It is very difficult to maintain these working relationships and, at the same time, take a very high tone public policy of criticism. This is part of the dilemma which we were discussing earlier.

But quite certainly I know of no one in the Department of State, at least, who condones the long-term continuance of this extraconstitutional regime.

Senator PELL. But the fact remains that no principal officer of our Government has uttered the slightest word of public criticism of the administration to the Greek Government since the junta came in.

Mr. DAVIES. Senator, I believe that the effort has been to work quietly in Athens primarily to use what influence we have to, in the first in-

stance, establish the trend of return to parliamentary constitutional government and, in the second, to accelerate this trend.

The trend is there, I think you can point to certain things that have been done. It is too slow and, as we were discussing this morning, we still do not have the question answered whether there will be elections next year.

Senator PELL. Finally and, as you know, I appreciate your offer to give me a briefing on the Tasca report, but before giving you my reply, I want to consult with our chairman because there are other members of the committee who are interested in it as well as I am. I personally think we should see it.

DOES TASCA REPORT RECOMMEND RESUMING SHIPMENT OF MILITARY GOODS  
TO GREECE?

But does it recommend the resumption of the shipment of military goods back to Greece? Can you answer that?

Mr. DAVIES. Let me clarify the status of the Tasca report, Senator Pell. The Ambassador has provided a whole series of reports. He has had over 100 conversations with members of the regime, some of the opposition, intellectual, professional people, and the report itself is in response to an NSC directive and, as such, is privileged.

We have asked Ambassador Tasca to put together for us, to transmit to you and the chairman, if he so desires, a statement of developments as he sees them in Greece, where they are trending, and what the prospects are.

I have not—this is not in yet, but in the main these reports constitute only one element in the decisionmaking problem.

The Ambassador has filed at least one report of conversation every day, and some of them have been tremendously revealing of the situation there. And, taken as a whole, they will be one part of the decision which has to be made by the administration of where we are going to go with this regime.

Senator PELL. My question was specifically though does the Ambassador recommended the resumption of arms shipments.

Mr. DAVIES. I am afraid I cannot comment on that, sir, because it is part of the NSC response.

Senator PELL. Right.

FAILURE OF UNITED STATES TO DEMONSTRATE OPPOSITION TO NATURE OF  
GREEK REGIME

I want to add I am not trying to heckle you in any way as individuals, but this has been a matter of concern to me for several years now, and I could not understand why we worked, indicated to our friends at the Council of Europe, that we did not like their actions with regard to Greece.

I would have thought we would have encouraged the Council of European Nations, as a means of demonstrating our position at the same time, as you know, in Rome, we did all that we could to discourage any action on the part of Denmark and Norway and, I believe, Germany. I am not sure.

If what you say is correct, that we disapprove of the government in Greece, why don't we just let things take their course? Why do we try to act as their defender with other nations?

Mr. DAVIES. The consideration here is the integrity of the alliance at a time when we are having problems in the eastern Mediterranean.

Senator PELL. But, forgive me, the country that is most concerned about the alliance would be, I think, Norway which would be the closest to the possible enemy, and they are the ones who think most strongly that the Greeks should be out of NATO.

Mr. DAVIES. The views of our allies were exchanged in Rome. They are on record as deplored the nature of the regime.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, did we publicly, did we privately, state that in the presence of the Greek Ambassador that we deplored the nature of the regime?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I am sorry. They are on record, the Danes, in particular.

Senator PELL. Yes, they are on record publicly.

Mr. DAVIES. I think the question is—and I do not have the answer here—is whether the community, the western community, working together cannot expedite the return to parliamentary government in Greece by keeping working relations with it rather than attempting to isolate it.

The regime is a military regime and, as far as I can see from the reports that are in, it has the support of the military, the Greek military.

Senator PELL. That is where we differ. I think we can do a greater job of nudging.

To be very specific with regard to our relations with the regime, am I correct in saying there was a high level military Greek delegation here in the last few weeks?

Mr. PRANGER. Sir, Admiral Margaritas came to visit Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator PELL. What is his job?

Mr. PRANGER. He is Chief of the Greek Naval Forces.

Senator PELL. That is a high level military visit.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, it is.

Senator PELL. What did they do in Washington when they were here? Did they just stay with the Navy Department?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, he did. He was here as a guest of the Chief of Naval Operations as part of an annual visiting program which the Chiefs of Staff have with military leaders worldwide and, I believe, he was the first Greek, senior Greek, official here since the coup.

Senator PELL. Was the visit publicized in Greece?

Mr. PRANGER. No, it was not.

Senator PELL. Are you sure?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, I do not know. I have not read—

Mr. VIGDERMAN. If it was it did not seem to rise to the level where it was reported back to us.

Senator PELL. I am surprised it was not mentioned in the Greek press.

Mr. PRANGER. [Deleted.]

Senator PELL. Would not our national interest suffer at all if he had not been invited?

Mr. PRANGER. This is a matter which is, I suppose one could argue, [deleted].

But again, our Navy has had a close relationship with the Greek Navy since the days of the—our first days in Greece, [deleted].

Senator PELL. Thank you. I have taken too much of the chairman's time, but I did want to ask these questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not at all.

Have you finished, Senator?

Senator PELL. Yes. Thanks.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have asked some very interesting questions.

Mr. Counsel.

#### PROSPECTS OF GREECE'S RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

Mr. PAUL. You mentioned this morning, Mr. Davies, certain steps that you see the present Greek regime taking in the category of civil liberties or individual rights. But what would you say is the prospect of a return to democratic government as distinguished from these civil liberty steps?

Mr. DAVIES. As I noted this morning, the schedule for promulgation of the Constitution is to be completed, according to the regime, by the end of the year. I would not want to deceive you. I think we are going to have to wait until the end of the year and see whether on promulgation the regime then moves ahead to announce a schedule for resumption of political activity and scheduling of elections.

I would hope they move in this direction, but I do not think any of us would care to say categorically that this is going to happen.

Mr. PAUL. When we were in Athens last year [deleted] told us there is no effective opposition in Greece today that could by strength of arms or otherwise overcome the regime but the regime has not developed any substantial support among the Greek people such that it could win a fair election and, accordingly, the prospects for it opting for a democratic election are very poor indeed.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Paul, it is my understanding that—and again this is based on reporting from the field that—while the regime is not, perhaps, popular in Greece, there is a level of acquiescence. The regime is country oriented.

Most of these officers [deleted] have taken certain reform measures which are of an egalitarian nature, which have been welcomed in rural communities.

One that I particularly recall was the abolishment of church fees by which the wealthy could get first-class funerals and the poor would have to make do with whatever the minimum service was.

It would seem to me that in a parliamentary situation it would depend pretty much on what level of activity was permitted political parties; that is, whether the regime would permit the organization of political parties and their free functioning in a period long enough before the elections to make clear what the issues are.

Mr. PAUL. Are you implying by that that if the colonels and their group allowed political parties to flourish for any length of time the colonels would not be the prevailing party in an election?

Mr. DAVIES. I have a very hard time seeing any people sir, voting for a military regime.

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POLITICAL IMPRISONMENTS

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us how many people approximately are now imprisoned in Greece for political reasons?

Mr. DAVIES. There are approximately 1,200, according to our latest reports.

U.S. ROLE IN RESTORING CONSTITUTION IN GREECE

Mr. PAUL. I know you have referred to this at various times this morning, but could you just briefly, so the record is clear, give us your view as to what the American role and responsibility is toward moving Greece toward a more liberal situation?

Mr. DAVIES. We believe that in maintaining a working relationship with the Greek Government we should not lose any opportunity for making clear that the level of our relationship, the warmth of our relationship, depends to a large extent on the progress made toward restoration of a constitutional situation in Greece.

From my familiarity with Ambassador Tasca's activities, he has done a splendid job in making this point clear at the top of the government.

Mr. PAUL. But what is it that makes this a goal of American foreign policy, not that I disagree that it should be, but why do we look upon it as our business?

Mr. DAVIES. Because we believe that the future stability of Greece will depend on a return to a constitutional parliamentary order.

Mr. PAUL. With that as a basis, would you say that the Greeks need our support more than we need theirs?

You referred to the Greek role in NATO as their contribution to us. But would you say on balance that they need our support more than we need them or the other way around?

Mr. DAVIES. I think this is a reciprocal arrangement. We have certain security needs which they share. I believe that the Greeks have resources to acquire from others those things which we have in suspense, and they very well may do so.

I do not think the present regime would acquire Soviet equipment, I may be wrong, but there are other vendors, including some from among the ranks of our close allies.

I believe that the policy we have sought to follow [deleted] gives promise of moving the situation back to a constitutional order.

IMPORTANCE OF GREECE TO NATO

Mr. PAUL. Has the State Department—not the Defense Department or the Central Intelligence Agency, but the State Department itself—made a careful assessment of the importance of Greece to NATO, of our need for Greece considering the fact that we have Turkey, we have the ability to close the Straits as long as we are allied with Turkey, and Greece can make very little contribution to the central region of NATO; have you carefully assessed the benefits?

Mr. DAVIES. This has been looked at very carefully.

Mr. PAUL. By the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Within the National Security Council, but the State Department contributes its assessment to this interdepartmental consideration.

The facilities we enjoy in Greece are important for our mutual defense and for the viability of the Alliance system.

Mr. PAUL. Let me just take that. The facility at Iraklion is obvious in its importance.

Would you say the same thing for all the other facilities in Greece as far as their importance to the American and NATO military posture?

#### IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS IN GREECE

Mr. DAVIES. As you know, Mr. Paul, my primary interest is the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, and I consider the importance of the 6th Fleet, as a military-political weapon to be of great importance.

Therefore, I think the naval communications in Greece are important. I think the fact that our ships can put into Greek ports is extremely important.

Mr. PAUL. Considering the alternatives to each of those positions, you still think they are important?

#### 6TH FLEET MOVEMENTS

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. At the present time we have no other area in the Eastern Mediterranean where our 6th Fleet ships freely could put into port.

As you know, in Turkey we do not have the same freedom in making fleet visits that we used to enjoy, although we do make some ship visits to that country.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is this?

Mr. DAVIES. Because it is a complicated story, Mr. Chairman. But, at the time we attempted to dissuade the government of Turkey from intervening militarily in Cyprus, the story ran through Turkey that the 6th Fleet had been positioned to prevent a movement of Turkish forces onto the island.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that true?

Mr. DAVIES. It is not true, sir. It is also—

Senator SYMINGTON. Where was the 6th Fleet when it happened?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know, sir, where it was, but it was not there, I am told.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record where the 6th Fleet was, including the carrier task forces?

Mr. DAVIES. I will supply it.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

Mr. DAVIES. The second rumor, which also spread, was that we used electronic means to block Turkish communications so that the military operation could not be carried out successfully, also a canard.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that true?

Mr. DAVIES. It is not true.

When the small extremist student groups began to object to 6th Fleet visits, particularly to Istanbul, in the main their efforts were not too unpopular with some Turkish people, because the residues of suspicion of what the 6th Fleet had done in the Cyprus crisis still exist.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many Americans did they throw into the water when the fleet visited there, not the last time, but the time before last?

Mr. DAVIES. It was 10 or 12 who were dumped off the pier in Istanbul.

Senator SYMINGTON. They did not throw any in the last time, did they?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir. There have been no injuries to Americans. There have been some Turkish casualties.

Senator SYMINGTON. The last time there was a lot of Turkish police protection.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many Turks were killed as a result of our fleet visit?

Mr. DAVIES. There were three Turks killed in February of 1969, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have the fleet carriers visited Turkey since that time?

Mr. DAVIES. We have put a cruiser in, but no carriers, [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did you send the crews that were in port?

Mr. DAVIES. To Izmir, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you call a cruiser a smaller vessel?

Mr. DAVIES. This was the last major visit.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where was that sent, and on what date?

Mr. DAVIES. December 1969.

Senator SYMINGTON. When were the three Turks killed?

Mr. DAVIES. February 1969.

Consequently, speaking on the basis of my information, on the basis of the political impact of the fleet on the Near Eastern problem, I believe the facilities we enjoy for the 6th Fleet are of value to us.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you enjoy if you cannot send the fleet into ports any more without having riots?

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry, sir, I was speaking of Greek ports.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Mr. DAVIES. So this is, if we are not permitted to put our ships into these ports, the closest ports are those of Italy.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. But you are no longer permitted to put your ships into a lot of ports.

Mr. DAVIES. No Arab ports, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can you put them into Morocco?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. But that again does not help us in the Eastern Mediterranean where we are concerned as to what is going on.

#### LIMITATION OF PORT FACILITIES FOR U.S. FLEET

Senator SYMINGTON. But there are also problems in the Western Mediterranean. For example, you cannot put any ships into Mers el Kebir in Algeria, can you?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't that an important problem?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. We are fairly well confined, sir, to the Northern Mediterranean littoral.

Senator SYMINGTON. Except for Turkey.

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Mr. DAVIES. Including Turkey; we can put ships into Turkish harbors.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the U.S. Fleet could still put into Greek ports if we refused to give Greece any more military aid?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know the answer to that question, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would be your estimate?

Mr. DAVIES. I would believe, Senator, that we could reach a point where the Greeks would find it inconvenient for—to extend certain privileges if we began to take steps which lower our working relationships.

Senator SYMINGTON. If they did that, that would leave Italy and Morocco. You cannot berth in France. Where else could the fleet visit?

Mr. DAVIES. I would think Spain, sir, Portugal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, you could go into Spain.

Mr. PRANGER. Malta.

Mr. DAVIES. Malta.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, Majorca.

Mr. DAVIES. The problem, as I see it, Senator Symington—

Senator SYMINGTON. What I am trying to say is your fleet is quite limited as to where it can go, especially in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. DAVIES. It is circumscribed, sir. It can stay at sea, but port facilities are increasingly limited; and, as we noted this morning, at sea it is pretty well followed, as we follow the Soviets.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you ever put the fleet into Yugoslavia?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware—

Mr. PRANGER. Individual ships, sir, but not the fleet itself or a task force.

Senator SYMINGTON. How large a ship?

Mr. PRANGER. Cruiser at one time.

Senator SYMINGTON. When was that?

Mr. PRANGER. We can supply that for the record, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

#### U.S. SHIP VISIT—YUGOSLAVIA

The USS Conynham (DDG-17) and the USS Furer (DEG-6) visited Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia 27-30 April 1970.

#### SOVIET PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN

Senator SYMINGTON. I am worried about carriers in the Mediterranean, because you not only have the development of sea-to-sea missiles, as exemplified in the destruction of the Israeli destroyer, the *Elat*, by an elementary Soviet missile of the Styx class; but you also have the more sophisticated weaponry that the Soviets have developed, including air-to-sea televised weaponry. Also, because of the narrowness of certain parts of the Mediterranean, you have the problem of land-to-sea missiles, which can be a pretty short range, what we would call tactical missiles.

The Mediterranean is becoming more of a Soviet than an American lake—as you know, they have tremendously increased their number of ships in the Mediterranean.

Mr. PRANGER. It becomes even more of a problem, sir, when you consider what is in the Black Sea where they have a fleet that is extremely large, [deleted] major surface combatant vessels, and [deleted] subs.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, and their pressures on the Turks have reached the point where now they can pretty much use the Dardanelles as they wish; isn't that a fact as far as the passage of their fleets is concerned?

Mr. DAVIES. No; the Turks are insistent upon the observance of the Montreux Convention [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but they can pass through, and what difference does the convention make?

Mr. DAVIES. But in accordance with the notification process, and certain—on the surface in the daylight is the convention.

Senator SYMINGTON. [Deleted.]

Mr. DAVIES. I think that is of major importance, Turkish ability, will to insist upon observance of that convention.

#### LESSENING OF U.S. GOODWILL IN TURKEY

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe that the general lessening of goodwill all over the world today, so far as the United States is concerned is primarily due to our excursion into Indochina? You would be the first to agree that we have lost a lot of goodwill with the Turks in the last decade; would you not?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps the pivotal event in our relations with Turkey was the necessary position we took on the Turkish desire to intervene on Cyprus in 1964.

Senator SYMINGTON. That does not answer my question.

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that the—

Senator SYMINGTON. If you said no you would be belying your own testimony you gave a few minutes ago. It is clear we have lost a lot of goodwill with the Turks, is it not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Why did we take the side of the Greeks to the extent we did against the Turks? The Turks are stronger and, certainly, in my opinion, would be at least as valuable a military ally for many different reasons.

Mr. DAVIES. The decision was taken, sir, that a confrontation between two allies, a war between two allies, would divide the alliance or have extremely adverse impact on the alliance.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which alliance?

Mr. DAVIES. The NATO alliance.

The Turks, in a letter from President Johnson, were informed that if the Soviets reacted as a result of any Turkish move on Cyprus, that the guarantees of the alliance would not necessarily apply.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did we have the right to say that without consulting the other members of NATO?

Did we have the full support of our allies when President Johnson wrote to Inonu?

Mr. DAVIES. In view of the very short time available to us before the Turks apparently intended to move, we had very little time within which to react. The letter pointed out that Turkey should not undertake such an action without full consultation with its NATO allies.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did the Turks stop?

Mr. DAVIES. Primarily, mainly, because of the strong indication of U.S. disapproval, sir.

I think they felt that this would be a major rupture in Turkey's relations with us, which they quite obviously valued highly, and I am talking about the Turkish Government of that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. But less highly than they did before; right?

Mr. DAVIES. That was a problem, sir, of whether we had a war between Greece and Turkey, and taking a strong position, I think the letter was drafted very hurriedly, and it did ruffle Turkish feelings.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the reason we thought it was to our disadvantage for the Greeks and Turks to fight?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, I am certain that any administration would be anxious to take steps to prevent war.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where?

Mr. DAVIES. I would hope anywhere in the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Everywhere?

Well, do you think the fact we have been heavily escalating the war in Laos in secret while, at the same time, we were deescalating it publicly in Vietnam, and have now gone into Cambodia, shows we are anxious to avoid war?

Mr. DAVIES. My conviction, sir, is that the Government, the administration, has set itself the objective of terminating the war in Southeast Asia. The measures that are being taken I would have to leave to my senior officers and those responsible for it.

#### STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES-TURKEY ALLIANCE

Senator SYMINGTON. I was just wondering why we interfered in that situation which has perhaps lost us our most valuable ally in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir. I think our alliance is still strong. I think the growth of nationalism in Turkey has been inevitable, as they develop more confidence in themselves, and their forces, and I look upon Turkey and Iran as conspicuous examples of the success of U.S. policies.

We have achieved what we set out to achieve, the emergence of strong states devoted to their own independence, and I thought this was our end in view. We want to wean—

Senator SYMINGTON. Like Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. I think we hope that we can see the Greeks increasingly take care of their own defense requirements.

Senator SYMINGTON. I hope so too.

Mr. Counsel, will you proceed.

#### GREECE-TURKEY SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, could you tell us now what the situation is with respect to Cyprus between the Greeks and the Turks?

Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, and the Greek Cypriots are in the midst of intercommunal talks which are directed toward establishing areas of agreement which can lead to an eventual settlement of the conflict.

There has been very little progress made. However, the talks are going on, and both communities and both Turkey and Greece desire that they go on.

1836

In March was the last flareup on Cyprus. There was an assassination attempt made against President Makarios, and a successful assassination of the former Minister of Interior, Georkjadis.

[Deleted.]

At the present time, the Cypriot Government is heading into elections. I believe that they will take place so that the situation will emerge roughly as it is now.

I would be very hesitant to make any prognosis as to how fast these intercommunal talks are going to produce results.

EFFECTS OF WITHHOLDING MILITARY AID BY UNITED STATES

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another situation. The December 24, 1969 issue of the Washington Post quotes Secretary Rogers, in referring to a classified study by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the subject of the effect of military assistance on countries for which such assistance is terminated, as follows:

It is interesting to me that we have had a study made of how many times we have been able to influence the policy of another government by withholding military aid, and we find that it has not been successful in any instance.

This morning you provided me with an unclassified version of this study, which I would like to place in the record at this point.

(The document follows:)

ARMS SUSPENSIONS: A BIG STICK OR A WEAK REED?

Since World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other countries, have attempted on a number of occasions to use the suspension or cut-off of military assistance as a direct policy tool. In no instance has the action been an unqualified success, and on several occasions, there have been distinctly negative consequences for the supplying nations.

Despite the general lack of hoped-for effects accompanying past stoppages of military assistance, the practice is still seen by many countries as an important means of exercising influence over the recipient country. An examination of the cases where a program of military aid has been suddenly modified or curtailed suggests, however, that the results desired by the donor can only be achieved under the rather exceptional circumstance of a total and exclusive dependence by the recipient on the supplier.

Some of the generalizations derived from past experience include:

1. *Cutting off or suspending military aid rarely achieves the desired purpose.*—The examples are legion. The US has not been able to forestall coups in Latin America or to persuade post-coup governments to restore representative government; the Soviet cut-off of arms deliveries and military assistance to China has only made Peking even more truculent toward Moscow; and the French refusal to supply Israel with arms after the 1967 war, while somewhat improving France's standing in the Arab world, has not had the slightest impact on Israel's policy.

2. *Rather than achieving the recipient's policy goals, cutting off military aid often has the reverse effect.*—Suspending military aid can be a two-edged sword. Far from making the recipient more amenable to the supplier's viewpoint, such moves often exacerbate relations between the two nations, and, in the end, the costs outweigh the benefits. China's reaction to the Soviet cut-off of aid has already been cited; the US embargo of arms to both sides following the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965 encouraged Pakistan to seek out new supplies in the USSR and Communist China.

3. *Military aid will not provide enough leverage to force a recipient to take any actions contrary to his vital interests.*—To have any real chance of effectiveness, the threat to end arms supplies must be aimed at an issue other than one which the recipient considers vital to its survival. Neither the UAR nor Israel, quite obviously, will feel constrained unless perhaps in a transitory and tactical

way, from taking whatever action it feels necessary to safeguard its position. Equally, Batista did not let the threat of losing US assistance stop him from using US-equipped units against Castro's guerrillas.

Despite the generally negative and unsatisfying results from using or carrying out the threat to suspend or end military aid, such tactics have, at times, at least partially achieved their aims. But success (in the supplier's terms) has then usually come only under somewhat special conditions.

1. *In general an arms cut-off will not succeed unless the recipient has no other source of supply.*—Given the option, any nation denied arms for what it considers political or unjustified reasons, will quickly turn to alternate suppliers. The current UN embargo on arms shipments to South Africa, for instance, has failed because other countries have made military supplies available to Pretoria, and because Pretoria can build up its own military industry at home.

2. *Arms cut-offs will not succeed unless the supplier uses all other means at its disposal to reinforce the police.*—No recipient is liable to take seriously a suspension of military assistance while aid and relations through other channels remain unscathed. This ambivalence led to the failure of the US embargo on arms to Nationalist China from August 1946 to May 1947. The same factors are also present in US policy towards the military junta in Greece.

3. *Chances of arms cut-off success may grow if the recipient is given a face-saving exit.*—Because most nations tend to react to a threat by digging in their heels, the threat to cut arms aid is likely to meet success only if the recipient has available, by design or accident, a means of complying without seeming to give in. The Soviet cut-off of aid to North Korea from 1963 to 1965 may have succeeded at least partially because Khrushchev's removal from power (as well as Peking's inability to meet Pyongyang's needs) allowed the North Koreans to swallow their pride and meet some of Moscow's desires.

4. *Arms cut-offs are most likely to succeed if the aid is a decisive component in the recipient's security.*—When suspension or withdrawal of military aid has succeeded in its aims, a decisive factor appears to have been the fact that the recipient considered the aid vital to his national security, and that no alternative source of supply was available. The US has thus been able to use the prospect of suspending its military aid to Laos to influence events in that country, and the Soviets have had similar success in manipulating the rate and quantity of their aid deliveries to Iraq and Syria.

In sum, it is probably true that the provision of military aid is usually a positive factor in the relations of two countries, and that it furnishes some incentive to the recipient to avoid provoking the supplier. However, an explicitly hinted, definitely threatened, or actually implemented suspension of military aid as a means of forcing the recipient to follow a certain course of action is at best a risky policy. While it can succeed under certain specific (and relatively unusual) conditions, it all too often can fail completely; in either case, furthermore, the high pressure tactic can have serious detrimental effects on the long-term relations between the supplying nation and the recipient.

Mr. PAUL. But I gather, having read it now, that the study does say that under certain circumstances a termination of military assistance or the anticipation of termination of military assistance or the prospect once a termination has occurred that perhaps military assistance would be resumed have had some effect.

Mr. DAVIES. If the donor is the sole resource of the recipient state. This is not true, for instance, in the case of Greece.

I recall back in 1960, the Soviet Union suspended the delivery of spare parts to Egypt as a gesture in the face of the United Arab Republic of disenchantment with Communist inroads in Iraq.

As I recall, Mr. Paul, the Soviets had to resume shipments because not only was President Nasser not intimidated but he reacted in such a way as to damage Soviet interests in other parts of the Near East.

#### MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY FRANCE TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. For the record, has France since the coup sold military equipment to Greece or otherwise provided it with military equipment?

Mr. PRANGER. Pardon me?

Mr. PAUL. Has France provided Greece military equipment since April of 1967?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, it has. The French have sold the Greeks [deleted] patrol boats and we are told, are dickering on Mirage fighters and helicopters.

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. EMBASSY VERSUS MILITARY PERSONNEL

Mr. PAUL. With respect to another subject which was raised this morning, Mr. Davies, what would you say is the relative effectiveness in dealing with the Greek Government between our Embassy personnel, on the one hand, and our military personnel, on the other hand, considering the military nature of the regime?

Mr. DAVIES. As we discussed this morning, Mr. Paul, the long-standing close relationship between the United States military officers and the Greek officers, obviously continues, but the American Ambassador is the U.S. Government's representative in Athens, the principal representative, and he is responsible for all political activity there and, I believe, is the primary contact between this government, the U.S. Government, and the top of the Greek Government, the Junta.

Mr. PAUL. We have not had an Ambassador until rather recently to Greece. There had been quite a hiatus for a while.

During that period when there was not an Ambassador available, was the position of our military such that it could involve itself in ways, perhaps, unintended to give an impression of rapport with the Greek regime that perhaps had there been an Ambassador would not have existed?

Mr. DAVIES. We had a very competent chargé d'affaires, Mr. Roswell McClelland.

It is my observation, although Greece was not my primary responsibility during this period, that the country team operated effectively during this period, and that there was no question but that the attitudes and views of the U.S. Government were imparted through the American Embassy.

RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. MILITARY IN GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Could you specify any restrictions that were placed upon our military, either those that were stationed in Greece or those that visited, to be sure that they did not foster or encourage the Greek regime in illiberal policies?

Mr. VIDGERMAN. Any specific restrictions?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. VIDGERMAN. I think the policy laid down by the Pentagon, as spoken to by Mr. Pranger—I mean we were sensitive to that, and visitors and others were instructed that the policy was to be laid down on the State Department Embassy side.

Mr. PAUL. Was there a monitoring of military-to-military contacts since the coup by our foreign policy officials in the State Department?

Mr. PRANGER. This subject of military-to-military contacts is a matter of some concern between the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

[Deleted.] It is a difficult problem, given the intimate command relationships [deleted] with the many people who travel throughout the NATO area on various assignments and missions.

VISITS BY GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Do you think you could provide for the record a list of the visits, to the extent that it is available, of general and flag officers who have visited Greece since April 1967?

Mr. PRANGER. I think we could get such a list from the services; yes. (The information follows:)

VISITS TO GREECE BY U.S. GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICERS SINCE APRIL 1967

	Number of visits
1967:	
GEN D. A. Burchinal	1
ADM J. S. McCain, Jr	1
VADM W. I. Martin	2
RADM L. R. Geis	2
RADM R. W. Paine, Jr	2
RADM J. E. Dacey	1
1968:	
MG G. Ruhlen	1
MG W. E. Greer	1
GEN T. W. Parker	1
GEN J. H. Polk	1
MG W. H. Craig	1
BG A. Hurow	1
MG E. Helton	1
GEN D. A. Burchinal	1
LTG R. H. Warren	1
VADM J. A. Tyree	1
VADM W. I. Martin	1
VADM D. C. Richardson	3
RADM V. G. Lambert	2
RADM L. R. Geis	1
RADM W. E. Lemos	2
RADM J. F. Calvert	3
RADM V. P. Healey	5
RADM E. C. Outlaw	2
1969:	
GEN A. J. Goodpaster	1
ADM W. F. A. Wendt	2
GEN J. L. Throckmorton	1
MG W. A. Enemark	1
LTG H. M. Exton	1
RADM D. W. Wulzen	1
MG A. J. Bowley	1
MG R. B. Marlin	1
MG R. Forbes	1
RADM Cassell	1
MG J. N. Ewbank	1
1969:	
BG E. B. Edwards	1
VADM D. C. Richardson	3
RADM W. E. Lemos	1
RADM P. M. Charbonnet	1
RADM J. M. James	3
RADM P. B. Armstrong	3
RADM F. H. Price	1

RADM R. E. Spreen.....	8
RADM E. W. Dobie, Jr.....	1
RADM E. C. Outlaw.....	1
RADM A. F. Fleming.....	2
MG N. O. Ohman.....	1
MG J. T. Scepansky.....	1
LTG H. J. Lemley.....	1
1970:	
GEN D. A. Burchinal.....	1
BG L. F. Boyle.....	1
MG R. H. Anthis.....	1
VADM D. C. Richardson.....	3
RADM W. H. House.....	2
RADM G. C. Talley.....	4
RADM E. W. Dobie, Jr.....	2
RADM L. E. Hubbell.....	5
RADM A. F. Fleming.....	1

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

Mr. PAUL. Finally, on a political matter, if Andreas Papandreou had won the election that was to be held in 1967, would he have withdrawn Greece from NATO, as has been suggested in some of the public media?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a hypothetical question, Mr. Paul.

The Center Union Party supported Greece's association with NATO.

Mr. Andreas Papandreou has made a number of statements, and I do not think from any of them one could say conclusively that he would have taken Greece out of NATO had he won the election.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was in Greece in early 1967, I believe it was, and our Ambassador was—

Mr. DAVIES. Talbot.

Senator SYMINGTON. Phil Talbot. There was quite a fight going on with Andreas Papandreou and his father George. Andreas had come back from the coast and said, "I really don't mean it. I still want to be a Greek, and I would like my citizenship back." Then he began gutting his own father is the story I was given when I was out there. The room was bugged, and the papers were loaded with it. There was a big fight between George Papandreou and his son, and suddenly the colonels took over and that ended the Papandreou regime.

Do you know about that?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes, I think that is—

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a pretty accurate description, isn't it?

Mr. VIGDERMAN. There is certainly no question about the fact that there was ill feeling between the father and son.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I remember, Andreas Papandreou was pretty anti-American before he was toppled.

Mr. VIGDERMAN. Yes. He tended to give interviews to Egyptian newspapers and talked about the necessity of following an "independent" foreign policy, and that is, I think, what lies behind Mr. Paul's question about what Andreas Papandreou would have done.

The problem with it is he made no commitment to any particular thing. But the tone of what he said was such as to make a lot of people nervous about exactly what he might do.

Senator SYMINGTON. All I can tell you is what I was told. Following the situation in Greece is pretty difficult at times.

LEVEL OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE IN 1967

Mr. PAUL. On the subject of military assistance to Greece, what was the level of the military assistance program for Greece when the selective suspension went into effect in April of 1967?

Mr. PRANGER. Fiscal year 1967 was \$70.4 million.

TERMS OF 1967 SELECTIVE SUSPENSION

Mr. PAUL. What were the terms of the suspension, Mr. Davies or Mr. Pranger?

Mr. PRANGER. The suspension was that—you mean the items in the suspension?

Mr. PAUL. What was it that we suspended, and were there any conditions expressed in the announcement of the suspension to allow for its resumption and were there any other significant dimensions of the suspension?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, I will read the political conditions. The United States on October 18—let me see—Mr. Davies, maybe you could take the political conditions. There were political conditions.

Mr. DAVIES. At the time of the coup, sir, and following on our consultations, we announced—I do not have the text of the—I will submit it for the record.

Mr. PAUL. Why don't you supply it.

Mr. DAVIES. The announcement.

Mr. PAUL. I think that would answer the question.  
(The document follows:)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF CERTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE FOLLOWING THE COUP

Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing, May 16, 1967:

Question. Bob, have we stopped the flow of American military equipment to Greece?

Answer. Let me answer that by saying something for background: In connection with our continuing review of the Military Assistance Program for Greece, we have withheld shipment of certain major items. We are examining our relationship with the new Greek Government, and look forward—

Question. Is that word "examine" or "re-examine"?

Answer. We are examining our relationship with the new Greek Government, and look forward to concrete evidence of progress toward a return to constitutional processes.

Question. Can you identify those items?

Question. Bob, when you say "major items," does this mean that minor items are still in the pipeline?

Answer. For background, certain items in the military program continue.

Question. By "major," you mean the size of them? Um?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Can you identify them?

Answer. No, sir. I am not at liberty to do that.

Question. Can you tell us what the size of the program has been again?

Answer. Fiscal 1966, military—and they are the last figures I have—all grant—\$78.7 million.

Question. Didn't you once say this year's was supposed to run about the same?

Answer. It's possible I did. If I did, I will stand on it.

*Question. Was this decision taken just recently, or has this been —when was this decision taken?*

*Answer. Recently.*

*Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing, August 17, 1967:*

*Question. Bob, where do we stand on the United States aid to Greece?*

*Answer. Well, on economic aid, that, in a large measure, has been pretty much phased out. I think perhaps there are some limited programs mainly to voluntary agencies.*

*Question. This was before the coup?*

*Answer. Yes, and unrelated. However, there was and continues to be a suspension on deliveries of military items.*

*Question. You say there continues to be?*

*Answer. Yes. Now, as I recall, this mainly had to do with some of the larger pieces of equipment in those programs, and no decision has been reached to change that. Yes?*

*Question. This suspension was related specifically to the coup?*

*Answer. That's correct.*

*Question. So I think it is correct to say that suspension of deliveries on certain military items?*

*Answer. Yes.*

Mr. PRANGER. The suspension was immediate on certain items which we can also supply.

Mr. PAUL. Would you do that?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

(The information follows:)

EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY SUSPENDED

[Deleted] Aircraft  
[Deleted] Jet Trainers  
[Deleted] Aircraft  
[Deleted] Military Helicopters  
[Deleted] Personnel Carriers  
[Deleted] Tanks  
[Deleted] Tank Recovery Vehicles  
[Deleted] Artillery Pieces  
[Deleted] Self-propelled Mortar Carriers  
[Deleted] Minesweepers  
[Deleted] Bullpup Missiles  
[Deleted] 90-mm. Cartridges

NOTE.—Value approximately [deleted] million.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Now, Mr. Pranger, would you tell us since April 1967 on an annual basis what has been the level in dollar amount of military assistance that we delivered to Greece, and what have been the main items that that represents?

Furthermore, so that the whole picture is there, what was the excess equipment that has been delivered and its value and the main items of it?

Mr. PRANGER. OK.

We began with fiscal year 1968. Delivery value of MAP equipment in fiscal year 1968, was \$45 million; delivery value in fiscal year 1969 was \$56.2 million; estimated delivery value in fiscal year 1970, \$33.6 million.

Mr. PAUL. What are the items that that represents?

Mr. PRANGER. The items represented are F-102 aircraft, [deleted]. This includes the excess items, and then I will get to the excess price because this includes both.

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Mr. PAUL. Fine.

Mr. PRANGER. That was an excess item. F-104 aircraft, 104G aircraft, [deleted]; F-104A aircraft, [deleted]; F-5B aircraft, [deleted]; T-41C aircraft, [deleted].

Mr. PAUL. Maybe you could summarize a bit.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

Mr. PAUL. Fighter aircraft, trainer aircraft.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

Mr. PAUL. You said there had been no tanks.

Mr. PRANGER. There are aircraft of the fighter variety and trainer variety.

There are helicopters, U-6A aircraft; Sidewinder missiles; coastal minesweepers, trailers and trucks. A variety of trucks from one-quarter ton trucks to 5-ton trucks.

There are some 90-millimeter recoilless rifles, some 175 millimeter guns, a wrecker and a bulldozer tank. According to my list in the period some time between the first of April 1967 and the 30th of June 1967, there were also [deleted] medium tanks delivered, which I can only assume were delivered either before the embargo was instituted which was, I believe, several days after the coup, or were delivered before the coup itself or were en route. We would not want that confused with the issue that was raised this morning on the other items. So these are the major items.

Mr. PAUL. Would you give us the value of the excess equipment.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

The value of the excess equipment in this same period is as follows:

In fiscal year 1967, and we are now talking utility value and not acquisition value. Fiscal year 1967 was \$4.2 million; fiscal year 1968 was \$2.5 million; fiscal year 1969 was \$25.6 million and for fiscal year 1970 it is estimated at about \$5 million.

Excuse me, on the fiscal year 1970, the delivery figure is \$12.8 million.

Mr. PAUL. Now, with respect to the items that you mentioned, such as fighter aircraft, helicopters and other aircraft, were those all in connection with that special post-Czechoslovakian invasion exemption from the suspension?

Mr. PRANGER. All of them, I am told, except [deleted] F-5's.

Mr. PAUL. What were they?

Mr. PRANGER. They were delivered before the coup.

In other words, as you will see when we supply this list, there are asterisks to what the items delivered before were, and we will have to check those [deleted] tanks for you.

Mr. PAUL. All right.

Now, finally, would you give us what the level of programmed military assistance to Greece has been for fiscal year 1968 through 1970, which does not necessarily mean it was delivered in those years.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, I wanted to go back to the earlier time. Here we are.

We will begin with fiscal year 1967 again. The programmed amount was \$70.4 million; \$39.1 million in 1968; \$37.5 million in 1969 and \$24.5 million in 1970.

STATUS OF AVAILABLE ITEMS ON SUSPENSION LIST

Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you this: Some of these things that are programed have, according to testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on the Foreign Assistance Act, have a leadtime sometimes of 2 years as typical.

What happens to a programed item when it becomes available in 2 years but still is on the suspension list?

Mr. PRANGER. Whenever it becomes available it is put into a, what we call, pipeline, which is actually a holding or storage operation, and I would not want to give the impression that this pipeline was fixed in any solid sense. That is to say, we can, while items are suspended, divert from this stock of items for other high priority areas, and we have done this occasionally from the Greek MAP items. But basically these items remain in a storage hold as far as I know, and there they sit.

We now have, for example [deleted] medium tanks awaiting delivery embargoed.

Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask you this: We have had the suspension in effect for quite a few years now, subject to an exemption.

Are we, perhaps, getting to the point where we are having enough in the pipeline that we ought to think in terms of suspending some of the programs as they relate to items on the suspended list?

I know in the first years the claim was that a leadtime was necessary. But now we have quite a few items that we have programed and would be presumably available.

Mr. PRANGER. Well, our concern is solely with the fact that as these items were programed they were originally intended to be phased into the Greek armed forces in substitution for other equipment.

This equipment really represents a kind of a buildup in the Greek ground forces and, as we build up the [deleted] tanks plus more, we are, in essence, saying that there are many tanks, there are that many tanks, in the Greek armed forces which ought to be retired.

Now, at what point the pipeline becomes so clogged that it is no longer an economically feasible operation does bother us, and I think there has been testimony before the various committees that this is costing us in storage charges each year out of MAP funds. This is a constant source of concern to the Department of Defense and also to our planning staff.

Now, at what point decisions will be made along the lines you are suggesting is simply not for me to say. This will take place in the form of the reevaluation of the force goals, and so on, which is strictly a military question.

RESUMPTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Now, Mr. Davies, according to the Washington Post of May 18, Ambassador Tasca recommended that full military assistance be resumed to Greece, and the June 3 Washington Post claimed the National Security Council had reached a decision to do so, but was waiting for a propitious time to announce it.

I gather from your statement that at least the June 3 article is incorrect?

Mr. DAVIES. It is misleading. I will provide for the record the Department's statement which was issued that same day.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

(The statement referred to follows:)

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT ON DELIVERY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

(Issued June 3, 1970)

A misleading article was given prominence this morning in a Washington newspaper on the question of military assistance to Greece. No decision has been taken to lift the suspension of the shipment of major military items to the Greek Government. The question remains under review.

The selective embargo on the shipment of heavy items of military equipment to Greece was a measure adopted by the previous Administration soon after the coup in Athens to demonstrate our concern for the extra constitutional assumption of power by the present Greek regime. This partial suspension of the shipment of major items of military equipment has continued since then (April 1967) with one exception: After the invasion by forces of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968 the previous Administration decided to lift the suspension on a one-time basis for certain key items of equipment (such as minesweepers and some aircraft) essential to the fulfillment by Greece of its NATO mission.

The decision made by the previous Administration in the fall of 1968 to deliver some of the equipment that had been suspended was made following consultations in October 1968 with certain members of the Congress and their staffs, and announced by me at our regular noon briefing on October 22, 1968.

ADDENDUM: ANNOUNCEMENT OF RELEASE OF CERTAIN PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED ITEMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR DELIVERY TO GREECE, OCTOBER 22, 1968

Verbatim excerpt from the Department spokesman's regular noon briefing, October 22, 1968:

Question: *Bob, what can you tell us about the resumption of heavy arms or military equipment delivery to Greece?*

Question: *We lost the last of your question.*

Question: *Greece.*

Question: *Greece.*

[Laughter.]

Answer: Let me give you this statement:

During the course of the continuing review of the United States military assistance policy for Greece, the need for strengthening the NATO Alliance, in light of recent events in Central and Eastern Europe, has been taken into account. The suspended Greek military aid items have been examined with particular attention to the NATO support role. And the decision has been made to release certain of them, including two minesweepers, and a number of aircraft.

Now at the time of the above decision—at the time that that decision was conveyed to Greek authorities, which was last weekend—it was made clear that the United States interest in seeing progress toward representative government in Greece remains as deep as ever; and that the United States will continue to press for this.

Question: *Can you tell us how many aircraft are involved; what kind?*

Answer: I am afraid I cannot.

Question: *Is it the United States view that there has been recent progress of significance in the progress toward representative government in Greece?*

Answer: I will stand on the statement.

Mr. PAUL. When would be the time that you would consult with the committee with respect to the resumption of full military assistance to Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. PAUL. I did not mean in terms of a date, but in terms of the point in the process, at what stage would you expect to consult with the Foreign Relations Committee on the resumption of the suspended items of military assistance to Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. Congressional consultations are envisaged prior to final action, Mr. Paul, and again I have absolutely no idea of when this might be.

EFFECT OF SPANISH BASE NEGOTIATIONS ON GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Could you also tell us what you consider to be the effect on our relations with Greece that result from our current negotiations with Spain on a continuation of base rights in Spain?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of any relationship between those two questions, Mr. Paul.

While what we do for Greece has been deemed part and parcel of our NATO relationship, helping Greece to meet force levels which cannot be attained from its own economy, the situation in Spain is more of a quid pro quo nature.

The Greeks may, perhaps, be watching the course of these negotiations, but I am not aware of any direct relationship.

Mr. PAUL. Turning to our facilities in Greece, besides the statistics that you provided this morning, could either of you gentlemen tell us what the total operating costs, including military pay, are for our facilities in Greece, and also what our overseas expenditures are.

Mr. PRANGER. We can supply it for the record.

Mr. PAUL. Supply it for the record.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

(The information referred to follows:)

ANNUAL COSTS FOR U.S. FACILITIES—GREECE

During Fiscal Year 1970, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated cost to maintain facilities in Greece was \$29 million. This estimate includes all military and civilian costs as well as the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities. This cost estimate does not include indirect logistic and administrative costs from outside the country, nor does it include major procurement or military construction costs.

The preliminary estimate of the fiscal year 1970 U.S. defense expenditures in Greece entering the international balance of payments from all sources (military functions, military assistance, operating costs and investment costs) is \$23 million.

REDUCTIONS AT ATHENS AIRPORT

Mr. PAUL. With respect to the facilities at the Athens Airport, was it the case that in connection with the recent program for the reduction of costs in Europe there was a proposal to reduce this operation by 95 percent?

Mr. PRANGER. I am not really free to discuss what is in the offing, Mr. Paul, but I can give you the actual reductions at Athens Airport which are—

Mr. PAUL. Would you just characterize them. They were not nearly 95 percent, were they?

Mr. PRANGER. I would say from my records it was not 95 percent. I can give you the figures. Would you like them?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. PRANGER. It is 289 military, 16 U.S. civilian; 109 foreign nationals, for a total of 414, I believe. This is the extent of the reductions.

1847

Mr. PAUL. How many people does that leave at the Athens Airport, approximately?

Mr. PRANGER. Approximately 1,000.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

PHASEOUT AT WHEELUS

Now, has the facility at Iraklion or any other facility in Greece received any substantial number of American personnel or equipment as a result of the phaseout at Wheelus?

Mr. PRANGER. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Paul. That is still under discussion on the Wheelus issue, but I am not aware of anything in Greece to speak of.

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NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT NEA MAKRI

Mr. PAUL. Does the naval communications facility at Nea Makri have a strictly ordinary communications function and no intelligence function?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

EFFECTS OF GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATIONS AND GREEK COUP

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us what has been the effect of Greek-Turkish confrontations and the Greek coup and counter-coup on our facilities in Greece? Have there been any incidents or any other significant effect on any of these facilities?

Mr. PRANGER. None that I am aware of except what was discussed this morning, and I am just not aware of these sorts of developments.

Mr. PAUL. Do you know of any, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know of any.

Mr. PAUL. There was reference to some in connection with [deleted] but you are not aware of that?

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of that specific incident.

Mr. PAUL. [Deleted]

Mr. PRANGER. I am just not aware of this. I will see if it is available for the record, and I will be glad to supply it.

Mr. PAUL. [Deleted]

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→ EFFECT OF U.S. REDUCTION OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, what would you say would be the political significance if we greatly reduced our military presence in Greece?

Mr. DAVIES. At the present time our military presence in Greece is in support of our roles within NATO.

If we substantially reduced our presence, it would seem to me that our role in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of NATO, would be correspondingly reduced.

Mr. PAUL. But I meant what would be the effect on our relations with Greece or the internal situation in Greece. It is not a military question that I am raising.

Mr. DAVIES. As far as I have been able to glean from reports, the American presence in Greece is politically acceptable to the Greek people who have very vivid memories of World War II and attacks by the Italians and the Germans, and fearing the Slavic push south

which followed the World War, feel that a powerful ally is a good thing. To date I am not aware of any major reaction to the American presence such as we are beginning to see in Turkey.

Mr. PAUL. But you could not speculate as to what would happen if we cut our forces in Greece, as has been suggested for other areas of the world?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not wish to speculate on that.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY CONCERNING CYPRUS CRISIS

Mr. PAUL. Turning to Turkey, if we may, I would like to put in the record at this time the letter that was referred to earlier from President Johnson to the Prime Minister of Turkey of June 5, 1964, with respect to the Cyprus crisis, and the response of Prime Minister Inonu of June 13, 1964.

(The document follows:)

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER INONU, JUNE 1964, AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE, JANUARY 15, 1966

*White House statement*

At the request of the Government of Turkey, the White House is today releasing the texts of letters exchanged on June 5, 1964, between President Johnson and the then Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inonu on the Cyprus crisis. Steps subsequent to this exchange of letters led to the visit of Prime Minister Inonu to Washington later in that month and constructive discussions by the President and the Prime Minister of the issues involved.

A joint communique released at the conclusion of those discussions welcomed the opportunity for a full exchange of views by the two leaders and the occasion to consider ways in which the two countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations with respect to the safety and security of Cyprus. The communique noted that "the cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States."

The United States continues to value highly the close and friendly relations we maintain with Turkey.

*President Johnson's Letter to Prime Minister Inonu June 5, 1964*

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present a unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of

the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent in the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us), and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the Communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral invention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

*Prime Minister Inonu's Response to the President June 13, 1964*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of candour and friendship in which your message is meant to be written, I will, in my reply, try also to explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.

Mr. President, your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations.

It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected.

In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1963, we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was not a party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British command was set-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London conference and of the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you that we might have to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However, you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved.

We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish community against the assaults of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the

Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force would be set up very shortly, you insisted again that we refrain from intervening. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations forces to assume their duty.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very outset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary set-ups have all helped only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to back up their ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the instigative attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State at The Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think, I have thus reminded you how many times and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus. I do remember having emphasized to your high level officials our due appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely, Turkey and Greece.

Mr. President, in your message you further emphasize the obligations of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has, not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them.

The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department.

We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power.

In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.

As you see, Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting continuously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action.

I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept "pacta sunt servanda" which is the fundamental rule of international law. This precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterized as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the "American Law Institute," is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with this understanding being shared by all parties thereto.

The "Gentleman's Agreement" signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding.

On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, the members of the organization were fully acquainted with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no objections were raised in this respect.

Furthermore, in the course of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Delegate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power to annul or amend international treaties.

The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purposes of effecting the partition of the island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States.

I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements.

In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Mr. President, referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces.

I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.

As to the concern you expressed over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war in case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and obligations stipulated in international agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore, a Turco-Greek war so properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. Our view, in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government's attention on those matters.

The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight,

should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963.

As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held three weeks ago at The Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the flagrantly unlawful acts of one of the parties on the island should in no way mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obligations of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be accepted, I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in a situation that can, by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons: Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the said resolution.

Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression.

The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations forces, assuaging Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their crops; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the crops of Turks are at stake and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you, whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events.

The report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Our allies who are in a position to arbitrate in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the proper functioning of an authority above the Government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the

December events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure acceptable to Makarics has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the Cyprus issues, the nature of the Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by Greece indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the sufferings we bear in our rightful cause and the irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves.

That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.

Mr. President, I thank you for your statement emphasizing the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to the United States to talk the Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO, will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Thomicoja will have submitted his report to the Secretary-General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to go abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th.

It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.

Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.

Sincerely,

ISMET INONU,  
Prime Minister of Turkey.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, you have given us a general idea as to the consequences of that letter, but could you tell us just briefly your assessment of the consequences of that letter today?

Mr. DAVIES. The Turks still recall that the United States intervened diplomatically to, in their eyes, prevent their exercise of the right under the London-Zurich agreements to intervene militarily on Cyprus.

It accomplished its purpose, but the Turks today regard the letter as blunt, maladroit and, as a retreat from the obligation of one ally to another.

To put this picture in perspective, following some very tendentious leaks in Turkish newspapers, by mutual consent with the Government of Turkey, we declassified both the Johnson letter and the reply from Prime Minister Inonu.

Mr. PAUL. As part of this letter, as you pointed out earlier today, the question was raised whether the United States would come to the aid of Turkey in the event of an attack on that country by the Soviet Union. This is a very interesting interpretation of our NATO commitment.

Does this suggest that the NATO commitment is not as ironclad as one might have suspected, NATO being, perhaps, our most sacrosanct treaty?

Mr. DAVIES. We do not consider that the treaty requires an automatic response. While the language of the North Atlantic Treaty making an attack on one member state an attack on all is the most strongly worded of any defense commitment to which the United States is a party, the treaty stops well short of automatically obligating a member to respond to an attack on another member with armed assistance.

The treaty preserves the right of each member state to take such action as it deems necessary, and to act "individually and in concert with the other parties."

Furthermore, in article 11 it is made clear that the treaty in no way purports to supersede any national constitutional requirements or to commit either the Congress or the President of the United States to any action within their respective constitutional spheres.

Therefore, we conclude that the United States would not be committed under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to view an attack by one member state against another member state as an attack on itself or to take the further steps contemplated in such an article.

Mr. PAUL. But my hypothesis was not an attack by one member of another but an attack by the Soviet Union on Turkey.

Do I gather from what you just said that we feel it completely consistent with our NATO obligation to review the circumstances of an attack by the Soviet Union on a member such as Turkey before determining whether to come to the assistance of that member country?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

#### AMERICAN COMMITMENT UNDER CENTO

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another defense commitment of which Turkey is a party, namely CENTO, which has its headquarters at Ankara, I would like to ask you what the American role is and what the American commitment is under CENTO.

Mr. PRANGER. In military terms we have 22 Americans in the CENTO headquarters, including two officers of general rank; Lt. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle, who is the U.S. permanent military deputy serving on the CENTO Military Committee, and we have Maj. Gen. Rollin Anthis of the U.S. Air Force, who is Chief of Staff of the Combined Military Planning Staff or CMPS.

Now, the Military Committee representative, General Boyle, is a personal representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He serves on that committee with other CENTO generals of equivalent rank or officers of equivalent rank.

The CMPS, of which General Anthis is the Chief of Staff, provides necessary military support required by the Military Committee.

Now, how does the United States participate in CENTO? Well, we participate in its military planning exercises, and we participate

in a limited number of annual CENTO military exercises and other professional military activities.

These include a small scale exercise in the Persian Gulf, and a search and rescue exercise.

Now, as far as the precise treaty commitments under CENTO are concerned, I would defer to my State Department colleague.

Mr. DAVIES. The United States is not a member of CENTO. It is an observer. Our commitment to CENTO members is contained in the bilateral agreements which implement the 1958 declaration.

Unlike the NATO and SEATO treaties, the CENTO bilaterals do not state that an armed attack against Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan would constitute an attack on the United States or would endanger our peace and safety.

Article I of the bilaterals obligates us only to consult on such appropriate assistance as may be subsequently agreed to.

We have not undertaken an obligation to act to meet a common danger as we have obligated ourselves in both NATO, article V, and SEATO, article IV.

Furthermore, our obligation is limited by the reference in article I to the 1957 Middle East resolution to a case of Communist aggression.

Mr. PAUL. Would you supply for the record, Mr. Davies, the relevant language involved in the CENTO Treaty among the United Kingdom, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, plus the language from the declarations of the United States that show the American "commitment" under CENTO as you have summarized it.

(The information referred to follows:)

**PACT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY (BAGHDAD PACT,  
SUBSEQUENTLY REDESIGNATED CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION)**

(Signed at Baghdad February 24, 1955; Entered into force April 15, 1955;  
Ratified by Iraq and Turkey (Iraq subsequently withdrew on March 24, 1959);  
Acceded to by Iran (July 3, 1955), Pakistan (September 23, 1955), and the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (April 5, 1955))

**ARTICLE 1**

Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

**ARTICLE 2**

In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Government of the High Contracting Parties . . .

\* \* \* \* \*

**ARTICLE 5**

This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties . . .

\* \* \* \* \*

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

DECLARATION RESPECTING THE BAGHDAD PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND IRAN, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Signed at London July 28, 1958; Entered into force July 28, 1958)

1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London have re-examined their position in the light of recent events and conclude that the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever. These members declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

2. Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been instituted. Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have been promoted. Relationships are being established with other free world nations associated for collective security . . .

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955 provides that the parties will cooperate for their security and defense and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to cooperate with the nations making this Declaration for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.

AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

(Agreement signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; Entered into force March 5, 1959. Identical agreements were entered into between the United States of America and (1) Iran and (2) Pakistan also signed at Ankara on March 5, 1959)

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey,

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955; the parties signatory thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defense, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defense . . .

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East;

ARTICLE I

The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its request.

ARTICLE II

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into

between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Turkey such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey, in order to assist the Government of Turkey in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development...

\* \* \* \* \*

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958 in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

\* \* \* \* \*

DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEATO AND CENTO

Mr. PAUL. Also you have made a distinction between SEATO—let us take SEATO, being somewhat looser drawn, perhaps, than NATO—and CENTO. First, you say there is a distinction with respect to the fact that SEATO says that an attack upon another member of SEATO would be a threat to the peace and security of the United States, and you consider that to be a distinction from CENTO; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PAUL. I wondered if you found that to be operative language in SEATO so as to have any significance as a distinction.

Mr. DAVIES. May I provide for the record the distinction, sir?

Mr. PAUL. Sure.

(The information referred to follows:)

In our opinion it is a significant distinction that neither the CENTO Treaty nor our bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan contain language similar to Article IV(1) of the SEATO Treaty which provides "Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." We consider this operative language from the SEATO Treaty to constitute a legally binding commitment to take appropriate action in event of "Aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area...."

The operative language in Article I of the bilaterals, however, constitutes an agreement to take such appropriate action as may be subsequently agreed upon. Our commitment to the three CENTO members is, therefore, basically an obligation to consult on possible U.S. or joint action in certain circumstances. United States obligations under Article I of the bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are limited to cases of armed communist aggression, as are United States obligations under Article 4(1) of the SEATO Treaty. The United States is, however, obligated in cases of other aggression or armed attack or other threat within the SEATO Treaty area to consult with the parties to the Treaty under the provisions of Article 4(2).

Mr. PAUL. Also, you mention that SEATO says that we will act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes, whereas in CENTO we say that we will provide assistance, including the use of armed forces, on the basis of subsequent mutual agreement—I am not quoting the language exactly.

Mr. DAVIES. Obligated only to consult on such appropriate assistance as may be agreed to subsequent to an attack on the parties.

Mr. PAUL. But there is specific reference in the American declaration under CENTO to the possible use of American Armed Forces.

Mr. DAVIES. This stems, I believe, sir, from the reference to the article, to the 1957 Middle East Resolution.

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us or ask the Department to give the specific reason why CENTO was not submitted as a treaty—why they think it was appropriate for SEATO and NATO to be treaties, and CENTO not to be a treaty.

Mr. DAVIES. At the time, sir, we did not want to ally ourselves formally with a state—Iraq, which was technically at war with Israel, Iraq never did enter into an armistice agreement with Israel following the 1947 Palestine war, and we were concerned that our formal adherence with Iraq at that time, which was the contender for power with Egypt in the Arab area, might create adverse political reactions in the Arab area.

Our association with Pakistan would create problems with India. We believe adherence to the CENTO Treaty would lessen our ability to moderate intra-area disputes, and the membership would not mean further aid or support to the members than we could provide as an observer.

Moreover, our commitment under the Baghdad Pact would have been greater since our obligations under it would not be limited to any specific kind of action and would be invokable in case of aggression from any source.

We still believe that our areawide interests made formal membership less desirable than the existing arrangements.

#### POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. Turning to the political situation in Turkey today, could you just briefly tell us what the status of the democratic processes in Turkey is today.

Mr. DAVIES. We believe that the status is extremely satisfactory since the return of power by the military to the civilian element following the 1960 coup.

There has been three general elections. Turkey has a very active free press. Its constitutional procedures have been observed. The fact that the President of the Republic is a military man seems to guarantee support to the government as a whole by the military forces.

Mr. PAUL. What is the position of the major Turkish political parties with respect to NATO?

Mr. DAVIES. Both major parties support the association of Turkey in NATO.

Mr. PAUL. What is the State Department's assessment as to the prospects of Turkey moving closer to the position of the Soviet Union in international affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. We believe that the Turks are firm NATO allies and on both ends of the political spectrum, the major parties strongly value the Western association.

The only Turkish political party which is opposed to the NATO link is the Turkish Labor Party which, in the last election, got somewhere around 2½ percent of the vote.

**American Personnel and Dependents in Turkey**

Mr. PAUL. Turning to the American facilities in Turkey, could you tell us, as you have provided for Greece, what the number of American personnel and dependents are in Turkey?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

The high point of U.S. military personnel in Turkey was in the period of 1967 to 1968 when there were around 24,000 Americans connected with the Department of Defense, both working and dependents in Turkey.

The current population in fiscal year 1970 is approximately 18,000, of which half or a little less than half are military personnel.

Early in fiscal year 1971 this number will drop to about 16,000 of which less than half will be uniformed personnel.

Mr. PAUL. Also would you supply for the record the total operating costs, including military pay, and the overseas expenditures that are represented.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

**ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS FOR U.S. FACILITIES—TURKEY**

During Fiscal Year 1970, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated cost to maintain facilities in Turkey was \$90 million. This estimate includes all military and civilian costs as well as the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities. This cost estimate does not include indirect logistic and administrative costs from outside the country, nor does it include major procurement or military construction costs.

The preliminary estimate of the fiscal year 1970 U.S. defense expenditures in Turkey entering the international balance of payments from all sources (military functions, military assistance, operating costs and investment costs) is \$45 million.

**U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY**

Mr. PAUL. Now, could you give us a thumbnail sketch of the facilities that we have in Turkey.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, I can. There are over 20—let us start over again.

There are a large number of detachments locations in Turkey. These detachments and locations include the following:

First, NATO tactical air units, principally at Cigli and Incirlik, with the phaseout occurring at Cigli Air Base.

The second area of our involvement there is in the [deleted].

The third area is in headquarters and support elements at Ankara and Izmir.

The fourth is in communications facilities; and the fifth in certain miscellaneous facilities in the form of sealift terminals and a Loran station.

Mr. PAUL. Where is the fourth category, communications facilities, what are you mainly referring to there?

Mr. PRANGER. Here we are referring to primarily relay facilities, troposcatter relay and terminals.

Mr. PAUL. What is TUSLOG?

Mr. PRANGER. The U.S. Logistics Group (Turkey). It is our central, by our meaning the U.S. Department of Defense, central logistics and command and support command for all of our activities in Turkey.

It performs a number of functions, including command functions, legal, labor relations, et cetera.

Mr. PAUL. They account for a lot of the facilities in the Ankara and Izmir area?

Mr. PRANGER. They do in the Ankara area. We have in Ankara scattered throughout the town some 24 activities in 10 to 14 buildings in downtown Ankara.

[Deleted.]

#### REDUCTION OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. There has recently been a considerable drop in total American military personnel in Turkey. Would this suggest that we found out we did not need quite so many people in Turkey as we thought we did 3 or 4 years ago?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, this is a combination of circumstances. There is no doubt in our mind that we are in an economy era and, therefore, there have been—there has been a very systematic attempt to phase down for this reason.

We also have found, particularly in congested urban areas, and Ankara here is very important to consider, that we do have a rather large presence which creates a high profile as opposed to a low profile presence.

Mr. PAUL. Wouldn't you say that it turned out we could get along without these people? Perhaps, it would have been militarily more desirable if we could have continued to have Cigli as well as Incirlik with a few more people, but the strategic situation has really not been endangered by this reduction in personnel?

Mr. PRANGER. No; it has not, and we have consolidated our NATO support or our NATO air tactical units in Incirlik and are pretty well getting out of Cigli, subject to negotiations with the Turks.

#### EFFECT ON U.S. FACILITIES OF GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATIONS

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us whether there was an effect from the Greek-Turkish confrontation on our facilities in Turkey in the form of either incidents or uses of American equipment or otherwise on our facilities in Turkey?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, we, during these crises, did attempt to stay out of the way, I think, of certain Turk preparations and operations.

As far as incidents are concerned I am not aware of any that took place.

Mr. PAUL. Who was General Dick?

Mr. PRANGER. He was Commander of LANDSOUTHEAST.

Mr. PAUL. Is he still commander?

Mr. PRANGER. He was.

Mr. PAUL. It was reported that a Turkish officer, in connection with the confrontation, informed General Dick [deleted].

Could you enlighten us on this incident?

Mr. PRANGER. I have heard of this story but I have no knowledge of this incident.

POSITION OF TURKEY IN EVENT OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, could you tell us what the prospect is of our being allowed to use our facilities in Turkey in the event of a Middle East contingency in which our forces would be directed against Arab State interests?

Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish Government takes the position as does its Parliament, that our joint defense efforts are directed against an attack from the Soviet bloc.

[Deleted] the Turks are very anxious to have our military relationship clearly rest on the NATO agreement.

ATTITUDE IN IZMIR AND ANKARA TOWARD U.S. FACILITIES

Mr. PAUL. Could you briefly tell us what the attitude of the local populace is in Izmir and Ankara toward the facilities that we mentioned a few minutes ago in the downtown areas of these two Turkish cities.

Mr. DAVIES. Frank, can I call upon you?

Mr. CASH. Knowledgeable Turks, that is those in a position of responsibility in government or military, appreciate the value to Turkey of our operational facilities, and support fully their continuances.

Some of these find our logistical support facilities less essential. In no case, however, has the Government of Turkey expressed in any way a desire for U.S. forces to leave a facility. Those which have been turned over have been turned over completely at U.S. Government initiative.

FACILITIES IN ANKARA

Mr. PAUL. How many separate facilities do we now have in downtown Ankara?

Mr. PRANGER. That number I gave was 24 activities in leased buildings, 14 buildings.

Mr. PAUL. What is the progress toward moving these out of Ankara to the facility we have in the suburbs?

Mr. PRANGER. From our standpoint it is not real good. The funds for the movement to Balgat have been somewhat limited.

We tried to consolidate facilities wherever possible. I think they moved the theater into JUSMAT Headquarters, and this sort of thing has always been taken and is being continued.

U.S. MOVIE THEATER IN DOWNTOWN ANKARA

Mr. PAUL. Taking that theater as an interesting situation, could you tell us a little about the attitude of the Turks which they had toward this movie theater which, I understand, was used for the exclusive use of Americans in downtown Ankara.

Mr. PRANGER. I will refer to Mr. Cash again who, I think, is familiar with it.

Mr. CASH. I think it was mainly a matter of congestion. The theater was located in a very congested area of the town, and it was a source of difficulty for everyone concerned, for the Americans getting in and out, and for the Turks who were living there and got caught in the traffic jams.

This is the only complaint we ever had from the Turks to the theater, that it added to the congestion, and we have wanted to move it. It was one of the facilities originally designated to be moved in the plan initiated in 1959.

We still have not gotten the funds to move it completely out to Balgat, but have gotten it moved out to JUSMAT headquarters out of town.

Mr. PAUL. Was this a problem for Turkish-American harmony since 1959?

Mr. CASH. It was not a problem, but it was an irritant.

Mr. PAUL. This is for a decade.

Mr. CASH. This was a progressively growing irritant. It was recognized in 1959 that it should be moved out of its location to Balgat.

Mr. PAUL. But it was only moved in 1970.

Mr. CASH. The funds were not available prior to that time, and no alternate site was available.

Mr. PAUL. You say the problem was congestion. Was it not also looked upon as a symbol of American privilege?

Mr. CASH. Yes; I think it is probably fair to say that.

#### U.S. FACILITIES IN IZMIR

Mr. PAUL. What is the situation in Izmir today? Do we still have facilities in downtown Izmir as part of the TUSLOG?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes. TUSLOG and also we have NATO personnel there, 20 facilities, and they consist of again a wide variety of facilities, warehouses, motor pool, personnel support facilities, schools, medical.

Mr. PAUL. Are there any plans for withdrawing any of these facilities from Izmir or deactivating it?

Mr. PRANGER. No. I believe that the primary emphasis is on deactivation at Cigli where there was some duplication of the facilities largely because—well, not largely, I cannot measure—but one reason being the congested road facilities between Cigli and Izmir.

So the emphasis is on phasing out of Cigli and consolidating our activities in Izmir.

Mr. PAUL. How many personnel do we have in Izmir approximately?

Mr. PRANGER. The number has run in the neighborhood of about, let me see, our total presence is about 2,000 and that includes dependents.

Mr. PAUL. So about half of those are military personnel?

Mr. PRANGER. A little less than half.

Mr. PAUL. Why do you need a facility like that in Izmir, that is, the TUSLOG facility there?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, there are some important NATO headquarters there for one thing. As far as any other activity which TUSLOG engages in in the Izmir area, in Izmir itself, we can supply that for the record, but there are NATO headquarters there.

Mr. PAUL. You need a thousand American personnel to support the NATO headquarters, LANDSOUTHEAST and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force? These are NATO headquarters, of which others are members, including Turkey. So why do we have 1,000 people to support these multilateral headquarters?

Mr. PRANGER. We can again give specific information as to their mission in the Izmir area.

(The information referred to follows:)

SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN IZMIR

The U.S. DOD-sponsored population in Izmir is approximately 2,200. About 1,400 of these are dependents and 550 are military personnel assigned to the two NATO headquarters, Land Forces Southeast and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. The remainder are administrative, communication, and supply support personnel who provide for: schools, commissary, post exchange, hospital, communication, postal, transportation, sea terminal, and warehousing services. Thus, the support personnel in Izmir support U.S. personnel throughout Turkey as well as those assigned to Izmir. They do not support the multinational headquarters as such.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AT INCIRLIK

Mr. PAUL. Now, turning to the tactical aircraft at Incirlik, could you tell us when these aircraft were deployed to Turkey, either at Cigli or Incirlik?

Mr. PRANGER. This is a tactical rotation agreement in February 1957, I believe.

Mr. PAUL. [Deleted.]

Mr. Davies, what do you think would be the effect on our relations with Turkey if our fighter aircraft were removed from Incirlik?

Mr. DAVIES. It would depend, sir, on the circumstances, whether it were done in consultation with the Turks and were acceptable to both parties.

Mr. PAUL. Obviously if they agreed, presumably harmony would follow. But if we wanted very much to take them out would the Turks object, do you think?

Mr. DAVIES. [Deleted.]

Mr. PRANGER. [Deleted.]

INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. NAVAL SHIP VISITS TO TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Davies, you mentioned an incident in February 1969 with respect to U.S. naval ship visits to Turkey. What are the others in the last 2 years, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. The incident referred to, plus the incidents which took place in the last cruiser visit to Izmir, which was December 1969, these were the principal events which led our Ambassador to suggest a changed pattern on visits to Turkish ports.

Mr. PAUL. What was the extent of the incident in December 1969?

Mr. CASH. Mainly harassment of personnel who were stationed in Izmir. That did not take the form of serious attacks on personnel from the fleet units.

BLACK SEA VISITS

Mr. PAUL. American naval vessels, I believe, go into the Black Sea. Could you tell us how often they do?

Mr. PRANGER. Yes, sir. They began their regular visits into the Black Sea in 1959, and have gone there on a semiannual basis, two visits per

year, two destroyers, until June 1969, and they now go into the Black Sea more frequently.

The purpose for this visit, these visits, is to—the main purpose is to—exercise our rights under the Montreux Convention [deleted] we do exercise this right, [deleted] and the Soviets have not registered much more than standard comments in the last year or so.

Mr. PAUL. Why did you increase it [deleted] in June of 1969?

Mr. PRANGER. Well, as an exercise in the Montreux Convention is concerned, we can go in when we give notice. [Deleted.]

#### U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. Turning now to military assistance to Turkey, what is the present level of such military assistance?

Mr. PRANGER. The 1970, the fiscal year 1970, program is at \$100 million, and in 1971 the program is at [deleted] million.

Mr. PAUL. Do we still provide economic assistance to Turkey, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. We do provide economic aid for fiscal 1971, a development loan program of [deleted] million, and a technical assistance program of [deleted] million are planned.

Mr. PAUL. Do we have any prospect for ending economic assistance to Turkey in the foreseeable future and making them an AID graduate, as the term is used?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir. We anticipate there will be a continuing need for economic assistance until around the mid-1970's. At this time we hope that Turkey will have reached the stage of self-sustaining economic growth.

Mr. PAUL. What about the prospects for ending grant military assistance in light of that?

Mr. DAVIES. As Turkey reaches economic viability we would plan to convert to other forms than grant aid.

Mr. PAUL. In the same timeframe, is that what you are saying?

Mr. CASH. We hope beginning in the mid-1970's.

Mr. DAVIES. In the mid-1970 time frame.

#### U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. How large is the military assistance advisory group in Turkey?

Mr. PRANGER. JUSMAT, which is the group, is as follows:

There was in fiscal year 1969, 215 military personnel, 42 civilians, and 137 local hire.

There was, and this total was, and we will give you the total in just a second, for fiscal year 1970 there will be a reduction on that to 193 military, 34 civilian, and 118 local hire, and similarly for fiscal year 1971 there will be a reduction, and the figures will be military 156, civilian 25, and local hire 106.

Mr. PAUL. Where do the reductions in the American military personnel usually come from?

Mr. PRANGER. I do not know where exactly these come from, but I can submit this for the record.

Mr. PAUL. If you could give us a sentence or two indicating it, and the significance of the cut or the effect of the cut.

(The information referred to follows:)

JUSMAT REDUCTIONS

The reductions in the military strength of JUSMAT Turkey were made proportionally in the three service sections and the joint headquarters. The cuts were applied, to a large degree, in the administrative and overhead functional areas, and with only slight reductions in the advisory functions.

EFFECT OF SPANISH BASE NEGOTIATIONS ON TURKEY

Mr. Davies, if I could ask you the similar question for Turkey that I asked with regard to Greece as to the effect of the Spanish base negotiations on our military status in Turkey.

Mr. DAVIES. Well, as in the case of Greece they are conducted in a dissimilar framework under divergent imperatives and for different purposes.

The NATO Treaty establishes a set of obligations. NATO defense plans set the parameters in which we work with our NATO allies to achieve goals designed to make those plans workable, and we have negotiated and are still negotiating with the Turks in order to redefine the local ground rules under which we shall continue to meet our NATO obligations in Turkey.

Spain is outside my area of expertise, but again I think they are to arrive at, the negotiations are to arrive at, a straight quid pro quo arrangement.

Obviously, our relationship in Turkey is considerably more complex and more clearly understood by both sides. Again I suspect that both Spaniards and Turks watch carefully to see that the other is not treated better by the United States.

LABOR DIFFICULTIES ON U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY

Mr. PAUL. Now, could you tell us what the status of our American facilities in Turkey is with respect to the right of the local employees to strike?

Mr. DAVIES. The Turkish workers on U.S. military sites have the same rights as Turkish workers in Turkish enterprises. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. You have recently had some labor difficulties with regard to some of our facilities. Could you tell us what the extent of these labor difficulties has been.

Mr. DAVIES. Frank, can you respond to this?

Mr. CASH. We have an Air Force contractor in Turkey, the Tumpane Co., and they have had two fairly extensive strikes in Turkey which have gone the route of labor negotiations and bargaining, and we have reached settlements. In the last contract which was terminated, the negotiations produced a settlement prior to the strike.

Mr. PAUL. I see.

In this connection, has there been complete accord between the TUSLOG Command and the Embassy with respect to the policy that should be followed in handling this labor difficulty?

Mr. CASH. Yes. I think so in general. There have been differences on tactics from time to time.

Mr. PAUL. Has the Embassy exercised ultimate control?

Mr. CASH. It has.

Mr. PAUL. And effective control in determining its policy?

Mr. CASH. It has.

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us what joint exercises have been conducted with the Turkish ground forces in the last several years?

Mr. PRANGER. I do not have those at my fingertips, but they can be readily supplied.

Mr. PAUL. Would you do that and would you also supply, if you do not have it, the same with respect to Greece, joint exercises with Greek ground forces, identifying in each case any unconventional warfare exercises.

Mr. PRANGER. Yes.

(The information referred to is classified and is in the committee files.)

Mr. PAUL. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND  
COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
GREECE AND TURKEY

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY,  
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 11 a.m., in room S-116, The Capitol Building, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding) and Javits.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pincus of the committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure you will be confirmed for any position that you are asked to take by this administration because of the respect of this committee for your record.

Before we do, however, we would like to ask you some questions about the Greek situation. I ask these questions in two capacities—first as chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs, which embraces Greece, and secondly, as chairman of an ad hoc subcommittee looking into American commitments overseas, which held a hearing day before yesterday on Greece and Turkey.

I just discussed this matter with the chairman who is in the debate upstairs on the floor, and with his approval we would like you to take the oath as we have with other witnesses.

Will you rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear the information you give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you met Mr. Pineus and Mr. Paul.

Mr. McCLELLAND. I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. As a followup to the hearings on Tuesday, Mr. Paul suggested that there might be some more questions that he would like to ask you.

Will you proceed?

Mr. PAUL. Mr. McClelland, when were you last in Greece?

TESTIMONY OF ROSWELL D. McCLELLAND, NOMINEE TO BE  
AMBASSADOR TO NIGER

Mr. McCLELLAND. I left about 10-days ago, on the 1st of June.

Mr. PAUL. What is the status of Greece today with respect to the prospects for liberalization and more democratic ways?

(1869)

1870

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, the prospects are not as good as we would like them to be. But the Greek Government is headed in the right direction.

How rapidly they will progress and how satisfactorily is still not entirely clear.

They have their constitution. [Deleted.]

Prime Minister Papadopoulos has assured the Ambassador on several occasions in the last few months that he has every intention of implementing this constitution, putting the articles into effect by the end of this year.

There is, however, a lot of supporting legislation. Many of the articles state that such and such a situation will prevail in accordance with the laws. But in respect to many articles these laws have not yet been drafted.

Mr. PAUL. What are the prospects for setting a date for an election?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Somewhat remote at the present time.

#### ROLE OF U.S. IN GREECE

Mr. PAUL. What do you see, if I may ask you, as the American role and responsibility in moving the Greek Government toward democratic processes?

Mr. McCLELLAND. [Deleted.]

I think as a matter of their own interest they realize that they have got sooner or later in response to both internal and external pressure to get back to some form of representative government.

Mr. PAUL. But do we look upon it as in the interests of the United States for them to return to democratic processes as well as in their own interests.

Mr. McCLELLAND. I certainly think so, yes.

Mr. PAUL. We were told at the hearing earlier this week which the chairman referred to that the United States is in somewhat of a dilemma because of its desire for a more democratic form of government in Greece but also our need for Greece in NATO. But the committee is not fully apprized yet as to our need for Greece, and that creates one horn of the dilemma.

#### IMPORTANCE OF GREECE TO NATO

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I think we have operated on a premise which I think is correct, that the facilities which Greece accords us and accords to NATO are extremely important ones. Some of these are related to NATO, some are more related to bilateral U.S. interests.

Mr. PAUL. I can readily appreciate that with respect to the facility at Iraklion. Are you speaking of facilities other than at Iraklion as important to us?

Mr. McCLELLAND. There are a good many facilities, some of which are related to NATO and some of which are bilateral, such as Nea Makri.

#### ATTITUDES OF U.S. EMBASSY AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN GREECE

Mr. PAUL. If I can just ask a question or two with respect to the relationship of the Embassy personnel, on the one hand, and U.S. military personnel, on the other hand, with the Greek Government,

it being a military regime. How would you assess the relative effectiveness of the two arms of the American official establishment, the Embassy, on the one hand, and our military personnel who are stationed there and who visit there?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I do not think we should make really a sharp distinction. The MAAG chief operates under the Ambassador's direction, participates in all of our staff meetings, and is bound by the same policy that we are on the Embassy side of the House.

Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you in that regard, if I may, Mr. McClelland, as you probably are aware, there are a number of statements in the press suggesting that our military has tended to encourage the junta in paths that are not completely consistent with that which the State Department might wish. In this connection, for instance, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the January 8, 1970, issue of the Washington Post said, "The open and enthusiastic cheers for the junta from U.S. military officers stationed in and passing through Athens is a scandal to the rest of the diplomatic community."

I would appreciate your comment on that.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I think that considerably is overstated.

The position of our military mission has been a difficult one professionally. Their job was to see to it that the Greek forces remained up to a high level of performance in connection with NATO. It was their program that paid the piper, so to speak since the military assistance was cut back as an indication of our disapproval of the Greek Government's political policy. So that the MAAG's mission was prejudiced. I think they understandably felt very unhappy about this as professional military people.

They were paying a military price for certain political ends. But to go beyond that and to say that for this reason they were disaffected and took matters into their own hands, I think would not be correct.

Mr. PAUL. Have they had, to your knowledge, conversations with various members of the junta that might have been out of line with what you would have liked to have seen said?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Not that we know specifically.

Mr. PAUL. What sort of restrictions has the Embassy attempted to place upon our military personnel to avoid this risk?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I am not sure that it is a risk, or that the Ambassador has placed restrictions on them.

I think that in regard to any policy discussions they may have had with the Greek military the Ambassador has been fully informed.

Mr. PAUL. How long were you the acting head of the mission in Athens? There was quite a time in which we did not have any ambassador.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Almost a year. Ambassador Talbott left on the 20th of January, 1969, and I left on home leave early in December. Mr. Tasca had not yet arrived then.

Mr. PAUL. You said the Ambassador has placed his restrictions; are you suggesting there has been a tightening up of restrictions with the arrival of Ambassador Tasca?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No, I certainly wanted to keep fully informed on what the military were doing as did Ambassador Talbot. No, I do not think it changed.

Mr. PAUL. You are satisfied with the reins that have been placed on our military in Greece, and also those who pass through, as far as

keeping them from making the Greek junta feel less concerned than they should as to our displeasure with the order of things in Greece?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, it is a difficult situation for a military man [deleted].

Mr. PAUL. I can appreciate that, but you also had dealings with the Greek Government and it might be awkward for you, but I am sure you still make your comments consistent with American policy, which is fairly clearly stated.

Mr. McCLELLAND. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you a more general question: How do the colonels look upon our large military presence in Greece, and our continuation of some military assistance to them, as evidence of our support for their regime regardless of statements made by American military men?

Mr. McCLELLAND. They—the colonels—certainly try, in fact go to considerable lengths, to construe it as political support. This is of course hard to knock down.

#### NATURE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Looking at military assistance, we had testimony this week setting forth the level of military assistance that has, in fact, gone on. This so-called selective embargo has limited it to some extent, but really a rather large amount of military assistance has gone on. So, as a political matter has this really been ineffective, the small amount of military assistance that we have suspended, and even that small amount was relieved after the Czechoslovakian invasion, to some extent.

Mr. McCLELLAND. What?

Mr. PAUL. Isn't it true the magnitude of our military assistance is such that essentially the Greeks are getting military assistance from the United States for all practical political purposes?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, they are certainly not getting some of the items they need quite badly on military grounds.

Mr. PAUL. What are you referring to?

Mr. McCLELLAND. In particular tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, strictly military weapons as distinct from smaller arms.

Senator SYMINGTON. If counsel will yield I would ask a couple of questions. What have we given to Greece in the last 12 months, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I cannot give you the exact figures, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you must know roughly what it is.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well—

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we given them planes and tanks?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No; no heavy equipment of that sort.

Senator SYMINGTON. No heavy equipment.

Have they asked for heavy equipment?

Mr. McCLELLAND. They declared to us on numerous occasions that the table of equipment and their [deleted] is very short [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think they need those tanks?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I think they do. There is an interesting little remark that Sulzberger made in a recent "Foreign Affairs" article which has stuck in my mind. He said that whereas an M-48 tank

is of very little added use over an M-47 for internal security purposes it is a lot more useful on a frontier in a defensive situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think the results would be if we cut off all arms to Greece?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, the most serious result would be to undercut the credibility of the NATO deterrent that Greece represents.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think it would have any effect on the position of the Papadopoulos' government with the people of Greece?

Mr. McCLELLAND. As a symbol of political disapproval, I am sure that it would shake things. In what direction they would be shaken is a very tricky point. Would it soften them up or make it more intransigent? That has been our worry.

#### U.S. SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO GREECE

Senator SYMINGTON. Do the Greek people know of the arms shipments we are making to Greece? Is that published?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I guess things are known, equipment comes into the port overtly, goes into units, and a good many people know it is coming in.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does it come out in the press?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I would not say that it is publicized; no.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why not?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I don't really know.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you must have thought about it if they are keeping it secret.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I would not say they are keeping it secret.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why don't they publish it? It is a controlled press, is it not?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Less than it was, but it is still under considerable constraint.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why isn't that information given to the people?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, I do not know as a matter of policy—

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, do they think it would weaken them if they were connected with us? Why wouldn't they think it would strengthen them to be getting these arms from us?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think they feel it would strengthen them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then why don't they tell the people about it? Have we asked them not to report it to the people of Greece?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No, no; not to my knowledge.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just wondered. [Deleted.]

#### ECONOMIC RIVALRY AMONG PROMINENT GREEKS

Let me shift to another line of questioning which rather intrigues me.

There was a gentleman over there, a private citizen, who had considerable position with the Greek Government, and he wanted to meet the Prime Minister with you and me.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was his name again?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Tom Pappas.

1874

Senator SYMINGTON. I read somewhere that he gave a dinner for Government officials and prominent Greeks like Mr. Onassis. What is the relationship, to the best of your knowledge, between Pappas and Mr. Onassis?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think they are rather considerable rivals at the moment. Tom Pappas is in the oil business and Onassis has just finished negotiating a very substantial economic agreement with the Greek Government which is built around a large oil refinery, which is going to undercut Tom Pappas' refinery in northern Greece.

In other words, they propose to put a ceiling on the output of Pappas' refinery in order to accommodate Onassis' refinery, so they are business rivals.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Where does Mr. Niarchos fit into this picture?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, Niarchos is the No. 3 man in the picture, so to speak.

He also negotiated an agreement with the Greek Government. He got the sort of tail end that was left. Just to indicate the order of magnitude, Onassis' agreement, I think, covers investment on the order of \$600 million, while Niarchos came up with about \$200 million. He gets a cut of the state refinery, including the contract to supply crude and increase the output somewhat. There are going to be three refineries, the old Pappas one in Thessaloniki, then the Aspro Pyrgos, which is the state refinery near Athens, of which Niarchos is getting a cut, and finally the new Onassis one at Megara.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which of the three are the closest to this particular regime?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, they both have their contacts, according to all evidence—we do not know definitely.

Senator SYMINGTON. This is an executive session.

Mr. McCLELLAND. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. These three gentlemen are very rich people.

Is there any problem with respect to resentment on the part of the Greek people about exploitation on the part of the United States?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No, I certainly do not detect that they feel exploited in any way by us, economically.

#### ATTITUDE OF GREEK PEOPLE TOWARD U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the reaction of the Greeks to our adventure in South Vietnam?

Mr. McCLELLAND. They are all for us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Indochina?

Mr. McCLELLAND. They are all for us. They feel this is a fight against communism, communist subversion, aggression, similar to the one that they experienced, and they are a hundred percent on our side.

#### GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you say that the Israel Government is also, in effect, fighting against Communist satellites?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I would not go so far as to say they are satellites.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I remember it when I was there, there was considerable resentment of the way the Greeks were handling the

problem, or not handling it, incident to their relationship with Israel because of their sympathy with the United Arab Republic regime or their fear of reprisal.

Mr. McCLELLAND. I remember in your conversation [deleted] you brought up the subject of why the Greeks did not have full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

If the premise is as you say that they support fully our efforts in Indochina to resist against communist satellites in the Far East, why do they feel differently about the efforts of Israel to resist comparable satellites in the Middle East?

Mr. McCLELLAND. [Deleted.]

#### NUMBER OF GREEKS IN UAR

Senator SYMINGTON. How many Greeks are there in the UAR?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I would say something like 30,000 left out of a colony of originally 120,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will Nasser let them go if they want to leave?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Yes, but without their property. There has been a great deal of confiscation of Greek property. They can go with a suitcase and perhaps \$500 when they may have had a factory and a fortune there.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

How many Greeks are there in Israel?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I do not know, sir.

I would think very few.

Senator SYMINGTON. Syria—very few. Are there any Greek colonies in Iraq?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Iraq, Syria, some in Lebanon, I believe. Egypt really has the main Greek group. The Greeks also have quite a substantial interest in Libya. The Greek sponge fishing fleets operate off Libya and they are anxious to keep their relations good with that country.

#### STABILITY OF PRESENT REGIME

Senator SYMINGTON. In early 1967, as I remember it, there was a feeling on the part of the monarchy, or the King himself, that things would go well, but things did not go well when he made his effort to capture power and he is still in Italy.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any chance, in your opinion, of his returning?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Not in the immediate future.

[Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. We have, as you know, a continuing fostering of resistance against the present Greek Government, perhaps led by Andreas Papandreu.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Andreas, the son.

Senator SYMINGTON. Andreas, yes; Andreas Papandreu, right. These names are hard for me to remember.

Mr. McCLELLAND. I can understand that because I have trouble with them, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think is the future? Is Papadopoulos nailng down his authority more and do you think it is going to be a relatively permanent regime or do you think he is just holding his own and his position with the other colonels is being weakened?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think his position is pretty solid.

Senator SYMINGTON. You feel the majority of the Greek people are behind him?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, that is a difficult point. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. If they had a really free election, do you think the majority of the people would support Papadopoulos?

Mr. McCLELLAND. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I thank the witness very much for his very illuminating testimony.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was also my feeling toward this witness. He was most informative when I was in Athens, and I appreciated it.

#### GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

Senator JAVITS. I would like to ask one question before you get through.

Have you said anything about Greek-Turkish relations?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No, sir.

Senator JAVITS. As you know, I am identified with a project with this Greek-Turkish matter. I haven't gone into Greece since the regime took over, but the project has been pushed along in the best way we can.

Would you have any observations about it? Is it worth carrying on? Does it have enough of an impact in the area of Greek-Turkish relations to warrant the time, attention, and some money?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think very definitely it does.

Senator JAVITS. It is not U.S. Government.

Mr. McCLELLAND. No; I know. I saw Sy Rubin quite recently when he was there.

Senator JAVITS. You think it is a good thing?

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think it is. The Greeks and Turks have a long-standing enmity and problem over Cyprus, as you know, and any areas, particularly functional ones, such as you are working on, that they can be brought together on is to the good.

Senator JAVITS. The Evros River and tourism and fisheries are apparently the three major areas that they have been able to do things on, so it is looking pretty good.

Well, thank you very much. It has been a job for me, and I just kind of wanted to sound you out.

Mr. McCLELLAND. I think it is well worth continuing.

Senator JAVITS. The Turks think so, Dimirel is very partial to this, and I have been assured by Pipinelis and Caglayangil, their respective Foreign Ministers, but it is good to get your statement.

Mr. PAUL. [Deleted.]

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#### GREEK USE OF VOA FACILITIES

Mr. PAUL. What arrangements did the Greeks have as far as their rights to use the Voice of America facilities we have in Greece?

Do we have any understanding with them that gives them time to any...

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Mr. McCLELLAND. Yes. The VOA Thessaloniki transmitter, the old one, the medium wave unit, I would say, gives probably over 80 percent of its time to the Greek broadcasting service. They use it particularly for broadcasts in Greek into Eastern Europe, because you can get medium wave into Rumania, Bulgaria, and the neighborhood countries.

Mr. PAUL. To what extent do we have coordination as to what they broadcast?

Mr. McCLELLAND. None.

We have no control over their programs, nor do they over ours.

Mr. PAUL. At the time of the coup, did the King seek to use one of these facilities to broadcast?

Mr. McCLELLAND. No.

Mr. PAUL. Was there any incident in which the King sought to use American facilities in connection with his coup?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Not that I know of, he didn't.

#### U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

Mr. PAUL. Just one or two other questions, if you will, Mr. McClelland.

It has been reported in the press that Ambassador Tasca has recommended full resumption of heavy arms military assistance to Greece.

Do you believe we should resume full military assistance to Greece?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Well, my personal opinion on a highly contentious issue of that kind is only one man's opinion.

I think the military assistance and its resumption is a part of a much bigger complex. It is only one element of the situation.

If you look at it on purely strategic military grounds, the answer would obviously be "Yes."

If you look at it on political grounds, the impact in NATO, for example, the answer would probably not be so clear a "Yes."

If our restoring military assistance, for instance, were to precipitate a major division inside NATO, that would certainly have to be taken into account.

Mr. PAUL. Do the Greeks follow our negotiations with Spain?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Not to the best of my knowledge; no.

Mr. PAUL. Finally, did the facility at Iraklion or any other American facility receive any significant equipment or personnel as a result of the phaseout at Wheelus?

Mr. McCLELLAND. Not that I know of.

Mr. PAUL. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are grateful to you——

Mr. McCLELLAND. I am happy to help you.

Senator SYMINGTON (continuing). And wish you the best of luck in your new post.

Mr. McCLELLAND. Thank you, Senator.

I hope you come and visit us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. It would be a pleasure to see you. (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock, the subcommittee adjourned.)

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